MOVING FORWARD ON AN SEA CT STRATEGY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BANGKOK 002270 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR S/CT, EAP, PM, INL, EAP/MLS, EAP/MTS PACOM FOR FPA (HUSO) E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/09/2016 TAGS: ASEC PTER CASC PGOV PINS KJUS KISL TH SUBJECT: MOVING FORWARD ON AN SEA CT STRATEGY REF: A. 2006 BRUNEI 00135 SE ASIA CT STRATEGY: BRUNEI ¶B. 2006 SECSTATE 34762 INTERIM RESPONSE TO SEA CT STRATEGY ¶C. 2006 JAKARTA 1454 BUILDING AN SEA CT STRATEGY ¶D. 2005 JAKARTA 16218 JOINT PROPOSAL FOR PROMOTING SEA CT Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) SUMMARY: On March 6, Embassy Bangkok and S/CT Ambassador Henry Crumpton hosted regional Chiefs of Mission and participants from other U.S. agencies to follow up on the January CT consultations in Jakarta (REFTELS). Chiefs of Mission (COMs) continued to develop a framework to counter the regional terror threat, outline the larger political context of regional CT efforts, and identify funding priorities and programs. Participants examined proposals to build regional host nation operational capacity to deny terrorists physical safehaven, focusing on land and maritime border control efforts. COMs also discussed the challenge of meeting the many regional security needs amid serious budget constraints, the need for specific metrics to chart overall progress in the regional CT effort, and additional Intelligence Community requirements. END SUMMARY -------------- -------------- Coordinated U.S. Actions Key to Long Term Success -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) Many Southeast Asian nations continue to need substantial foreign assistance to develop effective counterterrorism capabilities, from the most basic infrastructure and tools, to more advanced technical skills and systematic cross-border cooperation. The list of needs far outpaces available donor resources. At the Jakarta and Bangkok meetings, regional Chiefs of Mission suggested a multi-disciplinary, interagency approach to meet most effectively these needs and agreed that coordinated U.S. interagency measures are essential to successfully altering the environments conducive to terrorists and their ideology. At the Bangkok meeting, COMs continued to develop a framework of guidelines and programs -- using all aspects of our national power -- to counter the regional terror threat and identified funding priorities and programs. This cable focuses on the Sulawesi Sea area between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, the highest priority for national CT efforts, and provides initial recommendations to meet this regional strategic objective. Follow-on messages will examine other Southeast Asian CT priorities including regional public diplomacy efforts, southern Thailand, and the Straits of Malacca. Expand U.S. Navy and Coast Guard Regional Outreach -------------- -------------- ¶3. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) We should work more closely with U.S. military and Coast Guard elements to shape our combined CT effort. Increased regional outreach by the U.S. Coast Guard and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) agencies would provide needed expertise to improve host nation capabilities. DHS understands the possible benefits of regionalizing some DHS operations and COMs hope DHS will boost its regional role and resource commitment where possible. An increased DHS presence at regional hubs and sufficient funding of rovers could effectively and efficiently expand regional coverage. The U.S. military has prioritized regional maritime security and COMs hope they will further expand assistance, notably by deploying appropriate additional U.S. Navy resources to the region. We are working with PACOM, SOCOM, and SOCPAC, to conduct training of host nation police and military forces. For example, ICITAP's mid-2006 delivery of five boats to the Indonesian Marine Police detachment in Bitung, North Sulawesi, for use in patrolling the frequently transited waters in and around Sulawesi, will be followed by a joint ICITAP and JIATF-West counternarcotics and CT training exercise in mid-2006 using U.S. Naval special operations forces. ¶4. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) COMs identified and encouraged support for the following other maritime-related bilateral programs: -- Malaysia: Training and equipment for the Royal Malaysian Marine Police, who have primary enforcement responsibility in the Sulu Sea. The training would include: MTT Maritime Law Enforcement (MLE),Advance Boarding Officer ($68,000); MLE Curriculum Infusion Program ($25,000); Boarding Team Member EIMET in the U.S. for 20 officers ($102,240); Boarding Team Officer EIMET in the US for 5 officers ($42,220); Outboard Motor Maintenance MTT ($122,000). The equipment would include: 30 Mercury EFI 250-hp outboards motors ($345,000); 75 commercial, off-the-shelf night vision monoculars ($260,625); 75 commercial, off-the-shelf, handheld GPSs ($26,175); 1200 expandable batons (for use of force other than deadly force) ($72,000); 75 handheld communication devices for maritime use ($75,000). Total for training and equipment: $1,138,260 (potentially to be covered by EIMET and PACOM Counter-Terrorism Fellowship funds). -- Indonesia: Jakarta's ICITAP program is essential for us to build Indonesian police capacity. The Yudhoyono Administration, including the current INP chief, welcomes assistance. Cuts to Jakarta's overall ICITAP program budget have limited ICITAP offerings, and funding for ICITAP's Marine Police Special Boat Unit Project may run out in 2007. Expanded funding for this particular project would provide needed patrol and interdiction capacity to the heavily transited Sulawesi Sea area. Cost: Approximately $3.23 million would provide two additional five-boat marine police special boat units. The units consist of five 31' T-top SAFE boats with Yamaha 250hp motors ($224,000 per vessel), on-board electronics ($40,000 per vessel),night vision equipment ($25,000 per unit),unit administration equipment ($50,000 per unit),and training ($220,000 per unit). -- The Philippines: The June 2005 US-RP Joint Law Enforcement Assessment of the Philippine National Police (PNP) identified its Maritime Unit as a potential center of excellence. Training and equipping this force would enable us to improve the heretofore inadequate abilities of the GRP to control central Mindanao's Liguasan Marsh and other brown-water areas in which Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) terrorists find sanctuary and operate with impunity. Maritime police would also help patrol and control terrorist transit areas through Tawi-Tawi, Jolo, and Basilan. Cost: Approximately $2.5 million for in-country training and equipment. Potential sources of funds are Section 1206, INL, EIMET, and the PACOM Counter-Terrorism Fellowship program. -- Indonesia: Indonesian police and immigration offices in the border area between East Kalimantan and Sabah, lack the necessary resources to effectively control cross-border traffic at official ports of entry, including channeling travelers to check points to carryout documentation and baggage checks. We recommend funding strategic official maritime ports of entry along this border area with the equipment and training needed to control transit of this key area. Cost: Approximately $2.65 million (consisting of: $1.2 million for maritime patrol capacity, $750,000 for immigration check point improvements/equipment, $500,000 for police and immigration border control training, $200,000 for communications equipment and vehicles.) Increase Multilateral, Interagency CT Training -------------- - ¶5. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) Improving both local capacity and cooperation is crucial in the triborder area where stovepipes among security forces remain a serious problem. Current bilateral exercises/operations with the U.S. and its Allies should be expanded whenever possible to include military, immigration, and law enforcement agencies from the triborder nations. Tactical coordination will be especially important as operations continue in the southern Philippines. We are taking steps to identify the needs along this key border to ensure that extremists do not escape from the Philippines to find shelter elsewhere in the region. ¶6. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) COMs continue to urge U.S. sponsorship of a border control needs analysis to direct border assistance. The Border Control Assistance Initiative (BCAI) (Ref B) awaits DS/ATA's needs analysis and the initiative might usefully include additional training opportunities at the Southeast Asia Regional Center for Counter Terrorism (SEARCCT) in Kuala Lumpur, or the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA) in Bangkok, focused on building intraregional law enforcement cooperation. A funding source and estimated cost are yet to be identified. To encourage use of SEARCCT as a regional training resource, COMs recommend the purchase of basic reference books and periodicals for the SEARCCT research library. Cost (potentially to be borne by S/CT): $5,000. ¶7. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) We also are bringing together regional law enforcement and defense leaders with U.S. subject matter experts for conferences, such as the multilateral maritime workshop and tabletop exercise on the Sulu Sea that we are planning for 2006. The workshop will serve as a follow-up to a September 2005 JIACG-CT seminar in Honolulu and will involve authorities from the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia. The SEARCCT may co-host the event. JIACG-CT will bear the estimated cost of $225,000 for the workshop. ¶8. