SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: SENIOR THAI OFFICIALS BRIEF EAP

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 003179

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, EAP/MLS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/22/2016
TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH
SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: SENIOR THAI OFFICIALS BRIEF EAP
DAS JOHN

REF: A. BANGKOK 2335 (THAIS BEGIN TALKS WITH PULO)

B. BANGKOK 7527 (RTG REACHES OUT TO SEPARATISTS)

Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: In separate meetings on May 21 and 22,
Deputy Prime Minister Chidchai Vansatidya and NSC SecGen
Winai, respectively, told EAP DAS Eric John and the
Ambassador that the RTG was developing more effective
information on southern Thai insurgents and working to
improve RTG policy and operations in the South. Both
admitted that government missteps and information stovepiping
have hurt efforts to catch suspects and build local support
for the state. Chidchai emphasized that the RTG is now
focusing on winning the hearts and minds of the southern
population and will set up a new, central coordinating body
for civil affairs programs. Winai confirmed that the RTG
was involved in "unofficial" negotiations with separatist
elements. A recent hostage incident -- where two government
teachers were severely beaten by a mob of Malay-Muslim
villagers -- was a serious incident. Both Chidchai and Winai
expressed appreciation for quiet U.S. cooperation on the
South but emphasized that we must keep our distance to keep
the problem from becoming "internationalized." END SUMMARY


2. (SBU) Over dinner on May 21, Deputy Prime Minister
Police General Chidchai Vansatidya briefed EAP DAS Eric John
and the Ambassador on his most recent trip to the South. In
a separate May 22 meeting, DAS John and the Ambassador met
with National Security Council (NSC) Secretary General Winai
Phattiyakul to discuss RTG southern policy and strategy.

POINT MEN ON THE SOUTH OPTIMISTIC


3. (C) Both DPM Chidchai and Gen. Winai -- who serve as the
point men on southern policy within the RTG -- offered upbeat
assessments and indicated that the RTG was making progress in
the South. Chidchai has made 36 trips to the troubled region
since taking the lead on South policy in June 2005.
According to Chidchai, the situation was improving, and he
felt safe traveling to all areas in the three restive
provinces (Note: Chidchai travels under heavy guard and
rarely, if ever, stays overnight. End Note).


4. (C) Both Chidchai and Winai said that police had
identified nearly 500 suspected militants and arrested around
200 so far. Based on these arrests, the RTG is finally
developing a clear picture of the insurgency. Thai
intelligence sources have identified groups operating at the
village level and were developing a better understanding of
how militants were recruiting and indoctrinating. (Note:
Winai also said local religious teachers (Ustaz) were the
primary recruiters. End Note) The Emergency Decree for the
three far southern provinces, enacted in July 2005, had been
invaluable in generating leads and information about the
southern insurgents, he added. Winai was optimistic, but
emphasized that addressing the violence would be a long-term
problem.

OFFICIALS ACKNOWLEDGE GOVERNMENT MISTAKES


5. (C) Chidchai and Winai were both candid about the series
of policy and operational mistakes made by the RTG. Winai
said decades old grievances in the South had been re-awakened
by serious policy mistakes made in recent years. Malay
Muslims in the South had an inferiority complex and were
hyper-sensitive to slights. Winai likened government policy
mistakes to "adding fertilizer to already fertile ground."
However, the government had "learned a lot in the last two
years," and currently felt that they were on the right track.
Chidchai boasted that while he "understood the problem from
the start," the two years prior to his stewardship had been
marked by weak management of the issue. The people of the
South blame the government for everything. Chidchai
explained that in order to be successful the RTG must educate
police about the local culture and build up popular support
for the government through education, development and social
projects. To meet this need, Chidchai is moving to set up a
coordinating center for civil affairs, under the Southern
Border Provinces Peace Building Command.


6. (C) DAS John asked Winai how the RTG was working to
address stovepiping among security services -- widely blamed
for contribution to the situation. Winai said the government
was well aware of the problem and was trying to give local
officials greater autonomy to address the violence. The Thai
4th Army, based in Yala province, had been given full
authority to lead on security issues and was cooperating with
the Police forward command.

NEGOTIATIONS?...YES


7. (C) The Ambassador asked Gen. Winai if negotiations with
insurgent groups were part of the government's strategy
(reftels). Winai confirmed that members of the government
were conducting an "unofficial" dialogue with groups that
they believed to be credible interlocutors.

MOST RECENT HOSTAGE INCIDENT OF SERIOUS CONCERN


8. (C) The May 19 hostage taking of two government teachers
by a mob of villagers in Narathiwat was of serious concern
for RTG officials. A mob of villagers had beaten the
teachers, both female Buddhists, after police arrested a
local man wanted in connection with the September 2005 murder
of two Marines in the province. One teacher remains in a
coma. The incident produced outraged reactions in the
national media. Winai had been in close consultation with PM
Thaksin and acting DPM Chidchai following the incident. As a
result of the attack the government decided to temporarily
close 100 schools in Narathiwat until security could be
improved and has vowed to immediately mount rescue operations
in future hostage instances.

WHAT SHOULD THE U.S. DO?...STAY OUT OF IT


9. (C) In response to DAS John's query about what more the
U.S. could do to help, Chidchai expressed gratitude for
current training and assistance, but cautioned that any new
programs must not be based in the South, or publicly labeled
as focused on that region. Winai echoed these remarks,
indicating that our current assistant was adequate. He
appreciated our concern over the situation, and noted our
already close security relationship, especially between
intelligence agencies, was producing results. Winai
confirmed that there remained no direct evidence of links to
international terrorists. He opined that the South had not
become "internationalized" because the U.S. was not directly
associated with the situation and indicated that the best way
to keep it that way was to minimize the U.S. presence or
perception of U.S involvement.


10. (U) DAS John has not had the opportunity to clear this
message.
BOYCE