C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001139

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

GENEVA FOR RMA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016
TAGS: PREF PREL TH KS KN DPRK
SUBJECT: MEETING WITH SOUTH KOREAN EMBASSY ON NORTH KOREAN

REFUGEES

REF: A. SEOUL 471

B. STATE 4712

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR SUSAN SUTTON, REASON 1.4 (d).


1. (C) Summary. In a February 23 meeting, a South Korean
Embassy official said he had received no new instructions or
information from Seoul regarding U.S.-ROK discussions about
North Korean refugees, including on providing assistance to
the Embassy if any suitable refugee cases arose or sharing
information on North Korean refugees who wanted U.S.
resettlement. The official raised familiar concerns that
U.S. resettlement processing of North Korean refugees in
Thailand would lead to a surge in North Koreans coming to
Thailand and endanger the existing pipeline to the ROK. He
also speculated that if the United States resettled North
Koreans from Thailand, the DPRK might charge that the United
States was abducting its citizens and cite that as an excuse
not to participate in the Six-Party talks. End summary.


2. (C) Political Counselor and Refcoord met informally on
February 23 with Counsellor Hong-Kyn Kim of the South Korean
Embassy to discuss the North Korean refugee issue. Kim will
shortly be leaving Thailand to work in Seoul as one of the
special assistants to the ROK Foreign Minister.


3. (C) Political Counselor noted that the USG had recently
told the ROK government that it would continue to push ahead
on resettling a small number of North Korean refugees in the
United States. To that end, the USG would be trying to
overcome the resistance of asylum countries, including
Thailand, to permitting U.S. resettlement processing of North
Koreas. If suitable cases were found, we would also be
looking for some assistance from the ROK. Political
Counselor asked Kim for an updated assessment of the North
Korean refugee situation in Thailand and whether Seoul had
passed on any new instructions or information.


4. (C) Somewhat surprisingly, Kim responded that he had
received no new instructions or information from Seoul

regarding U.S.-ROK discussions on North Korean refugees,
including on the provision of assistance for suitable cases
or sharing information on North Korean refugees who wanted to
resettle in the United States. He added, however, that the
ROK Embassy would naturally follow any instructions that
Seoul might provide.


5. (C) Kim then raised the familiar concern that USG
processing of North Korean refugees in Thailand could
endanger the pipeline to the ROK and said that the USG should
not do anything that might disturb the existing system. He
asked whether the USG had considered Mongolia as an
alternative location, noting that the Mongolian government
seemed more forthcoming generally on this issue than
Thailand. (Comment: In ref a, MOFAT DG Kim took a different
tact, stating that a USG refugee resettlement initiative in
Mongolia could lead the Mongolians to shut down the pipeline
to South Korea and thereby end that country's status as a
particularly important transit point for North Korean
refugees. End comment.) Counsellor Kim stated that word
spreads rapidly among the NGOs and brokers involved with
North Korean refugees and it would quickly become known that
the USG was processing North Korean refugees in Thailand. He
predicted that the number of North Korean refugees would
surge since it was already relatively easy for them to travel
here. They would test the USG to see how many refugees it
would take.


6. (C) Kim continued that the Thai government was already
concerned about the increasing number of North Korean
refugees coming to Thailand. He noted a recent press report
in which a northern Thai police official had said that the
Thai government was worried about the trend and would bolster
its police presence in the areas where the North Koreans
crossed the border. He expressed confidence, however, that
the Thai government would not take steps to stop the existing
pipeline to South Korea. Apart from the higher numbers that
were moving through the pipeline this year, Kim said there
were no changes in how the system was working. It was now
taking about 2 months on average for North Korean refugees to
be processed in Bangkok before they were moved on to the ROK.



7. (C) Kim raised another concern about U.S. refugee
processing of North Koreans in Thailand. He said he believed
the DPRK had never approached the Thai goverment regarding
the existing pipeline. However, if the United States were to
start taking North Korean refugees from Thailand, Kim said
this would likely change. The DPRK would raise the issue
with the Thai. In addition, the DPRK might charge that the
U.S. was abducting North Koreans and use that as an excuse
not to participate in the Six-Party talks.
BOYCE