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) COMs recommend an expanded regional International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) grants program for groups of Malaysians, Indonesians and Filipinos, focused on maritime security and border control techniques (total of approximately 50 individuals). These would be in addition to existing individual country IVLP grants. The estimated cost of $400,000 could potentially to be borne by State/R. ¶9. (S REL AUS UK CAN) Training host nation prosecutors and police to better handle CT cases also is of key strategic importance. COMs support and encourage funding of the following bilateral initiatives: -- Malaysia: Funding would be used for the DOJ Attache in Manila to conduct training of Malaysian prosecutors/police on management of conspiracy prosecutions. Cost (potentially to be borne by DOJ or S/CT): $20,000 -- Indonesia: Since 2005, Jakarta's DOJ OPDAT representative (Resident Legal Advisor, or RLA),has been able to undertake a range of key projects with Indonesian authorities. However, the funding for an OPDAT position in Jakarta is limited and may not extend beyond 2006-2007. Funding for an additional 1-2 positions in Jakarta would increase our ability to engage the Indonesians effectively in key CT areas. Cost: Approximately $400,000 per OPDAT position. (Funding required) -- Philippines: The June-July 2005 INL-led Law Enforcement Assessment of the Philippine National Police (PNP) identified numerous deficiencies and the PNP subsequently incorporated the assessment's findings into its multi-year Transformation Plan. We need to support this effort by reestablishing a police advisor position at the Embassy and by backing a series of targeted interventions, including improving cooperation between police and prosecutors, helping the PNP develop a counterterrorism strategy, strengthening the PNP instructor cadre, and helping the PNP develop a standardized operations manual. Cost: $1.9 million in INL funds. Expand cooperation with the Australians and Japanese -------------- -------------- ¶10. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) Cooperation and coordination with regional allies is important to effectively boost triborder area capacities. Although Canberra's resources are more limited than ours, they are keenly focused on the threat from Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) and on JI's operations in the triborder region and continued consultations with Australia are important. Australian participation in the Five Powers Defense Arrangement (FPDA) also could add value in specific CT activities and programs in the region. Continued, albeit less extensive, engagement should continue with other partners, such as the United Kingdom and Japan, both of whom have limited but increasing regional interests. We support the Trilateral Security Dialogue as an appropriate forum to expand cooperation with the Japanese and Australians. We also should utilize the enhanced ASEAN partnership program to bolster support for strengthened triborder maritime and border security. Increase Rapid U.S. Response Capacity to Regional Crises -------------- -------------- ¶11. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) In both the Jakarta and Bangkok meetings, COMs voiced support for increased U.S. interagency capacity to take advantage of dramatic opportunities in host nations and the region. The response to the December 2004 tsunami provides a good example of how a rapid and robust SIPDIS U.S. response can be used to take advantage of changes in the broader political context. An interagency team representing State, USAID, DOD, CIA, DOJ, and DHS should prepare for future contingencies. Over time, this could evolve into a multinational effort. As part of Operation Unified Assistance, PACOM mobilized a Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT) made up of military officers from over 12 nations to serve as an information conduit. A similar approach would be useful in our CT effort. Our tsunami response in Indonesia was a factor in the successful SIPDIS Aceh peace process. Similar opportunities may present themselves in Mindanao as negotiations continue between the MILF and Manila; in Ambon if there is an opportunity to end violence between Muslims and Christians; or in southern Thailand. Expand and Improve Intelligence Collection -------------- ¶12. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) COMs greatly appreciate the current stream of intelligence, but more is needed. At present, missions are working at the most basic levels to define exactly who the terrorists are, where they are operating, and what resources they have available. Expanded signals intelligence collection in the triborder area -- especially Sabah -- would benefit the overall CT effort in the region. Defining and mapping exactly the location of physical safe havens should become a priority for the Intelligence Community and made available to Missions in the region to assist in guiding U.S. and host nation CT approaches. Likewise, we need to better understand and identify terrorist financial networks, including funding flows, financiers, and couriers. Improved coordination with operational assets to make our intelligence more actionable should also be a priority. CIA Stations need to coordinate technical assistance programs in the region to avoid discontinuity between the governments in the triborder area. Improved reporting from JSOTF-P also would improve overall CT intelligence collection efforts. Reporting from JSOTF-P that is accessible to all country teams would improve overall CT intelligence collection efforts. -------------- -- Marking Progress Toward Securing Triborder Area -------------- -- ¶13. