THAKSIN SEES SELF AS THAILAND'S AUNG SAN SUU KYY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002990 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/16/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH SUBJECT: THAKSIN SEES SELF AS THAILAND'S AUNG SAN SUU KYY REF: A. BANGKOK 2425 THE KING SAYS: IT'S A MESS ¶B. BANGKOK 2082 THAKSIN TELLS ALL (ALMOST) ¶C. 05 BANGKOK 07197 THE KING AND HIM: THE OPPOSITION PLAYS THEIR KING AGAINST THE PRIME MINISTER Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Thaksin sees himself as the victim of a "palace coup" and unironically compares himself to Aung San Suu Kyy - the winner of democratic elections blocked from his rightful office. In a discussion with a visiting Asia expert, Thaksin said that he could not return as Prime Minister "as long as this King is alive" but he confidently predicted that his Thai Rak Thai party would continue to dominate Thai politics. Thaksin accepted no responsibility for the current political crisis, blaming everything on the jealousy of a "provincial" royal family who feared that Thaksin would supplant them in the hearts of the peasantry, and on the machinations of "courtiers" who manipulated the King. While Thaksin's self-serving analysis is suspect on several counts, we believe that there is an underlying truth to it. The Palace has aligned itself against Thaksin, and the momentum now is all on the side of those forces trying to push Thaksin as far out of politics as possible, and keep him out for as long as possible. Thaksin is on the defensive, fighting for his political life. End summary. ¶2. (C) In a lengthy discussion with former NSC official Karen Brooks, Thaksin portrayed himself the victim of a "palace coup." He dropped several bombshells which, if true, recast the history of the past six weeks. Thaksin's story now is that the King explicitly told him to step aside during the fateful audience on April 4. He told Brooks that he had planned to step aside after the election, but he wanted to stay on through the King's 60th anniversary celebrations, and then resign. At the audience with the King, however, his hand was forced. After the audience, he gave his emotional speech announcing that he would not be PM in the next Parliament. ¶3. (C) Thaksin claims that even this was not enough for the Palace. A few hours after the speech, he said, the King's principal private secretary, Asa Sarasin, called him and said that he needed to "go completely." Thaksin agreed to do so in three stages: he would leave as PM, then leave as MP, and 
finally leave as party leader. This was the reason he suddenly took "vacation" immediately after his announcement that he would step down. NO RETURN WHILE THIS KING LIVES -------------- ¶4. (C) Thaksin spun an elaborate tale of palace intrigue, accusing privy councilors Prem and Surayud of conspiring against him, including blaming Surayud for bringing Gen. Chamlong out of retirement to head the opposition "People's Alliance for Democracy." He claimed that courtiers in the palace are manipulating the infirm and isolated King, Thaksin repeated his theory that the King sees Thaksin as rival for the loyalty of the people in the countryside. Thaksin denied trying to rival the King, saying that he was a just a "simple peasant" who wanted to be among the people and eat in noodle shops. He described the King, with barely-concealed disdain, as "provincial," unaware of the changes that had taken place in the world ("never been on a Boeing 747"),and accused him of "thinking he owns the country." Thaksin advisor Pansak Vinyaratn said that recent events were a return to "absolute monarchy." Thaksin told Brooks that he "cannot come back as prime minister as long as this King is alive." He unironically compared himself to Aung San Suu Kyy -- the winner of a democratic election who is not allowed to take office. He dismissed the courts' annulment of the elections as a sham. He claimed that, if it were not for his financial power and grassroots support, he'd be chased into exile. ¶5. (C) Although Thaksin had pledged to withdraw from politics in three stages, he hoped to draw out the stages. He mentioned his strong relationship with the Crown Prince (implying that, once the present King was dead, he would have an ally on the throne.) He planned to lead TRT into the next elections -- whenever they are -- and run as an MP. He expressed complete confidence that TRT would emerge with a commanding majority again. Thaksin would only announce that he would not serve as Prime Minister after the election, so as not to affect the enthusiasm of TRT's base or hamper their ability to set out the vote. He suggested several TRT members as PM prospects: DPM Chidchai, Prommin Lertsuridej (SecGen to the PM),and government