THAILAND: NEW PRICING POLICY REINTRODUCES DIESEL

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002617 SIPDIS SIPDIS STATE PASS TO USTR E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECON ELTN EPET TH SUBJECT: THAILAND: NEW PRICING POLICY REINTRODUCES DIESEL SUBSIDY BANGKOK 00002617 001.2 OF 003 ¶1. (U) SUMMARY: On April 26, after weeks of popular outcry over high fuel prices, Thailand's Ministry of Energy announced several fuel pricing measures that had the effect of reducing the pump price of diesel. Rather than introducing a direct subsidy, the government reduced contributions from retail sales to pay off the debt that remains as a result of the direct subsidy paid in 2004-2005. Editorial and expert opinion have criticized the effort to lower fuel prices as price-distorting and self-defeating because it does not assist in reducing demand for fuel. The Royal Thai Government feels it has to act, both to demonstrate its responsiveness to the concerns of ordinary laborers and the poor, and to undercut criticism of its policy of privatization of state-owned enterprises. END SUMMARY -------------- A NEW DIESEL SUBSIDY IN ALL BUT NAME -------------- ¶2. (U) On April 26, 2006, the Ministry of Energy (MOE) decided to cut the contribution to the State Oil Fund (SOF) from retail disel sales by one baht per liter. The effect was to reduce the pump price of diesel. PTT Plc has reduced the retail price of diesel to 25.69 baht/ltr., and other retail vendors followed, although the other vendors' prices are higher than the PTT price and on May 4 retailers other than PTT and Shell implemented an across the board increase in prices brought the diesel price back up again (to 26.59 baht/ltr.; Shell charges 26.09 baht/ltr.). The MOE also decided on a two-baht reduction in the price of so-called purple diesel, a special high-sulfur fuel sold to small fishing vessels. Additionally, the MOE announced a subsidy for bus operators of one baht per liter for diesel fuel. The economic effect of these decisions is to subsidize the price of diesel fuel. The MOE is considering cutting excise taxes, among other measures to ease the burden on consumers, if oil prices continue to rise. ¶3. (U) The MOE decision follows weeks of popular outcry over rising fuel prices and the effect they have had on several sectors of the economy. The Thai press has carried daily stories of how high fuel costs have crippled fishermen, farmers, manufacturers, truckers, and transport operators such as the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority. Although journalists have not emphasized the point, the essential problem in all affected sectors is that businesses are unable to pass on high fuel costs to consumers. Bus fares are regulated and margins in the transport sector are thin, for example, thus an increase in fuel costs quickly pushes bus companies' operations into the red. The fishing industry, by contrast, simply lacks pricing power because consumers can choose other products if seafood prices rise. 6 percent inflation in April is also squeezing margins on the manufacture of the consumer products subject to price controls (over 150 items in one form or another). ¶4. (U) Supply constraints have exacerbated problems associated with the rise in diesel prices. Oil distilling facilities at Bangchak Petroleum Plc have been temporarily closed for repairs, and diesel imported by oil firms carries a higher price. In April the RTG attempted to remedy shortages by setting up a quota system for allocation of fuel to bus operators. The effect, however, was to squeeze supply further. Transport operators, for example, reportedly had to pay one baht per liter above regular (regulated) rates for fuel in order to obtain diesel. Small fishing boat operators simply kept their trawlers in port, unable to obtain sufficient fuel on the regular market and unable to afford black market prices. Estimates vary, but all place at least 1,000 boats in port. ¶5. (U) The RTG has attempted to shield the public from surging oil prices for several reasons. Most popular anger over higher fuel prices is likely to be directed at the incumbent government if it does nothing, according to Prudhisan Jumbala, a political scientist at Chulalongkorn University. The Thaksin government in particular has based much of its electoral appeal on the strength of its commitment to addressing the concerns of ordinary laborers and the poor. The RTG's policy of privatizing state-owned enterprises -- among them petroleum giant PTT -- has also come under fire recently, and both the RTG and PTT have attempted to use fuel price manipulation to uncercut this criticism. As PTT Presdient Prasert Bunsumpun commented to the press on May 2, "Since our company is mainly owned by the BANGKOK 00002617 002.2 OF 003 government and a lot of Thai people, there is no reason the firm will run business in a way that exploits consumers." -------------- --- WHILE THE DEBT FROM THE PREVIOUS SUBSIDY REMAINS -------------- --- ¶6. (U) Under the new arrangement, the SOF receives only 90 satang for every liter of diesel sold on the retail market, down from 1.90 baht previously (one baht consists of 100 satang). Energy Minister Viset Choopiban acknowledged that the reduction in money collected for the oil fund will total about 1.5 billion baht per month. The MOE is expected to receive 2.5 billion baht from retail fuel sales, down from 4 billion baht. ¶7. (U) The SOF was originally set up to reduce pump price volatility and to give rural communities a cheap energy source. In 2004-2005, the fund spent over 80 billion baht to keep fuel prices artificially low through a diesel subsidy. The government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra decided to abandon this costly policy after its reelection in February 2005. The government is still paying off 26.4 billion baht in bonds to fund the debt accumulated from the previous subsidy scheme. As a result of the decision to cut the contribution to the SOF, the Energy Policy and Planning Office (EPPO) had to reschedule loan payments with creditors. -------------- -------------- CRITICS: STOP-GAPS HURT EFFORTS TO REDUCE CONSUMPTION -------------- -------------- ¶8. (U) The government's announcement of the new subsidies had the intended effect of dissipating consumer discontent. Complaints have fallen off. Inter-provincial bus operators who had been planning to raise fares or go on strike if the RTG did not cap diesel prices called off their strike plan after the MOE announced the subsidy. Newspapers have carried stories on PTT's plan to spin off a subsidiary oil refinery rather than on calls to probe oil company profits. ¶9. (U) Editorial and expert opinion, however, has been critical. Post Today editorialized that "The price intervention is a price distortion. By keeping the diesel price low, the government is hurting its own efforts to encourage people to reduce oil consumption. Users of diesel oil will not be compelled to economise when the price is low." Tharn Settakij expressed its sympathy for those with low income, but noted that the problem of high fuel prices will not go away if Thailand continues to consume fuel at the present rate. ¶10. (U) Almost all observers agree that the subsidy is only a short-term fix, and that the RTG is betting on world fuel prices going down. At a Stock Exchange of Thailand roundtable discussion on the day the subsidy was announced, however, company executives voiced concern of $100/barrel oil. The effect of high oil prices is exacerbated by Thailand's extremely low energy efficiency and lack of domestic oil supply. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶11. The new subsidies distort the Thai fuel market and raise concerns about both the ability of Thailand's economy to adapt to change and the attractiveness of the investment climate. By their very nature, the RTG-imposed controls on certain consumer products and materials such as steel and cement impede the ability of the economy to adapt to changing fuel prices because they lead to shortages and bottlenecks in an inflationary environment. No one knows the level at which the price of a given item would peak if controls were lifted, so it is hard for businesses to make informed investment decisions. Owing to the political sensitivity of the diesel price, it is hard for the government not to intervene, especially since direct diesel subsidies ended only last July. Yet such resort to using PTT diesel pricing policy as a way of setting retail prices sets a disturbing precedent. It shows the limits of the actual privatization of Thailand's state owned enterprises. Additionally, minority shareholders in the partially privatized PTT are clearly being deprived of potential profit. Such manipulation of the market by the majority shareholder sends the wrong signal to potential BANGKOK 00002617 003.2 OF 003 investors. BOYCE