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) To prioritize and evaluate the kaleidoscope of both existing and proposed counterterrorism related programs, a system of metrics that provides specific criteria could be useful in determining which CT programs meet regional strategic CT objectives. At the Jakarta and Bangkok meetings, COMs agreed that improved border security, particularly in the loosely regulated triborder area between Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, serves as an initial strategic target. Although host nation security capacities vary, assets along the border area in many cases are so few that the success of this first step in the regional CT strategy discussed in the Jakarta and Bangkok meetings could be measured in terms of delivery of appropriate equipment and training. The border security needs analysis recommended in Ref C would be an important tool in guiding CT programs to the most critical needs. ¶14. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) We could use the following criteria to measure the success of efforts to build capacity. These criteria could form the basis of a matrix to correlate needs with programs to mark progress toward regional objectives. -- Patrol assets: Patrol capacities are central to successful law enforcement interdiction and deterrence along the largely maritime and inland waterways of the border areas. Also, similar capacities among littoral states could ease joint patrols. Depending on the host nation security apparatus, this would require coordinated capacity building and cooperation among host nation coast guard, military, police, and immigration. We could measure success by the number of patrol assets available and the coverage capacity they provide. Appropriate interagency training and bilateral/multilateral exercises that seek to eliminate information stovepipes and emphasize the cross-border nature of the threat, effective security strategies, and tactical cross-border communication methods, could also be a useful metric. -- Immigration check points: As evidenced by the several arrests of individuals attempting to cross the border between Indonesia's East Kalimantan province and Malaysia's state of Sabah, terrorist and criminal networks freely use public transit systems to conduct their border transit operations. Although host nation abilities vary somewhat, police and immigration offices in the border area generally lack the necessary capacity and resources to effectively control cross-border traffic. Many ports of entry (POE) lack controls to channel travelers to check points to effectively carry out documentation verification and lack equipment to conduct personal and baggage checks of travelers crossing the border. With initial focus on the official POEs, success could be measured by the percentage of the total number of official POEs in the border area that are secured and fulfilling the equipment and training needs required to secure them. Border programs should also seek to standardize documentation requirements and implement documentation systems that assist in identifying fraudulent travel documents. -- Community Watch Programs: As a supplement to physical security measures, assisting host nations in implementing community watch programs could deter terrorist transit along parts of the triborder area and develop a general environment less conducive to terrorist or criminal activity. Success could be measured by the number of key communities along the border areas compared to the number of watch programs in place. Also, statistics such as the number of leads generated and the numbers of arrests made could be used as a measure of success. Other Key Areas and Initiatives -------------- ¶15. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) Although these suggested initial measures were specifically tailored to guide and measure progress in addressing the immediate concerns along the triborder area, the process could serve as a useful paradigm in developing similar criteria against subsequent targets of this regional CT strategy. For instance, concurrent with this initial step to improve border security, other targets such as terrorist leadership, require continued host nation coordination with the United States, Australia, and other donor nations. The coordinated effort to track down leaders of JI and its associated groups in the region should continue to take place and programs should be considered that help authorities locate, isolate, and arrest them. Measuring success against terrorist leaders by using the number of them identified and taken out is irrelevant without a clear idea of that number as a percentage of the whole. However, success identifying and eliminating known violent extremists and terrorist leaders could be measured in terms of disrupting coordinated terrorist command and control activity that could lead to fewer attacks, decrease available funding and training, decrease cross-border terrorist transit, etc. ¶16. (S/REL AUS UK CAN) In other areas, stronger and more complete CT-related legislation, such as conspiracy laws, sentencing guidelines, and stricter prison regulations, also would likely demonstrably disrupt terrorist activity and could be used to measure success toward coordinated regional U.S. CT objectives. BOYCE