ISRAELI READOUT ON MOD GILAD'S VISIT TO AZERBAIJAN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 001709 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR/CARC AND NEA - JEFFREY; FOR NP/ECC - PVANSON, ACHURCH AND JGABRYSZEWSKI E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/21/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV ETTC MASS IR IS AJ SUBJECT: ISRAELI READOUT ON MOD GILAD'S VISIT TO AZERBAIJAN REF: A. STATE 182032 (NOTAL) ¶B. BAKU 1541 BAKU 00001709 001.2 OF 002 Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse per 1.4 (b,d). ¶1. (C) Summary: According to Israeli Ambassador to Azerbaijan Arthur Lenk, Israeli MOD DG for Political-Military Affairs Amos Gilad's October 30-31 visit to Azerbaijan was low-profile and short on substance. Gilad engaged Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Abiyev in a detailed discussion of Iran's military and political structures, but his other GOAJ meetings - mainly at the deputy minister level -- were a perfunctory overview of the ministries' activities. While Azerbaijan and Israel signed a new bilateral defense cooperation agreement during Gilad's visit, Lenk did not expect that the agreement would prompt any immediate changes in the bilateral relationship or degree of assistance provided by Israel. Lenk pledged specifically that Israel would not pursue new bilateral defense assistance initiatives in Azerbaijan without consulting the USG. He also said that Israel had reconsidered its earlier plans to assign an Ankara-based Defense Attache and now planned only to send a Tel Aviv-based MOD official on quarterly visits. Both the GOAJ and the GOI seem fully aware of the risks that could be posed by an elevated bilateral security relationship and we are confident Israel will not undertake new unilateral intiatives. However, well thought-out, targeted technical assistance in an area such as border controls, conducted as part of an international initiative, could be helpful and politically viable. End summary. MEETING WITH MINDEF ABIYEV -------------- ¶2. (C) During a November 15 meeting with DATT and P/E Chief, Israeli Ambassador to Azerbaijan Arthur Lenk provided a readout of Israeli MOD DG for Political-Military Affairs Amos Gilad's October 30-31 visit to Azerbaijan. Gilad met twice with Azerbaijani Minister of Defense Safar Abiyev, first for what Lenk described as far-reaching review of Azerbaijan's security environment -- including a lengthy exchange on Iran -- and a second time to sign a new bilateral defense agreement. Lenk reported that Abiyev and Gilad engaged in a detailed discussion of Iran's military and political power structures, with Abiyev arguing that Iran's Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Ministry of Defense have effectively been merged and are under the combined, direct command of Supreme Leader Khamenei. Lenk commented that Abiyev was noticeably reticent on the subject of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, his usual favorite topic with visiting dignitaries. ¶3. (S) Lenk did not reveal details of the new bilateral defense cooperation agreement, but said he did not expect any immediate follow-up. (In a previous meeting, Lenk had described the agreement as "short on substance but a good start" - see ref b). An official from the Israeli Ministry of Defense will travel to Baku in late November to exchange signed copies of the agreement, and Lenk hinted that further discussions about the parameters of new assistance could take place at that time. However, Lenk noted that the USG had raised concerns about possible new Israeli defense assistance programs in both Baku and Tel Aviv (reftels),and said that Israel understands that any new initiatives should be closely coordinated with the USG. (Drawing from ref a, pol/econ chief explained that the USG welcomed and encouraged Israeli outreach to the Muslim world, but wanted to ensure that any new initiatives did not complicate existing, excellent GOAJ cooperation in the Global War on Terror.) The new Israeli-Azerbaijani bilateral defense agreement was not publicly announced. REVISED DATT PLANS -------------- ¶4. (C) Lenk said that Israel had reconsidered its plans to accredit an Ankara-based Defense Attache to Baku. Instead, Israel plans to send a Tel Aviv-based MOD official to Azerbaijan on a quarterly basis "to test the waters." Lenk said the press of work in Ankara made it difficult for an Ankara-based official to take on responsibilities for Baku, BAKU 00001709 002.2 OF 002 but he also hinted that the Israeli decision could be based on concern about how an Israeli DATT would be received. In response to a question from our DATT, for example, Lenk said that Israel would not list the Tel-Aviv based MOD official on its diplomatic list and planned to introduce the DATT only to his US and UK counterparts. OTHER GOAJ MEETINGS -------------- ¶5. (C) While in Baku, Gilad also met with the Head of Azerbaijan's State Border Service, General Guliyev, who provided an overview of Azerbaijan's border service capabilities and activities. Lenk said that he and Gilad were left with the impression that, due to a lack of resources and capacity, Azerbaijan's borders were quite open. Lenk commented that Israel could provide expertise in this area, offering training and technical assistance to increase the GOAJ's capacity, but affirmed that he would not consider undertaking new assistance programs without consulting the USG. He wryly noted that he was fully aware of likely GOAJ sensitivities regarding possible Israeli assistance on Azerbaijan's southern border. ¶6. (C) Gilad also had separate meetings with President Aliyev's National Security Advisor Vahid Aliyev, and the deputy ministers of Internal Affairs, Emergency Situations, and National Security. According to Lenk, none of these meetings were terribly substantive; the Deputy Minister of Defense Industry, for example, made small talk while never explaining that the Minister (whom Gilad had been scheduled to meet) had been called away to meet the Prime Minister. Lenk said the two sides did not discuss arms sales. The deputy ministers of Internal Affairs and National Security simply provided an overview of their ministries. Lenk noted that Israel had provided crowd control/riot police training to the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the run-up to Azerbaijan's 2005 parliamentary elections, and felt that had been an effective bilateral initiative. COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) Comment: Both the GOAJ and the Government of Israel seem fully aware of the risks that could be posed by a new, elevated security relationship between Israel and Azerbaijan. Judging from the relatively low-level and low-profile reception offered to Gilad, the GOAJ did not want to do anything during this visit that could be viewed as provocative by Iran. Based on Lenk's haste to reassure us of Israel's commitment to close consultations with the US on this issue, we are confident that Israel will not pursue new, unilateral initiatives that could jeopardize our own security cooperation with Azerbaijan. ¶8. (C) In our view, technical assistance to help strengthen Azerbaijan's border controls could be one area for possible expanded Israel-Azerbaijani security assistance. The USG provides assistance through a range of DTRA, DOE, EXBS, INL and EUCOM-funded programs, but Azerbaijan's border control needs are immense. Border control assistance -- particularly if conducted under the rubric of an internationally organized effort such as the OSCE's new border security initiative, could be both effective and politically sustainable. We will mull this idea in-house and report the embassy's consolidated views septel. DERSE