A LONG-TERM THAI EFFORT TO DEAL WITH SOUTHERN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002890 SIPDIS STATE FOR EAP, EAP/MLS, S/CT PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2026 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH SUBJECT: A LONG-TERM THAI EFFORT TO DEAL WITH SOUTHERN VIOLENCE REF: A. BANGKOK 2338 (WAY AHEAD IN SOUTHERN THAILAND) ¶B. BANGKOK 2337 (CURRENT U.S. ASSISTANCE/PROGRAMS) ¶C. BANGKOK 2330 (LIFTING BAN ON PROVINCIAL POLICE) ¶D. BANGKOK 926 (U.S.-THAI MILITARY COOPERATION) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a, d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION: As we continue to develop a framework to assist the Thai deal with the situation in far southern Thailand, we should be realistic about the limitations of our aid and the length of time it will take for the Thai to make significant progress in the South. Expanded training of military and police/prosecutors (including provincial police) offers us the most expeditious path towards helping the Thai address immediate security shortcomings. Reconciliation efforts, including sensible recommendations that come from the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC),also deserve our attention. However, given the historical realities of the conflict, built-in limitations of Thai security forces, and constraints on our direct involvement, we can only expect incremental improvements in the situation. Currently, the violence in the South remains localized, directed towards Thai targets and driven by deep-seated grievances of ethnic Malays against the central government. Attacks are not directed against Americans or the West and there are no clear links to transnational terrorists. Targeted U.S. assistance can help give the Thai the tools they need to get better control of the troubled provinces security, but it will take years of enlightened Thai government policy, better intelligence, and luck, frankly, to finally quell the insurgency. END SUMMARY/INTRODUCTION FOCUSING ON WHAT WE CAN CHANGE -------------- ¶2. (S) Our current assistance programs (reftels B, D) and requests for expanded assistance (reftels A) focus on security assistance -- particularly the continued professionalization of the military and police and prosecutor training. We have developed proposals for a range of training and assistance programs that are aimed at improving RTG performance and coordination in the South. This focus will require the participation of all Thai security agencies, and will require us to relax our absolute ban on training the provincial police (reftel C),while maintaining a strict human rights vetting regime. An immediate focus on expanded training -- which fosters inter-service cooperation -- with security forces and prosecutors offers us the most expeditious path towards helping the Thais get a handle on the security situation in the near-term. Because this type of assistance builds on our existing programs and relationships with professional working level officials, it avoids aggravating a delicate political situation by raising the U.S. profile too high. SUPPORTING SENSIBLE LONG-TERM RECONCILIATION -------------- ¶3. (C) The long-awaited report by the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC),dedicated to addressing root causes of the conflict, is currently on hold until a stable government is established. When the political situation stabilizes enough for the NRC to step forward and present its findings, we should weigh in vigorously to support practical recommendations presented by the Commission. The Thai will eventually have to address some of the legitimate grievances detailed in the report that are root causes of the alienation of the local populace. This will require the RTG to make some tough, and probably unpopular, choices on how it governs the South and to examine what it means to be "Thai." Implementation of the recommendations -- unlikely to have an immediate impact on the violence -- will require patience from both the RTG and the U.S. A Thai military officer involved in southern security issues told us that the Army was preparing political leaders to face a decade of effort to "fix" the South. Some notable conciliatory changes are already being implemented. On May 5, caretaker Education Minister Chaturon Chaisaeng announced that some public schools in the three southernmost provinces would start using a bilingual Malay/Thai curriculum. -------------- BEING REALISTIC ABOUT OUR ASSISTANCE -------------- ¶4. (C) It is vital that we work to improve the performance of Thai security forces and support sensible reconciliation efforts, but we also need to be realistic about the limitations of our involvement: -- History of Violence: We should be prepared to see a high level of violence continue in the South regardless of our actions. The Malay-Muslims of greater Pattani were incorporated in the Thai state 100 years ago against their will. They are proud of their unique history, language, culture, and religion. In the future, a certain level of violence will continue as some ethnic Malays continue to resist the imposition of control and culture from Bangkok. Moreover, this border region has always been one of the most violent parts of Thailand due to criminal activities which are often reported as "insurgent-related" by police and the media. -- We Can't Change Everything: We should be aggressive in our implementation of assistance to address the serious deficiencies of Thai security forces, especially stove-piping and abilities of some prosecutors and police. We can work on these problems. However, there are deeper, ingrained shortcomings within the security forces that will be harder to address, including a lack of respect for ethnic Malays that borders on outright racism and institutionalized rivalries between police and the military. Our modestly expanded aid will help overall, but it will not solve these problems. -- Expect Incremental Improvements: Though the Thai have their problems, we should acknowledge the relative professional standard of RTG security agencies, especially when compared with neighboring countries. Many Thai officials are well aware of the deep and complicated nature of the situation and have been working to overcome traditional failings despite being hampered by poor policy choices from political leaders. We can expect incremental rather than exponential improvements from increased U.S. assistance. -- Anti-U.S. Rumors Remain a Serious Concern: Rumors that we are somehow fomenting the violence as part of our war on terror, or as a pretext to establish a military base, continue to be widely believed in the South. To avoid feeding these rumors -- and consequently redirecting anger towards us or possibly attracting international jihadists -- we must scrupulously avoid a U.S. presence in the South and whenever possible not label our security assistance as related to the conflict. This reality will necessarily have some degree of impact on the effectiveness of our assistance. The southern Philippines model will not work here (not withstanding the fact that the situation in southern Thailand is not analogous to the Philippines). CONTAINING THE PROBLEM -------------- ¶5. (S) Without downplaying the seriousness of the situation, it is important to remember that the RTG is not losing its grip on power in the South. The shadowy militants do not offer the population an alternative to the Thai government and do not appear to enjoy widespread support among southerners. Despite dire predictions, the violence to date remains contained and isolated to the geographic far South. The best evidence -- and we check this constantly -- is that transnational terrorists are not directly involved in the South. Most importantly, violence and anger in the South is not directed against the U.S. and, rumors aside, we are not seen as a central part of this problem. As we consider our approach and offers of additional assistance, it is imperative that we pay careful attention to managing both the form and content of U.S. assistance programs. Sustained, low-key, long-term support is the key to doing our part in assisting the Thai government to better manage the difficult southern provinces. BOYCE