OFFENSIVE IN KAREN STATE? A CROSS-BORDER AID

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003799

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016
TAGS: PHUM PREL PREF TH BM
SUBJECT: OFFENSIVE IN KAREN STATE? A CROSS-BORDER AID
WORKER OFFERS VIEWS

REF: A. RANGOON 00848


B. CHIANG MAI 00066 AND PREVIOUS

C. BANGKOK 03342 AND PREVIOUS

BANGKOK 00003799 001.2 OF 002


Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton for 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Poloffs and Defense Attache met recently with
a representative from an organization that provides
cross-border assistance to conflict-affected populations in
northern Karen State, Burma. He stated that though the
number of casualties remains low, the ongoing military action
is the most significant since the 1997 offensive. He said
that a growing number of villages are being affected by this
operation as the Burmese military expands its network of
roads and base camps. Still, he noted, the affected
population continues to cope with only limited assistance
from the outside and relatively few have crossed the border
into Thailand seeking refuge. He offered several opinions as
to why the Burmese military is conducting this operation now.


2. (C) The source has conducted cross-border relief
activities in Karen State for close to 10 years. End Summary.

Burmese Military Actions in Northern Karen State
-------------- ---


3. (C) The source stated that the current Burmese military
action in Karen state is the most significant since the 1997
offensive. He said that the action is continuing into the
rainy season and shows no sign of ending soon. He noted,
however, that the military action does not appear to be
designed to kill large numbers of Karen people. Rather, the
action appears aimed at controlling terrain and wearing down
the Karen resistance by forcing populations to flee and then
destroying abandoned villages and any assets left behind.
(Comment: This would indicate that there is no offensive
designed to wipe out the Karen people as some exile groups
have claimed. End Comment.)


4. (C) The source said that casualties are relatively low
because of the method employed by the Burmese military to
clear villages. He said that an attack typically commences
with several hours of light shelling by mortars from a
distance. This gives villagers time to abandon their homes.
The military then enters the villages and destroys homes and
assets left behind (pots, pans, utensils, tools, storage
containers, etc.). The source's opinion was that the Burmese
soldiers do not necessarily want to kill the villagers.
However, if stragglers are still in the villages when the
military enters, they will be attacked. (The source stated
that the Burmese military will often leave booby-traps behind
in villages to discourage villagers from returning. He gave
as an example a case in which the military posted signs in a
village it had briefly occupied. They then plant small
landmines around the signs such that anyone approaching the
sign to read it would step on the mine.) Captured villagers
are routinely forced to serve as porters for the military.


5. (C) The source said that there are two full divisions (10
battalions each) involved in the ongoing action. He said
that there are also four Military Operation Commands MOC's
involved (about 7 battalions each). He said that to his
knowledge there is no air support for the ongoing action. He
said that even Burmese officers injured in fighting have been
unable to get air medivac. Nevertheless, source noted that
as the military advances they are digging into positions and
expanding their control of terrain. He said that based on
recent interviews with escaped porters and radio intercepts
shared by the Karen National Union (KNU),his assessment is
that the current military action is designed to continue
through December 2006.

Conditions of IDPs
--------------


6. (C) The source stated that in many areas of northern Karen
state life continues on normally and there have been no
attacks or displacements for years. However, he said that as
the Burmese military continues to expand its road and base
camp network it is able to project forces into these areas
and it is increasingly difficult for villagers to move
freely.

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7. (C) He stated that since the beginning of the latest
military action (December 2005/January 2006) the number of
new internally displaced persons (IDPs) is fluctuating
between 10,000 and 20,000 depending on the intensity and
location of the attacks. In addition, over 2,000 have
crossed the border into Thailand seeking refuge. The source
said that he believes the current number of IDPs to be around
18,000. He pointed out that this number is constantly in
flux. He said that when the Burmese military attacks a
village, people in surrounding villages (approximately a 10KM
radius) hear the attack and flee their homes as well. The
Burmese military then proceeds in one direction, attacking
the next village in its path. After a few weeks, villagers
from surrounding villages that were not attacked tend to
return home.


8. (C) The source stated that although fleeing villagers are
facing extreme hardships, no one is starving. Villagers
routinely hide portions of their harvests outside of their
villages as a precaution. According to the source, villagers
also contribute up to one-third of their individual harvests
for community needs. He also noted the availability of
limited amounts of aid from organizations conducting
cross-border operations from Thailand offering basic health
care, small amounts of food assistance and some education
programs. He said that there is division within the RTG as
to the appropriateness of allowing such cross-border
assistance operations to continue. However, at present he is
confident that cross-border operations will be allowed to
continue.

Why now?
--------------


9. (C) The source offered several opinions as to why the
Burmese military has chosen this time to mount the current
action. He said that it may be a combination of factors
including:

-- efforts to create a security perimeter around the new
administrative capital;

-- an effort to establish control over the land surrounding
the proposed dams along the Salween river, and access routes
to these sites; and

-- possible conclusion by hard-line elements in the regime
that they must defeat the core of the KNU in its heartland.
The source referred to the KNU in/around Mae Sot as
splintered, corrupt and, as such, more easily manipulated.
However, according to the source, the KNU leaders in the
areas currently under attack are more resolute in their
determination to resist the Burmese military. Hard-liners in
the regime may have concluded that the only way to defeat
these leaders is militarily.

Comment
--------------


10. (C) Though we do not have evidence to conclude that the
Burmese military push into northern Karen State constitutes a
"major offensive," the information offered by this source
appears to be in line with recent reporting from Embassy
Rangoon (see Reftel A). Among the many things that remain
unclear is what specific objectives the Burmese military
would be attempting to achieve by continuing offensive
operations well into the rainy season. We believe that all
of the factors outline by the source in paragraph 9 represent
valid possible objectives. Regardless of the motives, the
resulting internal displacement and increased refugee flows
into Thailand are further evidence of the threat to regional
stability that the Burmese regime represents. Post is
increasingly concerned about the potential for large scale
human rights abuses and further displacement that may result
as plans to dam the Salween river progress (See Reftels B and
C). Next week, Poloffs from Bangkok, Rangoon and Chiang Mai
will undertake a joint fact-finding trip to the Thai-Burma
border to talk with recently arrived refugees from northern
Karen State about the conditions that caused them to flee.
ARVIZU