GANGING UP ON THAKSIN -- SNAP ELECTIONS NEXT?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BANGKOK 001034 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/20/2016 TAGS: PGOV PHUM TH SUBJECT: GANGING UP ON THAKSIN -- SNAP ELECTIONS NEXT? REF: A. BANGKOK 969 ¶B. BANGKOK 922 ¶C. BANGKOK 0538 Classified By: Ambassador Ralph L. Boyce, reason 1.4 (b) (d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: Things are getting worse for the Prime Minister. A prominent leader of the 1992 democracy movement has joined the anti-Thaksin coalition, calling on Thaksin to resign and promising to join the protest on Sunday. Retired General Chamlong Srimuang's political influence has declined, but he is still famous and respected as a deeply religious anti-corruption campaigner. More significant, he is Thaksin's political mentor, having brought him into politics twelve years ago. As the PM's woes mount, we believe that he is considering calling a snap election. It is unclear if this move would quiet his opponents, who understand the difficulty of beating TRT, even in a fair contest. END SUMMARY. ONWARD, BUDDHIST SOLDIERS... -------------- ¶2. (C) Bit by bit, the coalition against Prime Minister Thaksin Shinnawatra continues to grow. On Saturday, a leader of the 1992 movement that ousted the military government announced his support for the anti-government coalition and called on Thaksin to resign. Chamlong Srimuang, a retired general and former governor of Bangkok, was a prominent political figure in the 1980's and 1990's; his political influence has waned, but he still has star power. His criticism of Thaksin is especially noteworthy as he was the PM's first political mentor: Thaksin got his start in Chamlong's Palang Dharma party twelve ago. Chamlong is an outspoken critic of government corruption, a "Mr. Clean" who adheres to strict Buddhist precepts and organizes his supporters to demonstrate against social evils like alcohol. He says he will lead his "Dharma Army" to participate in the next protest rally on Feb. 26. ¶3. (C) Chamlong brings some baggage along with him. After leading the popular uprising against the military dictatorship in 1992, he was blamed by some for contributing to the violence and the deaths of demonstrators. He stepped down from political life for several years to atone for his role in the bloodshed. Some press and NGOs are raising concerns that his participation on Sunday could spark violence in what have been, up to now, largely peaceful protests. ¶4. (C) Following Chamlong's announcement, the PM convened an emergency cabinet meeting at his house the next night, then called for a special joint session of Parliament next month to debate the recent criticisms of the government. The move was dismissed as "too little, too late" in one newspaper headline: this probably reflects the general view of the opposition, which smells blood. ¶5. (C) During a meeting with visiting US Senator Feingold on February 20, the PM was clearly tense and preoccupied. Asked about the political climate, he shrugged off the threat to his government and maintained that he was still in a strong position. The Ambassador heard a different viewpoint in a surprisingly candid comment from a Deputy Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Defense, following the Senator's call on the Minister. Admiral Banawit, while walking the Ambassador out of the meeting, noted that the demonstration on Sunday would be big and that "the government would fall" because "Chamlong is very effective." He seemed pretty cheerful about it. (Comment: Banawit is an acolyte of Privy Council Chairman Prem Tinsulanonda, which makes his enthusiasm for Thaksin's downfall doubly interesting. End Comment.) SNAP ELECTIONS -------------- ¶6. (C) It appears that the PM is considering calling snap elections. A government spokesman over the weekend said that dissolving parliament might be a way out of the political crisis. Thaksin has denied he is considering the option. He is left with few other ways, however, to slow the momentum of the opposition. Thaksin will assume, like most observers, that his Thai Rak Thai (TRT) will be able to garner a strong majority again in new elections. TRT support seems to be declining, but its majority (375 out of 500 seats) is so large that it can slip a long way and still be ahead. Over the weekend, one of the more credible polling organizations here (ABAC) reported a precipitous fall in Thaksin's popularity rating, from 58 percent four months ago to 34 percent now. Some of this decline is probably due to the modest but notable shift in the media. While pro-government messages still dominate the broadcast media, print media is showing some more independence. Papers that formerly ignored political stories or toed the government line are cautiously increasing their coverage of criticism, particularly of the Shin Corp deal. And even the broadcast media cannot ignore the fact of the large and repeated anti-Thaksin rallies. Nonetheless, TRT has money, power and a grass roots structure that would be hard to beat. ¶7. (C) In a meeting with the Ambassador on Friday, February 17, a close advisor to Thaksin discussed TRT's options. Pansak Vinyaratn blamed the PM's problems on a failure to communicate. He said that Thaksin had not explained the "conventional" nature of the Shin Corp transaction well enough. The opposition is making untrue accusations, or criticizing things which are "normal business practice." TRT will respond by counter-attacking against questionable business practices by the opposition and by clarifying the questions around Shin Corp. Pansak said that the party had good polling data which showed it was still strong. The worst case scenario, he said, is to call new elections, which "TRT will win" anyway. The Ambassador asked what would happen if the situation got worse and something provoked an intervention by the Palace. Pansak replied that TRT would not allow this to happen, tacitly acknowledging that such an intervention would be inimical to Thaksin's interests. COMMENT - IS IT ENOUGH? -------------- ¶8. (C) Calling snap elections is probably Thaksin's smartest move, but it may not be enough. The opposition can also read the polling data; they didn't go to all this trouble just to get stomped by TRT on election day again. Thaksin's manipulation of the institutions of government have left the opposition with little faith in the Electoral Commission or other official bodies to carry our fair elections. We understand that some of the opposition forces are still hoping for a scenario in which the King intervenes, sets up a caretaker government for an interval (in part to allow consideration of amendments to the Constitution) and which then serves as an impartial administrator of the next elections. We still see little sign as yet that the King or his closest advisors want to get drawn into this kind of political role. ¶9. (C) We believe that Thaksin and TRT are still weighing their options on early elections. Thaksin will be extremely reluctant to show any weakness or make any concession to the opposition; it's just not his style. But he has very few other cards to play against an opposition movement that, although not enormous, just won't quit. End Comment. BOYCE