BRUNEI'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEBANON RELIEF AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 000414 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR P, EAP, EUR, NEA, EB, AND PM SINGAPORE ALSO FOR DAO E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/16/2016 TAGS: EAID IR LE PREL BX SUBJECT: BRUNEI'S CONTRIBUTIONS TO LEBANON RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCUTION, SUPPORT FOR UNSCR 1701, VIEW OF IRAN REF: BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 398 (NOTAL) Classified By: Ambassador Emil Skodon, reasons 1.4 (b, d) ¶1. (C) Government of Brunei (GOB) Foreign Minister II Pehin Lim Jock Seng told Ambassador on August 15 that Brunei is contributing BDOLS 1 million (approx USDOLS 633,000) for immediate humanitarian relief in Lebanon in response to an OIC appeal. Lim said the GOB may be willing to contribute more for relief and reconstruction, but wants to wait for a definitive needs assessment and better organization of the reconstruction effort. He said the GOB has received overlapping and apparently uncoordinated appeals for aid to Lebanon directly from Prime Minister Siniora, the OIC, and UNSYG Annan, and would like for these to be sorted out before making further commitments. ¶2. (C) Lim, who had briefed the Sultan of Brunei on UNSCR 1701 the previous day, told Ambassador the Sultan had believed strongly for the last month that the top priority in southern Lebanon was to stop the violence as soon as possible and supported 1701 as a means of achieving that aim. Lim said that the Sultan and GOB recognize the need to build upon UNSCR 1701 and secure a durable settlement in Lebanon. The GOB will support steps in that direction, as well as any renewed steps toward a comprehensive resolution of Arab-Israeli differences. ¶3. (C) Ambassador told Lim the key to durable peace in Lebanon was for Hezbollah and its backers to end the untenable situation of maintaining a state within a state, and accept that the Lebanese government should assert control over its own territory. The USG hoped the GOB would support that position in the OIC and other fora. Lim nodded agreement but said the GOB would avoid taking a public stance in favor of quiet diplomacy. He also cautioned that, based on the GOB's recent experience with the Iranian Foreign Minister in Kuala Lumpur at the Emergency OIC Meeting, the Iranians continued to "talk tough" and were extremely difficult to deal with. ¶4. (C) Lim said Teheran continued to push for the Sultan to accept its invitation to visit Iran, but that he was inclined to advise the Sultan not to do so. Ambassador urged that the Sultan not visit Iran, since no matter what was said behind closed doors, the Iranians would maintain that the Sultan had supported their position on nuclear enrichment and other issues, thus presenting His Majesty with the uncomfortable choice of either tacitly accepting that characterization or publicly calling his hosts liars. SKODON