OFFENSIVE IN KAREN STATE? A CROSS-BORDER AID

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003799 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/29/2016 TAGS: PHUM PREL PREF TH BM SUBJECT: OFFENSIVE IN KAREN STATE? A CROSS-BORDER AID WORKER OFFERS VIEWS REF: A. RANGOON 00848 ¶B. CHIANG MAI 00066 AND PREVIOUS ¶C. BANGKOK 03342 AND PREVIOUS BANGKOK 00003799 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Political Counselor Susan M. Sutton for 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (C) Summary: Poloffs and Defense Attache met recently with a representative from an organization that provides cross-border assistance to conflict-affected populations in northern Karen State, Burma. He stated that though the number of casualties remains low, the ongoing military action is the most significant since the 1997 offensive. He said that a growing number of villages are being affected by this operation as the Burmese military expands its network of roads and base camps. Still, he noted, the affected population continues to cope with only limited assistance from the outside and relatively few have crossed the border into Thailand seeking refuge. He offered several opinions as to why the Burmese military is conducting this operation now. ¶2. (C) The source has conducted cross-border relief activities in Karen State for close to 10 years. End Summary. Burmese Military Actions in Northern Karen State -------------- --- ¶3. (C) The source stated that the current Burmese military action in Karen state is the most significant since the 1997 offensive. He said that the action is continuing into the rainy season and shows no sign of ending soon. He noted, however, that the military action does not appear to be designed to kill large numbers of Karen people. Rather, the action appears aimed at controlling terrain and wearing down the Karen resistance by forcing populations to flee and then destroying abandoned villages and any assets left behind. (Comment: This would indicate that there is no offensive designed to wipe out the Karen people as some exile groups have claimed. End Comment.) ¶4. (C) The source said that casualties are relatively low because of the method employed by the Burmese military to clear villages. He said that an attack typically commences with several hours of light shelling by mortars from a distance. This gives villagers time to abandon their homes. The military then enters the villages and destroys homes and assets left behind (pots, pans, utensils, tools, storage containers, etc.). The source's opinion was that the Burmese soldiers do not necessarily want to kill the villagers. However, if stragglers are still in the villages when the military enters, they will be attacked. (The source stated that the Burmese military will often leave booby-traps behind in villages to discourage villagers from returning. He gave as an example a case in which the military posted signs in a village it had briefly occupied. They then plant small landmines around the signs such that anyone approaching the sign to read it would step on the mine.) Captured villagers are routinely forced to serve as porters for the military. ¶5. (C) The source said that there are two full divisions (10 battalions each) involved in the ongoing action. He said that there are also four Military Operation Commands MOC's involved (about 7 battalions each). He said that to his knowledge there is no air support for the ongoing action. He said that even Burmese officers injured in fighting have been unable to get air medivac. Nevertheless, source noted that as the military advances they are digging into positions and expanding their control of terrain. He said that based on recent interviews with escaped porters and radio intercepts shared by the Karen National Union (KNU),his assessment is that the current military action is designed to continue through December 2006. Conditions of IDPs -------------- ¶6. (C) The source stated that in many areas of northern Karen state life continues on normally and there have been no attacks or displacements for years. However, he said that as the Burmese military continues to expand its road and base camp network it is able to project forces into these areas and it is increasingly difficult for villagers to move freely. BANGKOK 00003799 002 OF 002 ¶7. (C) He stated that since the beginning of the latest military action (December 2005/January 2006) the number of new internally displaced persons (IDPs) is fluctuating between 10,000 and 20,000 depending on the intensity and location of the attacks. In addition, over 2,000 have crossed the border into Thailand seeking refuge. The source said that he believes the current number of IDPs to be around 18,000. He pointed out that this number is constantly in flux. He said that when the Burmese military attacks a village, people in surrounding villages (approximately a 10KM radius) hear the attack and flee their homes as well. The Burmese military then proceeds in one direction, attacking the next village in its path. After a few weeks, villagers from surrounding villages that were not attacked tend to return home. ¶8. (C) The source stated that although fleeing villagers are facing extreme hardships, no one is starving. Villagers routinely hide portions of their harvests outside of their villages as a precaution. According to the source, villagers also contribute up to one-third of their individual harvests for community needs. He also noted the availability of limited amounts of aid from organizations conducting cross-border operations from Thailand offering basic health care, small amounts of food assistance and some education programs. He said that there is division within the RTG as to the appropriateness of allowing such cross-border assistance operations to continue. However, at present he is confident that cross-border operations will be allowed to continue. Why now? -------------- ¶9. (C) The source offered several opinions as to why the Burmese military has chosen this time to mount the current action. He said that it may be a combination of factors including: -- efforts to create a security perimeter around the new administrative capital; -- an effort to establish control over the land surrounding the proposed dams along the Salween river, and access routes to these sites; and -- possible conclusion by hard-line elements in the regime that they must defeat the core of the KNU in its heartland. The source referred to the KNU in/around Mae Sot as splintered, corrupt and, as such, more easily manipulated. However, according to the source, the KNU leaders in the areas currently under attack are more resolute in their determination to resist the Burmese military. Hard-liners in the regime may have concluded that the only way to defeat these leaders is militarily. Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) Though we do not have evidence to conclude that the Burmese military push into northern Karen State constitutes a "major offensive," the information offered by this source appears to be in line with recent reporting from Embassy Rangoon (see Reftel A). Among the many things that remain unclear is what specific objectives the Burmese military would be attempting to achieve by continuing offensive operations well into the rainy season. We believe that all of the factors outline by the source in paragraph 9 represent valid possible objectives. Regardless of the motives, the resulting internal displacement and increased refugee flows into Thailand are further evidence of the threat to regional stability that the Burmese regime represents. Post is increasingly concerned about the potential for large scale human rights abuses and further displacement that may result as plans to dam the Salween river progress (See Reftels B and C). Next week, Poloffs from Bangkok, Rangoon and Chiang Mai will undertake a joint fact-finding trip to the Thai-Burma border to talk with recently arrived refugees from northern Karen State about the conditions that caused them to flee. ARVIZU