SECOND TUAREG - GSPC BATTLE PLACES ALGIERS ACCORDS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAMAKO 001243 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/26/2016 TAGS: PREL PINR PINS PGOV ML SUBJECT: SECOND TUAREG - GSPC BATTLE PLACES ALGIERS ACCORDS IN DOUBT Classified By: Political Officer Aaron Sampson for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) 1.(C) Summary: Concern over the status of the Algiers Accords deepened following a second battle between the Tuareg Alliance for Democracy and Change (ADC) and the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). One day before the ADC-GSPC October 23 fight, an official within the Malian Ministry of Territorial Administration told Radio France that rebel disarmament and the repositioning of Malian military units in Kidal would begin on October 28 under Malian and Algerian supervision. The same day, the ADC claimed to have no knowledge of the October 28 deadline and described the GOM's "unilateral" decision as a "provocation." After the ADC-GSPC firefight, the ADC released a second statement accusing the GOM, First Lady Toure Lobbo Traore and the Malian Arab/Berabich community of using the GSPC as a proxy to weaken Tuareg rebels (this posting was later removed from the ADC website). Embassy contacts from the Arab and Tuareg community stressed that without the re-establishment of a direct channel of communication between President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) and ADC leader Iyad ag Ghali, the situation could deteriorate further. As of this writing, ADC disarmament and cantonment in Kidal had not taken place. End Summary. -------------- The ADC's Statement -------------- 2.(C) Following the October 23 battle between members of the ADC and the GSPC in the Timbuktu region of northern Mali, the ADC released a statement accusing the Malian military of helping the Arab/Berabich community support the GSPC; the ADC threatened action in response, albeit in the the realm of international opinion, of the potential negative consequences of such support. As reported via other channels, seven ADC members were reportedly killed, with three seriously wounded and two individuals taken prisoner. The text of the ADC's statement was posted on the ADC's website (http://azawad-union.blogspot.com) on October 24 and then removed a few hours later. (Text follows at paragraph 9.) -------------- Accords on the Rocks -------------- 3.(C) The leak to French radio of Territorial Administration Minister Kafougouna Kone's apparent deal with Algeria to reposition Malian forces and begin collecting the ADC's weapons on October 28, together with the ADC's heavy losses at the hands of the GSPC on October 23, further threatened the Accords implementation process. The process has been stalled for several months due to the Accords' failure to indicate whether the Malian military must withdraw to the outskirts of Kidal before or after the rebels return the weapons stolen during the May 23 Kidal and Menaka attacks. The ADC was apparently not part of Kone's recent arrangement with Algeria regarding the timetable for disarming the rebels and the repositioning of Malian military units, and described the decision as a "provocation." 4.(C) Following the ADC's October 24 statement, many observers suggested the status of the Accords was now in doubt. In this view, the ADC would refuse to disarm if they believed the GOM was arming their GSPC opponents. Additionally, some have noted the irony of the Algerians who facilitated the accords providing logistic support to Mali's "armed bandits" so that they can attack the Algerian Salafists. Others have questioned whether it is purely coincidence that the ADC launched its campaign against the GSPC at the very moment the ADC was supposed to have begun turning in its weapons. According to one local media account, the GSPC finds itself "caught between the fire of the Kidal insurgents and the Algerian army, and is under close surveillance by the Americans who have tracked the GSPC's movements for years." The GOM, on the other hand, is reportedly "embarrassed by the unfolding of a situation that risks to delay, if not completely compromise, the implementation of the Algiers Accords." -------------- The Need for Dialogue -------------- 5.(C) Amidst the heightened level of uncertainty and concern following the ADC-GSPC confrontations, Arab and Tuareg contacts have stressed the need for resumed dialogue between President Amadou Toumani Toure (ATT) and Iyad ag Ghali. A Bamako-based Tuareg who remains in close contact with Iyad ag Ghali and Ahmada ag Bibi told the Embassy that to resolve the BAMAKO 00001243 002 OF 002 current conflict and ease tensions in the north, ATT needed to re-open direct channels of communication with Iyad ag Ghali. Talks between the two men reportedly ceased more than a month ago. Timbuktu Arabs express a similar point of view. For the Arab community, Iyad and the ADC are increasingly unpredictable. The worst thing ATT can do, one contact told the Embassy, is ignore Iyad. ¶6. (U) Text of statement posted (and then withdrawn the same day) on ADC website, October 24: "24 October 2006, When A State Supports Terrorists: Doesn't one often say that the friend of my friend is my friend: Mali is supporting the Berabich who are aiding the GSPC and therefore by association Mali is aiding the GSPC. The government created an Arab militia largely composed of Berabich and allied nomadic fractions following the famous Gossi meeting (of Malian Arabs held in May 2006) that was widely publicized and covered by the Malian media. The origin of this idea comes, we know, from the First Lady of Mali Lobbo Traore who has family ties to these Arab groups and who thought of creating an anti-Alliance militia. It so happens that the Berabich are helping the terrorists. In any case, one truth is apparent: on May 23 we gained a sufficient quantity of arms and ammunition to spark a war and begin long-term hostilities, but because of our love and attachment for our meager territory we opted for dialogue and peace. In contrast, in a spirit still loyal and patriotic, we decided to expel the GSPC and all Islamic actors or terrorist elements from our northern regions, these foreign actors who have tarnished our image and our customs (by) hostage taking, repeated acts of banditry and smuggling, it is unfortunate that in the course of this struggle with these terrorists we once again meet the hand of the Malian government. In the deadly ambush of Monday, October 23, of which we were victims we recognized and identified machine-guns belonging to the Malian army. We will take action and you can be assured that this is only the beginning. We intend to attract the attention of international opinion in regard to the very serious consequences the Malian security forces' plans can provoke." McCulley