EU SPECIAL REP SEMNEBY ON EU SOUTH CAUCASUS POLICY

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 000660 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 05/01/2016 TAGS: PREL PREF PBTS PNAT AJ GG RU MD SUBJECT: EU SPECIAL REP SEMNEBY ON EU SOUTH CAUCASUS POLICY Classified By: acting DCM Joan A. Polaschik, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: EUR Senior Advisor Steven Mann met with EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby (Sweden) on April 22. Semneby provided a readout of his recent conversation with Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Azimov, outlined the EU process for committing peacekeepers, and advocated close coordination and a strong line on the Georgian separatist conflicts. END SUMMARY -------------- -------------- NAGORNO-KARABAKH PEACEKEEPING INSIGHTS FROM AZIMOV -------------- -------------- ¶2. (S) Semneby gave a readout of his April 21 meeting with Azerbaijani Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov, who shared several ideas about the composition of a potential peacekeeping force for Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K): it should not include Russians, preferably be UN-led (to ensure an Azerbaijani voice),and roughly resemble the provincial reconstruction teams crrently active in Afghanistan. Azimov told Semnby he would like to see peacekeepers assist in the return of refugees and internally displaced persons. Conceding that a military force would be required initially, Azimov reportedly envisioned a drawdown to a police force as N-K evolved into a semi-autonomous region of Azerbaijan with self-government capacities similar to those of the Azerbaijani exclave of Nakhichevan. More generally, Azimov told Semneby that the G-8 might be a realistic target for working out an N-K deal, but he complained that proposed working groups on the modalities of a referendum on the final status of N-K could not delay progr ess on other measures. -------------- N-K PEACEKEEPING: THE EU PERSPECTIVE -------------- ¶3. (S) Semneby said he had contacted the chief EU military planner the previous week to request a report on peacekeeping options by the end of May. He planned to involve the national intelligence services of EU member states in the planning phase, as well. He said he would report to the EU on peacekeeping options by the end of May in an effort to sensitize member states to the issue and ensure they will be able to make a decision when the time comes. From the signing of a peace agreement, Semneby said the EU would require six weeks of "pre-planning," an undetermined length of time for member states to reach a political decision, and two additional months to get boots on the ground. If an N-K peacekeeping force were to be EU-led, Semneby said it would be led out of one of the EU's four international command centers: in Germany, the UK, France, or Greece. ¶4. (S) Semneby returned to the peacekeeping issue at the end of the meeting with a plea for as much detail as possible on peacekeeping in any agreement between Presidents Aliyev and Kocharian. He said the EU will require a formal trigger to start the planning process and that the two sides will need to state exactly what they want. He asked specifically if a law-enforcement component was envisioned. Mann outlined a vision of a 5000-man force for approximately three years that would ultimately be drawn down to a monitoring force. He told Semneby that any successful peacekeeping force in N-K and the occupied territories would need to be asymmetric (i.e. deployed in greater numbers in the most politically sensitive areas) and might able to rely on remote sensor technologies to enhance monitoring efforts. -------------- -------------- GEORGIAN SEPARATIST CONFLICTS: MORE VISIBILITY NEEDED -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) On Georgia, Semneby said he believes Abkhazia is closer to annexation than South Ossetia but that both conflicts need to be raised "at the highest levels all the time." He plans a trip in the next few weeks to South Ossetia with Georgia OSCE Head of Mission Roy Reeve. Semneby is keen on getting international media attention on the Georgia conflicts: "people need to see it," he said. Having worked at the OSCE mission in Tbilisi in 1992-93, Semneby called it an "outrage" that no progress has been made on the conflicts in the last thirteen years. Tangentially, he called for closer coordination with EU Special Representative for the Transnistria conflict, Adriaan Jacobovits de Szeged. BAKU 00000660 002 OF 002 More centrally, he bemoaned the fact that the EU continues to have a problem reaching consensus on its Russia policy. ¶6. (C) Semneby said he spoke recently to Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who advocated renegotiating the Sochi Agreement in order to transform negotiations on South Ossetia into "a real dynamic process." Semneby reportedly argued for patience on this point, urging Saakashvili not to act too quickly and jeopardize the upcoming South Ossetia donors' conference. Semneby was focused on the benefits of the South Ossetia needs assessment survey and impending donors conference, arguing that they would ensure an international presence in the region and lead to a change in format with financial contributors leading the charge to resolve the conflict. ¶7. (U) Ambassador Mann has cleared this cable. HYLAND