SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THAIS TO BEGIN TALKS WITH PULO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002335 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EAP, S/CT PACOM PASS FPS (HUSO) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2026 TAGS: PGOV PREL PTER TH SNAP SUBJECT: SOUTHERN VIOLENCE: THAIS TO BEGIN TALKS WITH PULO REF: A. 05 BANGKOK 7573 ¶B. 05 BANGKOK 7527 ¶C. 05 BANGKOK 2062 Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (b,d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: The Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue (HDC) has facilitated talks between the RTG and purported leaders of southern Thai separatist groups. The talks, scheduled for June, will take place in Geneva and reportedly have the support of key parts of the Thai government. Talks are positive, but it will be difficult to translate a dialogue into a reduction in the violence as the separatist "leadership" has questionable control over militants in the South. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S) On April 20, Michael Vatikiotis (strictly protect), regional representative for the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, told they Ambassador the HDC had brokered an agreement to establish a dialogue between the RTG and the exiled leadership of the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO) and other southern Thai separatist groups. The talks are scheduled to begin in June and will take place in Geneva. The Thai government will be represented by NSC Deputy Secretary-General Jiraporn Bunnag, NSC Director of Strategic Security Somkiat, and prominent academic and National Reconciliation Commission (NRC) member Mark Tamthai (reftel C). PULO members Katsuri Mahkota and Shamsuddin Khan will likely represent the southern separatists. Vatikiotis hinted that leaders of other southern militant groups would also attend, including BRN-C. ¶3. (S) HDC has been quietly meeting in northern Malaysia and in Europe over the past year with purported leadership figures from southern Thai separatist groups in an attempt to facilitate a dialogue (reftel B). Vatikiotis and other HDC staff have reportedly had high-level contacts in Thailand and Malaysia including Thai Prime Minister Thaksin, NRC Chairman Anand Panyarachun, and Malaysian Prime Minister Badawi. (NOTE: Vatikiotis said that Malaysian external intelligence had identified, and was in contact with, many of the senior separatist leaders in Kelantan. He claimed that Malaysian intelligence had facilitated a February meeting between former Prime Minister Mahathir and Thai separatist leaders on Langkawi Island. END NOTE) ¶4. (S) Vatikiotis said that the dialogue -- which has been quietly supported by the Thai political leadership -- had received buy-in from crucial members of the RTG, including Supreme Command and the National Intelligence Agency. There is a growing consensus within the RTG that PULO is organizing itself into a credible political organization that can legitimately engage in a dialogue with the government. Vatikiotis believes PULO is modeling itself on Indonesia's GAM. ¶5. (S) Vatikiotis said HDC had been meeting in Malaysia's Kelantan State with purported separatist leadership figures who claimed they provide logistical support to the loosely organized group of militants who are carrying out the attacks in southern Thailand (reftel A). These leaders reportedly admitted that the militants who actually carry out the attacks were "difficult to control." Vatikiotis believes that separatist leaders in Kelantan do not enjoy operational control over all the militants operating in the South. Cells appear to be organized into districts and act autonomously for the most part. However, he believes they have enough influence over the militants in the South to be credible interlocutors. ¶6. (S) Vatikiotis was confident about the timing of the talks. According to him, there is a real chance for dialogue and compromise now that Thaksin has stepped down; Thaksin had allowed exploratory talks with purported separatist leaders, but was not sincere about pursuing a substantive dialogue. The NRC, which has completed its report, also feels emboldened by Thaksin's political demise. Anand believes a new government may provide the opportunity for positive change to take place in the South. The NRC final report will also recommend dialogue between the government and militants. ¶7. (S) COMMENT: Talks are good -- and Thaksin's retreat does open the possibility for changes in Thai policy towards the South -- but the direct impact the envisioned dialogue will have on the violence is questionable. As Vatikiotis acknowledged, the exiled separatist leaders probably do not have operational control over those who are actually carrying out attacks. These "leaders," who fled Thailand in the 1970s and 80s, are from an older generation than the angry ethnic Malay youth who appear to be behind the majority of attacks. It is interesting that the RTG apparently believes that PULO can credibly represent the separatists. Most observers -- ourselves included -- view PULO as a highly factionalized purveyor of web-site separatist propaganda rather than a credible political organization. It will be difficult to translate talks in Europe into a reduction of violence on the ground in the South, but it is a start. END COMMENT BOYCE