PURSUIT OF TERRORIST INFO EXCHANGE WITH BRUNEI

S E C R E T BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000636 SIPDIS SIPDIS FOR EAP/MTS, S/CT, AND CA E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2016 TAGS: ASEC BX CVIS KHLS KVPR PINR PREL PTER SUBJECT: PURSUIT OF TERRORIST INFO EXCHANGE WITH BRUNEI REF: STATE 190832 Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon, Reasons 1.4 (B & D) ¶1. (C) Reftel requested reporting on Government of Brunei (GOB) activities to collect identifying personal information on terrorists or suspected terrorists. Following post assessment is keyed to questions posed reftel. The majority of this information has not/not been publicly released by the GOB. It was acquired by post in numerous discussions with GOB officials over last several months, including within the context of pursuing an HSPD-6 information sharing agreement with Brunei. Some of it is classified as "Secret" by the GOB and was shared with us in confidence. -------------- Immigration Databases -------------- ¶2. (C) The GOB maintains a computerized immigration database at all ports of entry (POE's). This system tracks all entries and exits and provides immigration officers at the POE with a detailed record of those events, as well as a digital facial image of the traveler that was captured during his/her initial entry into the system. This system, which was procured from a German company, looks to be robust and efficient. The database is updated on a continual basis. It is also used for screening visa applications. Its most significant limitation appears to be the lack of a rigorous, transparent, and consistent GOB-wide set of SOP's for entering names into the system watchlist. -------------- Watchlist and Information Sharing -------------- ¶3. (C) A name-based watchlist is integrated into the computerized GOB immigration system described above. It includes immigration violators and criminal suspects entered by the Royal Brunei Police Force (RBPF). The RBPF and the Internal Security Department (ISD) can add suspected terrorists or terrorism supporters to the list. In addition, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade provides the names of individuals designated on the UNSC terrorist list. Multiple classified GOB databases contain background information on terrorist suspects whose names may be entered into the watchlist. ¶4. (S) The GOB has no formal watchlist agreements with other countries. Information is shared on an ad hoc, case-by-case basis. Post is aware that ISD conducts regular intelligence exchanges with some (but not all) ASEAN countries, and some watchlist entries are presumably shared in these contexts. The GOB is currently reviewing the USG proposal for an HSPD-6 information-sharing agreement. -------------- Biometrics -------------- ¶5. (SBU) As noted above, the immigration database available at all POE's includes the capability for digital facial imaging. The GOB currently issues a machine-readable passport. It has contracted with a private company for manufacture and issuance of a biometric passport that meets ICAO biometric standards and USG requirements for Visa Waiver Program countries. The GOB plans to begin issuing this new biometric passport when it becomes available from the manufacturer early in 2007. -------------- Identifying Appropriate Partners -------------- ¶6. (SBU) The GOB is definitely an appropriate partner for data sharing. Post and Department have been actively pursuing an HSPD-6 information sharing agreement with GOB for the past year, and have provided GOB with the text of a model MOU, which it is currently reviewing. Post is cautiously optimistic that we may be able to finalize an HSPD-6 agreement in 2007. ¶7. (C) Post believes GOB will be willing and able to apply necessary safeguards to USG information supplied under an HSPD-6 agreement, and would use such data appropriately. It is conceivable that GOB information supplied to the USG under such an agreement could include individuals whom do not meet the USG bar for excludable terrorist activity, such as Islamic religious dissidents. This issue can be easily avoided, however, by requesting that the lookout entries supplied by the GOB under HSPD-6 be tailored to USG requirements. ¶8. (C) Given the progress made to date in pursuing an HSPD-6 information sharing agreement with the GOB, post believes that USG efforts to expand terrorist information sharing with the GOB should continue to focus on the HSPD-6 path in 2007, unless that approach is ultimately rejected by the GOB. SKODON