THAILAND: PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT POLITICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001208 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH SUBJECT: THAILAND: PERSPECTIVES ON CURRENT POLITICAL STALEMATE REF: A. BANGKOK 1091 ¶B. BANGKOK 0538 ¶C. 05 BANGKOK 7197 Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) Summary and Introduction: The Thai political system is working through its biggest crisis since 1992. Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra enjoyed a precipitous rise to power in 2001. Since then, he has dominated all the elements of government that were intended to balance the increased powers given the PM in the 1997 constitution. This has revealed weaknesses in the constitution and the political system that Thaksin has no interest in fixing, since they benefit him. Faced with a tilted playing field, the opposition, at least for now, has resorted to a time-honored tactic of minority parties: to boycott elections in order to highlight their inherent unfairness. This move may force an impasse that takes Thai politics into territory uncharted by the constitution. At this point, we believe there is a reasonably good chance the Thai will work through this problem peacefully, and in a way that will be considered generally acceptable and legitimate here. This may involve some creative interpretations of their constitution; a role for the King is entirely conceivable. Embassy recommends that the USG message emphasize: 1) respect for democratic process; 2) importance of restraint and peaceful methods; and 3) resolution that reflects the will of the Thai people. We are in a good position. We have frank communications with the government, NGOs and the opposition parties. We have used our contacts with police and military to caution against the use of force against peaceful demonstrators, a coup, or other illegal intervention by the security forces. We should allow the players here to work through the problem, carefully limiting our statements to avoid being seen as taking sides. End Summary and Introduction IVORY TOWER MEETS SMOKY BACK ROOM -------------- ¶2. (C) Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra has changed the nature of Thai politics. The 1997 constitution sought to strengthen the role of the Prime Minister in order to avoid continuation of weak, short-lived and often ineffective governments that had plagued Thailand under civilian rule. The constitution also called for the creation of a range of institutions to counterbalance that increased power. For 
example, the state was supposed to divest itself of control of broadcast media by allocating broadcast frequencies in a transparent manner through an independent regulatory agency. It was supposed to have strong anti-corruption watchdogs in the National Counter-Corruption Commission (NCCC) and the Auditor General. A non-partisan Senate, composed of respected and well-known leaders of society, was supposed to be involved in the selection of the members of these institutions, with the King approving them. ¶3. (C) The problem is, it didn't work. The Senate is not an independent body. A large number of the senators are unabashed TRT supporters, whether through conviction or out of self-interest, in exchange for pay-offs or other favors. In a cascade effect, one after another of the watchdog institutions has either succumbed to TRT control or been strangled at birth. The Election Commission and the Constitutional Court are widely believed to be excessively influenced by TRT. The NCCC and the National Broadcasting Commission are not functioning, due to bureaucratic problems in a Senate that lacks the commitment to push through credible appointments to these important oversight bodies. Money politics is nothing new here, but Thaksin is one of the richest men in Thailand, and he has played the game expertly. The drafters of the Constitution clearly underestimated that ability of a strong, determined Prime Minister to turn these institutions into toothless tigers. ¶4. (C) As we have reported (ref A, C),the opposition parties see no way to break through the TRT's control of the media and other institutions. Given only a month to organize a electoral challenge, the main opposition parties have opted -- for the time being -- not to lend legitimacy to this process by participating in it. As they further point out, the problem is not with the Parliament, the problem is with Thaksin. Meanwhile, the demonstrators are not calling for new elections, they are demanding Thaksin's removal, primarily because they believe, with some justification, that he violated the law with some aspects of his Shin Corp sale (ref B),and that he will get away with it because no institution is strong enough to hold him accountable. HIT THE 'RESET' BUTTON -------------- ¶5. (C) What will happen now? It is possible that Thaksin and the TRT will hang together and barrel forward to elections on April 2, without the participation of the boycotters. However, we think that this is an unlikely outcome at this point. Without the three opposition parties, the elections will clearly lack legitimacy. ¶6. (C) At one end of the spectrum, there are solutions to the impasse that bring the opposition parties back to the table. Thaksin may finally offer a compromise acceptable to them. Yesterday, he announced he was willing to discuss constitutional reform issues, but his offer fell so far short of the opposition party demands that they could not accept it. Today, he said he was willing to delay the elections to give the opposition more time to prepare. Thaksin knows that the opposition parties decided on the boycott strategy with great reluctance, and may be open to compromise. The NGOs that are leading the charge against the PM will keep the pressure on the parties to hold the line, however. ¶7. (C) Or, the Thai ship of state may sail off into uncharted territory for a while. Commentators are referring to the constitution's Article 7: "Whenever no provision under this Constitution is applicable to any case, it shall be decided in accordance with the constitutional practice in the democratic regime of government with the King as Head of State." This seems to be a very Thai provision that essentially says, "do whatever works as long as most everyone can agree on it, and the King will approve it." Solutions at this end of the spectrum could involve more direct pressure on Thaksin to resign, the appointment of some kind of interim, compromise government under the royal aegis to oversee constitutional changes and new elections, or some other option we haven't thought of yet. OUR ROLE - DON'T GET IN THE MIDDLE OF THIS -------------- ¶8. (C) Our first interest is to use our influence to ward off any move by the security forces to use force against peaceful protesters or to intervene in the political process. We have been emphasizing this concern with our RTG contacts. So far, we believe that the police have made the decision to behave responsibly in policing the demonstrations, and the Army is reluctant to intervene. This is encouraging. ¶9. (C) Our next interest is to ensure that the U.S. is not seen as taking sides in a political contest that needs to be decided by the Thai people. Both sides have looked for ways to drag the U.S. into this fight. Our FTA negotiations have been used to whip up a frenzy of opposition to the Prime Minister, who in turn likes to highlight his close relationship with the U.S. In our statements, we should emphasize the need for a peaceful outcome, but avoid getting drawn into discussions about what is or is not constitutional here. Because the TRT is attempting to paint the opposition boycott as unconstitutional and illegal, we need to be particularly careful about the words we choose. SUGGESTED PRESS GUIDANCE -------------- ¶10. (C) -- We urge all parties in the current confrontation in Thailand to refrain from the use of force and to find a peaceful solution to the current impasse. -- Thailand has experienced a series of large demonstrations. They have been peaceful. The police have behaved responsibly. We believe that the Thai people have the political maturity to continue to work toward a solution to the political questions they are facing. Q: Do we support the opposition's boycott of the elections? A: -- It is up to the Thai people to decide whether to support the boycott or not. Q: If the opposition parties don't participate in the elections, are they free and fair? A:-- We are not going to speculate. We believe the Thai people and their leadership can work through this problem. BOYCE