CHINESE VIEW OF BURMA FROM THAILAND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 004848

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPT FOR EAP/MLS, EAP

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/09/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV TH BM CH
SUBJECT: CHINESE VIEW OF BURMA FROM THAILAND

REF: A. BANGKOK 04749

B. BANGKOK 4803

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Classified By: Political Officer Mark B. Lambert for reasons 1.4 b and
d


1. (C) Summary: On August 7, the Political Officer from the
Embassy of the People's Republic of China who covers Burma
issues offered open and frank commentary on a wide variety of
topics including PM Thaksin's recent trip to Burma, PRC
relations with Burma, the move of the capital to Naypyitaw,
Aung San Suu Kyi and the UNSYG candidacy of DPM Surakiart
Sathirathai. End Summary.

Thaksin's Trip to Burma
--------------


2. (C) PRC Embassy Political Officer Mr. Wang Shuai said
that the Chinese Embassy had received very little information
on Thaksin's visit to Burma the previous week. He said that
they requested a briefing from MFA, but had only met with the
Deputy Director General of the East Asia Affairs Department
who, according to Wang, had absolutely no information on the
trip short of what was already being reported in the media.
Wang said that he was scheduled to accompany his Polcouns to
a meeting on August 8 with the Director General of the East
Asia Department and they hoped to get a more informative
readout.


3. (C) Wang was aware, in broad terms, of the August 4
briefing the Ambassador received from Permanent Secretary
Krit Garnjana-Goonchorn (see Reftel A). Wang found the
rationale offered by Krit to be particularly dubious (i.e.
Thaksin concern that the message of mounting frustration in
ASEAN and the rest of the international community was not
being conveyed to Than Shwe). "Didn't UN U/S Gambari meet
directly with Than Shwe in May? Don't you think he was able
to deliver that message on behalf of the international
community?," Wang asked. He then pointed out that the
Philippine Foreign Minister plans to travel to Burma in a
matter of days and, as the current chair of ASEAN, would have
been a much more appropriate party to convey concerns on
behalf of ASEAN. Wang also noted the absence of any
information on how Than Shwe responded to Thaksin's message.
Poloff agreed and suggested that these would be good
questions to ask during his upcoming meeting with MFA.

"China Owes Burma"
--------------


4. (C) Wang said that China has attempted to persuade the
regime in Burma to be more open. He noted that when PM Soe
Win visited China earlier this year he was taken to Shaanxi
Province and Shenzhen to demonstrate the potential
development that could come with opening up to the
international community. However, Wang went on to note that
the visit of Soe Win was largely irrelevant because "the real
power in Burma is held by only two individuals" (i.e. Than
Shwe and Maung Aye). Wang suggested that China had extended
an invitation to the generals to make a similar visit to
China, but neither accepted.


5. (C) Wang acknowledged some concern with the increasing
isolation of the regime, but did not suggest the PRC could do
much to steer the regime away from its current course. Wang
said that the international community over-estimates China's
influence with the SPDC. He then paused and said, "You must
understand, Burma is not like the DPRK. China feels that the
DPRK owes China. We helped them during the Korean War. But
China feels that it owes Burma. During the period that China
was closed to the world Burma helped us. Burma helped
provide access for China to the rest of the world."


6. (C) Wang suggested that Vietnam might serve as a good

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example to the Burmese regime of how a country can develop by
opening its economy to the outside world. He agreed that
Indonesia also offered a positive example of a government
previously dominated by the military that was able to
transition to a democratic system without the military having
to relinquish all of its power and influence.


7. (C) Wang went on to say that China is not overly concerned
with the political situation in Burma, or with the fact that
power is concentrated in the hands of a few elderly generals.
He described the system whereby the regime has developed a
small cadre with a vested interest in holding on to power.
As the current rulers age and eventually die, younger
officers are moving up the ranks to fill the void. Wang said
that China is content to work with this system as opposed to
having to adapt to a new one. Wang declined to speculate
about who might be "moving up the ranks" in the Burmese junta.

ASSK
--------------


8. (C) Wang brought up the subject of Aung San Suu Kyi. He
asked Poloff's opinion as to whether ASSK is a pragmatic
person who could work with the SPDC to help solve some of
Burma's problems. Wang said that he believes the regime is
convinced that ASSK is overly subject to outside influences
and that she will only be satisfied if the SPDC is completely
removed from power. (Note: Leon de Riedmatten of the Henri
Dunant Center for Humanitarian Dialogue, met with Poloff on
July 31. In that meeting, de Riedmatten emphasized that in
his recent conversations with Chinese interlocutors, the
Chinese had shown "much curiosity" about ASSK. He said they
were most interested in de Riedmatten's assessment of ASSK's
willingness to work together with the SPDC to move Burma
forward. End note.)

Naypyitaw - Controlling Civil Servants
--------------


9. (C) On the subject of the new Burmese capital of
Naypyitaw, Wang volunteered his opinion that one of the main
reasons the regime moved the capital was in order to "control
civil servants." He said that the generals wanted to
separate civil servants from Rangoon and its educated
population, and put them in a place where information (and
their activities) can be more easily monitored and controlled.

The Race for UNSYG
--------------


10. (C) Wang reaffirmed the PRC's position that the next
UNSYG should be from Asia, but he stopped well short of
indicating that China was leaning toward the Thai candidate,
Surakiart Sathirathai (see Reftel B). Wang referred to the
Sri Lankan candidate as "too old", said that the Indian
candidacy will likely be made problematic by the expected
entry of a Pakistani candidate, and shrugged his shoulders
when Poloff asked about the South Korean candidate. Wang
said that he suspects candidates finishing toward the bottom
in the next two rounds of straw polling will withdraw from
the race. Poloff asked if that assessment applied to
Surakiart and Wang replied, "No, I think he will hold out
until the bitter end."

Bio Note
--------------


11. (C) Wang spoke openly on a range of topics that are of
mutual interest to the US and China. Thailand is his first
overseas assignment after serving in MFA's North American
Affairs Division in Beijing. Wang is open and progressive
and is conversant in Chinese policy with the U.S., Europe,
Southeast Asia, and the Middle East. He is a student of
history -- particularly Ming and Qing Dynasty diplomatic

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history.


12. (C) Wang will return to the North American Affairs
Division in Beijing in December 2006. After another tour
there, he hopes to be posted to the U.S. Wang is part of a
tandem couple. His wife, Zhang Ying, also works in the
Political Section of the PRC Embassy in Bangkok. Her current
portfolio includes ASEAN, EAS and cultural exchange
activities. Based on previous contact, Zhang is relatively
less candid, but equally talented.
ARVIZU