THAKSIN TELLS ALL (ALMOST)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BANGKOK 002082 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/06/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH SUBJECT: THAKSIN TELLS ALL (ALMOST) Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Thaksin told me on April 7 that he had planned all along to step aside after the April 2 election. He admitted that he had been taken by surprise to the strong reaction to his family's sale of Shin Corp to Singapore, and that he may have made a tactical error when he snubbed an opposition offer that might have headed off their boycott. In his mind, the "Bangkok elite," the press, "the mob," and some privy councilors brought him down, despite his broad support in the countryside. Thaksin said he thought the obstacles to seating the new Parliament would be overcome, and mentioned three TRT members as good candidates to be the new PM (Bhokin, Somkid, Sudarat). Thaksin said that the opposition would never be satisfied until they could block him from public office forever. He confirmed that several of the protest leaders might be arrested and charged with lese majeste or offenses against internal secuirty, but said that any such move would depend on the courts. Right now, he did not feel any interest in trying to return as PM, he claimed. Thaksin seemed calmer and more relaxed than he had appeared in some time. Although his decision to step aside relieves some of the pressure on him, it does nothing to resolve the political dilemmas the result from this election. After a brief respite, political tensions may rise again. End summary. ¶2. (C) I met with caretaker PM Thaksin Shinawatra on April 7 at his request to discuss his political fortunes and the way ahead. Thaksin recounted how surprised he had been by the reaction to the Shin Corp sale to Singapore. He said that the opposition Democrat Party had reacted negatively to the sale not on principle, but because they feared his increased political clout if he had so much disposable wealth. I noted that part of the opposition to the sale stemmed from the widely held belief that Thaksin himself must have been involved; no one would believe that his children had managed the sale by themselves. Thaksin baldfacedly said there had been no other alternative; he could not be seen to have been involved because "there was insider trading." (Comment: any comment would be superfluous. End comment.) ALL ACCORDING TO PLAN -------------- ¶3. (C) Thaksin reviewed the events of the week. He said that, despite his defiant performance on TV Monday night, he had gone to the audience with the King on Tuesday knowing that he would have to step aside. He said that he knew that the King did not like him. For the first four years of his tenure, he and the King had had a good relationship. After Thai Rak Thai's (TRT) landslide victory in February 2005, the relationship had deteriorated, since the King saw Thaksin as challenging the King's popularity in the countryside. Soon after dissolving Parliament in late February, Thaksin's plan had been to hold the election in order to show his continued relevance but then to take a break in order to allow the political situation to calm down. Although his support in the rural areas was strong, he faced opposition from a cabal of the "Bangkok elite," the press, "the mob," and some privy councilors. ¶4. (C) I asked about some of the decisions he had made, including dissolving Parliament and then turning down the opposition's compromise proposal (to participate in the election in exchange for concessions on the process to amend the constitution). Thaksin insisted that he had no option other than to dissolve the Parliament, given the building pressure to respond to calls for his resignation. The opposition had made it clear that they would not hold a no-confidence debate, because they knew they would lose. Therefore, Thaksin dissolved the House and called new elections, because he knew he would win. ¶5. (C) Regarding turning down the opposition's compromise proposal, he complained that the three parties had not been sincere in making the offer. (Even as they were discussing it, he said, certain of the opposition were approaching Thaksin and looking for money in exchange for participation in the election.) Thaksin reluctantly conceded to me that it had probably been a tactical error not to call their bluff, at least. Once the boycott was in effect, he said, he realized that he would not be able to come back as PM, but he wanted the elections "to make his mark." ¶6. (C) Thaksin said that he had retained the post of caretaker PM in order to preserve the constitution. If he resigned (without a parliament in session to vote for a new PM),then it would have required the King to intervene to BANGKOK 00002082 002 OF 003 name a temporary successor (under Article 7). He did not want to be the one "to tear up the constitution," or to force the King to play a role he did not want. Therefore, he retained his office and, during this interval, he had turned over day to day responsibility to DPM Chidchai as a further effort to calm the situation. Should anything urgent arise, he said he would return to assume his responsibilities. WHAT NEXT? -------------- ¶7. (C) Thaksin said he would go to the UK to join his daughter, who is starting school there, and then take her for a visit to the US. He hoped to be able to call on former President Bush, which whom he has a personal relationship, while he was in the U.S. He said he would vote by absentee ballot in the April 19 Senate elections, and return before the April 23 round of voting for the unfilled MP seats. He expected that the next round of voting would succeed in filling the remaining seats, and he expected to overcome the other obstacles to seating the Parliament as well. He thought that some of the micro parties might win seats in the southern constituencies, since TRT was so disliked there. (Note: The Electoral Commission, in a controversial decision, will permit new candidates to register and run for the 39 open seats. We presume that, given the additional time they have had to prepare, there will be at least two legally qualified, or at least plausible, candidates in each race, circumventing the 20 percent rule. This could enable all the remaining seats to be filled, even if the overwhelming majority of voters vote "no vote." End note.) Thaksin said he would welcome the participation of Chart Thai or Mahachon parties in the new government that follows; the Democrat Party has already said that they will not participate. If they changed their mind, they would also be welcome. ¶8. (C) Asked about the new PM, Thaksin suggested Parliament speaker Bhokin, DPM Somkid, or Agriculture Minister Sudarat. (Comment: the usual suspects. End comment.) I noted that many Thai he had heard discussing this issue had raise suspicions about corruption issues connected to Sudarat. Thaksin noted that Bhokin, a lawyer, would be the right person to oversee the Constitutional reform. Somkid was strong on economic issues, but wouldn't be able to stand up to the Democrats, in Thaksin's view. In any event, he didn't have to decide right away. AS FOR THE OPPOSITION -------------- ¶9. (C) I asked if Thaksin planned to come back to the PM position after the political reforms and the next election. He said that the opposition would be happy if they could pass a constitutional amendment to say "Thaksin Shinawatra can never participate in politics again." And if Thaksin changed his name, "they'd pass an amendment that no one with his DNA could run for office." Thaksin said that, "the way he felt right now," he didn't want to come back as PM. He noted that the opposition did not just want him to step down, they also wanted to seize his assets and force him to leave the country. (Comment: this is true for some elements of the opposition, although they do not speak with one voice. End comment.) ¶10. (C) I asked whether there were plans, as we have heard, to arrest protest leaders Sondhi or Chamlong. Thaksin immediately confirmed that they could face charges for lese majeste and for violating section 116 of the penal code, "Offenses against the internal security of the Kingdom," based on the protesters breaking into the Government House compound in a mid-January demonstration. I cautioned that such arrests could provoke a backlash, and suggested that the protest movement and its leaders would probably lose steam now that Thaksin had stepped aside. I also said that such moves against the opposition over protest activities would raise the question of why similar steps weren't taken against TRT members, such as Newin Chidchob, who had organized illegal demonstrations against a newspaper. Thaksin's only response was, "That's different." He also said that any moves to arrest Sondhi or Chamlong would depend on the courts. COMMENT -------------- ¶11. (C) Thaksin appeared calmer and more relaxed than I have seen him in some time. The decision to step aside has relieved the enormous pressure on the caretaker PM. However, it has hardly solved the political dilemmas caused by this election. Versions of the week's events we have now heard BANGKOK 00002082 003 OF 003 from both the PM and the opposition PAD indicate that there was no deal or prior understanding between the PM and the opposition on Tuesday before the PM's announcement that he would step aside. Elements of the opposition are still pursuing their goal, which for many of them is, as Thaksin said, to ensure that he never returns to power again. Thus, after a brief respite next week for the Thai new year, we can expect the political temperature to rise again. BOYCE