spokesman Surapong Suebwonglee. At present, he was leaning toward TRT Deputy leader Pongthip Thepkanchana. Commerce Minister Somkid, who has figured in press reports as a leading contender, was now off Thaksin's short list. Thaksin told Brooks that he was disappointed in Somkid: Thaksin had brought him up "from nothing", and had just given him 5 million baht for his recent surgery. But Somkid apparently showed a lack of loyalty by betraying an expectation that he would be the next PM; he had even approached someone to be "his" finance minister. Another prospect, Parliament speaker Bhokin, was controversial even within TRT. ¶6. (C) Thaksin and advisor Pansak expressed disappointment with the US position. They had expected a clearer public and private line that the US wanted all parties to abide by the rule of law, which they believe was subverted by the course of events. They hoped that the US would recognize that what was happening was a setback for democracy in Thailand. REALITY CHECK -------------- ¶7. (C) While other Thai we have spoken to do not see Thaksin as the poor, downtrodden victim of the power hungry King, they also cast the current struggle to a certain degree as a contest between the King and the prime minister. Journalist Kavi Chongkittavorn also predicted that Thaksin would not be able to return as PM in the short term. He anticipated that the courts, empowered by the King's instructions to them, would take whatever steps were necessary to ensure that Thaksin would not re-emerge after the elections. He expected that TRT would be dissolved as a result of the investigation of their role in paying microparties to contest the April elections, and that Thaksin and other party leaders would be banned from politics for at least five years. Thaksin had one advantage -- while the Thai people were very influenced by the King, they tended to have short memories. It would be several months until elections, and the effects of the King's statement may "wear off," leaving it harder for the courts to carry through on controversial decisions. ¶8. (C) Kavi said that the King had not been influenced by his councilors -- quite the opposite, in fact. A close friend of the King's had recounted how the King himself had been poring over law books and quietly preparing his response to the problematic elections. The Privy Councilors had been unaware of his plans and were taken by surprise when he made his speech criticizing the elections. Kavi, a rabid opponent of TRT, reflected the view of much of educated Bangkok: although he wished that the King had intervened earlier, he believed that the King had taken an important step to preserve democracy. At the same time, he recognized that the King, by intervening in politics, had taken a risk. He was concerned that Thaksin, knowing his political future was in serious trouble, would try to "take the King down with him." COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (C) Thaksin's diatribe and revisionist history are highly suspect; we are not convinced that the King and his minions pushed Thaksin out of office. Thaksin's enormous ego has taken a tremendous battering this year, and it may be hard for him to grasp how a rag-tag bunch of demonstrators somehow started a process that led to this deadly challenge to his political future. He would rather see the King as his nemesis. As the elections proceeded, Thaksin appeared to have a reasonable plan: take a strategic break until things cooled down, and return to power after a decent interval. The King's condemnation of the elections, and the courts' aggressive response, laid waste to that plan. His story of the palace's machinations against him, and his accusations of a palace coup, may be part of his effort to "bring the King down with him," as Kavi suggested he would. That said, we agree with the underlying theme of Thaksin's complaint -- the palace has aligned against him and will (carefully) seek ways to support the effort to drive him from politics definitively. ¶10. (C) Thaksin's account of his troubles also edits out a lot. He makes no mention of the possibility that TRT will be dissolved, even though this is an increasingly real threat. He ignores evidence that high-ranking members of his party committed serious abuses in hiring microparties to run in the elections, and assisting them to fake documents so they would qualify. In Thaksin's mind, nothing is ever his fault. He accepts no responsibility for the current situation, and the problems it presents for the country. He sees no irony in comparing himself to Aung San Suu Kyy. Given this almost delusional view of his own role, he is unlikely to concede defeat gracefully in order to spare the country the damage of a prolonged political crisis. BOYCE