Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BANGKOK355
2006-01-19 10:45:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Bangkok
Cable title:  

SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO

Tags:  PGOV PHUM PREL PTER TH PSI BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS 
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000355 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

JAKARTA FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER TH PSI BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS
SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO
THAILAND

Classified By: CHARGE ALEX ARVIZU. REASON: 1.4 (D)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 000355 SIPDIS SIPDIS JAKARTA FOR AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM PREL PTER TH PSI BURMA HUMAN RIGHTS SUBJECT: SCENESETTER: AMBASSADOR CRUMPTON'S VISIT TO THAILAND Classified By: CHARGE ALEX ARVIZU. REASON: 1.4 (D) ¶1. (C) Bilateral relations with Thailand have been generally excellent. Thailand is a security treaty ally and has been firmly supportive of the Global War on Terror. American businesses have over $20 billion in direct investment in Thailand, the second largest investor after Japan. Thailand and the U.S. have long enjoyed a close security relationship. Thailand is a Major Non-Nato Ally (MNNA) of the United States. For years, Thailand has hosted the Cobra Gold annual exercise, our largest multilateral exercise in Asia. Over time, that exercise has transformed from a bilateral event designed to thwart a Vietnamese invasion of Thailand to a multilateral exercise to train for peace keeping and disaster relief preparations. Recent exercises have allowed American and Thai troops to train with militaries from Singapore, Japan, the Philippines and others. We are now planning for Cobra Gold 2006 which will include possible participation by Indonesia in addition to Singapore and Japan. We are convinced that we and the Thai can work with other militaries to support key U.S. objectives in Asia such as improving responses to terrorism, enhancing peace keeping, promoting interoperability with U.S. forces, and improving maritime security -- while continuing to provide us a vital platform in the region from which to respond to future contingencies. In 2004-5, thanks to years of working with the Thai military, the United States was able to quickly deploy over one thousand American soldiers, marines, sailors and airmen to Utapao Naval Air Base and set up a regional relief operation. Thai cooperation in the Global War on Terrorism is excellent. The capture of the JI terrorist Hambali in 2003 highlighted the willingness of Thailand to work against international terrorism THE SOUTH AND TERRORISM ¶2. (C) The most pressing security concern for the Thai remains the unrest in Thailand's deep south provinces bordering Malaysia. The violence continues to occur almost daily with over one thousand persons reported killed over the past two years either by militants or government actions. The ongoing violence has historic roots going back a century and is based on local grievances from poor treatment by the government
and a desire to separate the region from the Thai state. There still is not any direct evidence of operational links between Thai separatists and outside terrorist. Incidents such as Tak Bai (in which some 80 Muslim men died in security forces' custody following an October, 2004 demonstration),Thaksin's harsh rhetoric and often ham-fisted police tactics, as well as a serious lack of coordination and information sharing between security agencies have probably exacerbated the violence and public alienation in the region. ¶3. (C) The National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), appointed by Thaksin last year and led by former PM Anand Panyarachun, one of the most respected leaders in Thailand, is expected to announce a set of policy recommendations policy recommendations in March. Critics of Thaksin maintain that he is likely to pay lip service to the NRC's recommendations while still tending to some of his more authoritarian tendencies in his approach to the south. Nonetheless, Thaksin has committed his government to implementing education and economic reforms to benefit southerners -- a move we encourage -- and we urge him to listen seriously to the suggestions of the NRC. The Thai government does not seek a U.S. presence in the south and is sensitive over rumors of U.S. involvement in the violence. Nonetheless, we have worked closely to find areas where we can help. We have stepped up our human rights training of Thai troops rotating into the south to improve their ability to control crowds and conduct other operations in a way that complies with international norms. We are also working with the Thai to improve their intelligence sharing and gathering capabilities. PROLIFERATION SECURITY INITIATIVE ¶4. (C) Despite our efforts since 2003, the RTG has not yet formally endorsed the PSI Statement of Principles. Prime Minister Thaksin has told senior USG officials that another "Muslim" ASEAN nation (read Malaysia or Indonesia) should endorse PSI first or concurrently with Thailand, so as to avoid the appearance that Thailand is getting too far in front of its neighbors and because of concern over how endorsement might be perceived vis-a-vis the situation in the South. OUTSTANDING ISSUES ¶5. (C) For most of the Thaksin administration, we have been at odds over our respective approaches to Burma -- essentially agreeing to disagree. The RTG under Thaksin has claimed that though it agrees that the regime must show progress in bringing out national reconciliation, Bangkok must stay engaged with the SPDC in order to keep a dialogue open on issues that directly affect Thailand such as illegal immigration from Burma and narcotics smuggling. We have maintained that Thailand has appeared to go beyond this to the appoint of being perceived as an apologist for the regime. Lately, at our urging, the Thai have begun to move closer to regional and international opinion, by publicly criticizing the SPDC on its continued detention of Aung San Suu Kyi and resistance to national reconciliation. ¶6. (C) We have also criticized the RTG for some of its human rights practices. A bloody crackdown on alleged drug vendors during a "war on drugs campaign" in 2003 and actions by security forces in the south, notably the aforementioned incident at Tak Bai, have been publicly raised by us in our annual human rights reports and in public fora, as well as in our private conversations with Thai officials. ¶7. (C) Your meetings with Thai officials, as well as your dinner with academic and press observers of the south, will give you an opportunity to thank the Thai for their cooperation with us in the Global War On Terrorism, most notably their deployments of troops to Afghanistan and Iraq, their capture of Hambali in Ayudhaya in 2003 and their role in promoting regional cooperation in fighting international terrorism. It will also be a chance for you to urge the Thai to sign on to the PSI Statement Of Principles and to underscore Thailand's commitment to fully join the international community to combat the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their precursors. ARVIZU

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