LIFTING THE BAN ON PROVINCIAL POLICE TRAINING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 002330 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/20/2016 TAGS: PHUM PTER TH SUBJECT: LIFTING THE BAN ON PROVINCIAL POLICE TRAINING REF: 2003 BANGKOK 2246 Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (U) This is an action message. Please see paragraph 8. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY and action request: Since 2003, we have barred the use of INL funds for training of provincial police, due to their suspected involvement in extrajudicial killings in the war on drugs. Post recommends that we relax this absolute ban, and permit limited training of provincial police, consistent with Leahy amendment provisions, in order to improve the RTG's ability to combat terrorism connected to the ethnic Malay-Muslim insurgency in the far South. END SUMMARY and action request. BACKGROUND -------------- ¶3. (C) In 2003, Prime Minister Thaksin initiated a three month "War on Drugs" campaign intended to eliminate narcotics from the country. In the wake of the campaign, there were approximately 1,300 killings of suspected drug traffickers. The government claimed that most of these killings resulted from disputes among those involved in the drug trade. Other sources, including Thailand's National Human Rights Commission, disputed this claim and called for thorough investigation of all EJKs. The subsequent government investigation lead to few accusations against police or military officers. There was, and still is, broad public support for the crack-down on drug-related crime. As post reported three years ago: "The precise number of extra-judicial killings of drug suspects since February 1 -- and the identities of their perpetrators -- is not known or knowable to the Mission. Nonetheless, the preponderance of evidence suggests that a significant number of these killings were perpetrated by the police or by individuals acting on behalf of the police. The evidence also suggests that most of the killings associated with the police are associated with the provincial police forces rather than with those who work for the divisions of police tasked with specific functions, for example: Immigration police, Crime Suppression Police, Special Branch or Border Patrol Police." In that report, post included a recommendation to limit the training that would be provided to provincial police due to these concerns, noting, "In addition to the fact that the provincial police appear most heavily involved in the (EJKs), we as a mission have also traditionally had far less contact with provincial police than with the Border Patrol Police, Special Branch, Immigration, and other non-police law enforcement entities." (reftel) Department subsequently implemented a ban on INL funding for provincial police training. ¶4. (C) Since the conclusion of the "war on drugs," there has not been another spike in suspected EJKs to compare with ¶2003. For example, the total number of presumed insurgency-related deaths from every cause (insurgent or security force) for the past two years is about 1,100. The problems of poor police performance and lack of accountability remain serious, however. POLICE FAILURES FUEL SOUTHERN INSURGENCY -------------- ¶5. (C) As we have discussed the RTG's difficulties in countering the insurgency in the far south, it has become increasingly apparent that this poor performance and lack of accountability are obstacles to Thailand's counter-terrorism efforts. Everyone from foreign experts to Muslim southerners point to similar problems. The police are often incapable of performing the most basic police work - gathering evidence, following up on leads, making a case that prosecutors can bring to court. According to one source, the police have identified suspects in only about 12 percent of the suspected insurgent attacks. There are few convictions, and courts have acquitted suspects in several high-profile cases because of lack of evidence. When a crime or insurgent attack occurs, the first unit that reaches the scene -- provincial police, other police, or military -- usually takes charge of it. They are usually unable to identify useful evidence, and they permit bystanders and the press to contaminate the scene. Trained officials, for example, those who have the background to do a post-blast investigation at a bombing site, arrive to find the crime scene being hosed down and reopened to traffic. The inability of the police to find the perpetrators of crimes/insurgent violence obviously makes it easier for insurgents to act. In addition, it has fed the local suspicions about the origins of the violence. Local contacts say southerners point to the lack of prosecutions or even arrests as evidence that Thai security forces or other third hands (including the US) are "really" behind the violence. ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM -------------- ¶6. (C) Septel will describe post's proposals to ramp up certain kinds of training for the police to improve their counter-terrorism abilities. In order for these proposals to have the desired impact, it is essential that provincial police be included as part of the training -- As reftel makes clear, the ban on provincial police training was not made strictly pursuant to Leahy standards. Post did not have "credible evidence" that the provincial police were behind specific killings. Based on the information available to post at this time, it appears that our decision was over and above the legally required response. -- Although we are not satisfied with the RTG government response to the 2003 EJKs, we recognize that the campaign ended quickly and has not been repeated. We believe that strong international reaction against the killings had the desired effect, making clear to the Thai that there would be a price to pay for continued killings. We note that, although there have been some credible reports of EJKs by security forces in the southern provinces, the number is limited. We cannot document a specific link between EJKs in the south and the provincial police. -- We believe that the inability of the police to gather evidence to make credible cases is disastrous on several fronts. First and most obvious, genuinely dangerous supporters of terrorism may well be acquitted by the independent courts, which must have evidence on which to base a conviction. Second, there is palpable and growing frustration on the part of government officials that terrorism suspects cannot be convicted. This could lead to a higher level of EJKs, as police take the law into their own hands. ¶7. (C) We could move forward with our proposal for increased counter-terrorism training without including the provincial police, but this would leave a significant gap. The provincial police are often the first to respond to a insurgent incident. They have an important role to play -- at a minimum, to understand how to secure a crime scene and refrain from destroying the evidence until trained personal arrive. Post would make clear to the RTG that our inclusion of provincial police would be limited to training we believed necessary to support our common counter-terrorism objectives. Our goal is to foster institutional change, therefore, we would not rule out any participation from police other parts of the country. However, our priority is the South. Participants would of course be vetted to ensure respect for Leahy standards and Department policy, and human rights training would be a key element in the program. ¶8. (C) Action request: Post requests that the Department approve the inclusion of provincial police in targeted INL-funded training. End Action request. BOYCE