THE THAI ARMY COMES TO DINNER

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001302 SIPDIS SIPDIS PACOM FOR FPA HUSO E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/02/2016 TAGS: ASEC PGOV PREL MARR TH TRT SNAP SUBJECT: THE THAI ARMY COMES TO DINNER REF: BANGKOK 1214 Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce. Reason 1.4 (a and d) ¶1. (C) Summary. During a March 2 dinner hosted by the Ambassador, Royal Thai Army (RTA) CINC, GEN Sonthi Boonyaratglin and his senior staff appeared relaxed and gave no indication that the Army plans to involve itself in the ongoing political crisis. Sonthi told the Ambassador that he had recently urged PM Thaksin Shinawatra to show restraint, make concessions to his critics, and avoid antagonizing opponents in order to defuse tensions but seemed skeptical that Thaksin would do so. Sonthi believes that the present situation is much different than that of 1992, the last time the Army intervened in Thai politics, and suggested that the only way the Army would intervene would be to protect the monarchy and restore order. Although Sonthi and his senior staff officers were surprisingly candid in telling Embassy officials about their dissatisfaction with Thaksin's leadership -- to the point of making jokes at his expense -- they took pains to demonstrate their intention to remain on the sidelines. Sonthi hopes that anti-Thaksin rallies continue to remain peaceful but acknowledged that his biggest worry is that they will not. END SUMMARY. SONTHI ASKS THE PM TO SHOW RESTRAINT ¶2. (C) On March 2, the Ambassador hosted RTA CINC Sonthi and seven senior RTA officers to dinner at the residence. In a pull-aside before dinner, Sonthi briefed the Ambassador on his February 28 meeting with PM Thaksin. Sonthi said that, contrary to press reports claiming he had urged to PM to step down, he had simply urged Thaksin to back away from confrontation, show a willingness to make concessions, and generally take the high road when commenting on the political situation. He was quick to note, however, that given the PM's personality, it was unlikely Thaksin would heed such advice. THIS IS NOT 1992 ¶3. (C) Sonthi believes that the current crisis differs significantly from 1992 -- when segments of the RTA fired on protesters opposing General Suchinda Krayprayoon's assumption of the Prime Ministry. In 1992, Sonthi explained, the RTA had a vested interest in Suchinda remaining in power. Today, the RTA has no similar stake for or against Thaksin. Sonthi said that his biggest concern was that an unforeseen act might cause one of the protests to become violent. He underscored the need to be on the watch for agitators who might try to provoke violence. Sonthi indicated that the only circumstance under which the RTA would intervene would be to protect the monarchy. WHAT ABOUT SURAYUD? ¶4. (C) Sonthi is a protege of retired Army Commander and current Privy Councilor General Surayud Chulanont. Sonthi told the Ambassador that Surayud is uncomfortable with press speculation that he might be appointed as an interim Prime Minister should Thaksin step down. Nonetheless, Sonthi was keenly interested in hearing about the Ambassador's February 28 meeting with Surayud and asked whether the Ambassador's impression of Surayud corresponded with his own (reftel). NOT CRITICAL OF CHAMLONG ¶5. (C) The Ambassador invited Sonthi to comment on the new dynamic presented by the involvement of retired GEN Chamlong Srimuang in the anti-Thaksin rallies. Sonthi refrained from endorsing or criticizing Chamlong's role in the protests. ARMY SUPPORT FOR THAKSIN NOTICEABLY LUKEWARM ¶6. (C) Sonthi and his staff appeared very relaxed throughout the evening. The officers freely expressed their opinions about the political situation and some even made jokes at Thaksin's expense. GEN Chirapong Vanarat, Chief of Staff for GEN Sonthi's inner office, went so far as to predict that Thaksin would have to step down within the next three days. That said, these same officers gave numerous examples of steps they were taking to avoid giving any impression that the military intends to intervene. Overall, we were struck by how tepid the senior Army leadership's support for Thaksin seemed to be. MOLES IN OUR MIDST? ¶7. (C) Interestingly, the only wall flower during dinner was Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence LTG Chatchai Thavaraputta. His reticence was probably due to his having been an Armed Forces Prep School classmate of Thaksin's. In Thailand, police and military officer candidates attend prep school together for two years prior to moving on to their respective service academy. Members of the same class meet annually and form close bonds. An officer is frequently more loyal to his prep school classmates than he is to any other group. Thaksin has been criticized by many within the RTA for promoting his classmates, graduates of Prep School Class 10, ahead of more senior officers. During dinner, GEN Chirapong laughingly said within earshot of LTG Chatchai that the only reason Chatchai was present was to watch the others. ¶8. (C) Officers at post had been concerned that the last minute addition to the Thai delegation of MAJ Saravudh Shinawatra, nephew of the Prime Minister, might inhibit conversation. However, Saravudh and the other aides waited outside the dining room throughout dinner. Several of the aides spoke openly with PolOff while the senior officers dined in the residence. Whenever Saravudh would approach, however, the other aides would stop talking about the crisis and turn the conversation to something more innocuous. Saravudh otherwise spent most of dinner on a cell phone talking with two of his girlfriends. COMMENT ¶9. (C) Sonthi gave every appearance of being a measured professional who is committed to keeping the Army on the sidelines of the unfolding political situation. We also believe that he and his senior staff have a good grip on the Army rank-and-file. BOYCE