AZERBAIJAN MUM ON P5+2 STATEMENT ON IRAN, LIKELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAKU 000163 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/03/2016 TAGS: PARM PREL KNNP AORC EU IR AJ SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN MUM ON P5+2 STATEMENT ON IRAN, LIKELY TO REMAIN SILENT REF: A. STATE 16171 ¶B. 05 BAKU 1959 Classified By: AMBASSADOR RENO L. HARNISH III PER 1.4 (B,D). ¶1. (C) Pol/Econ Counselor delivered ref a demarche on Iran's nuclear programs to MFA Americas Desk Director Ilgar Mukhtarov on February 2. Mukhtarov had no substantive comment and, in response to emboff's query, said the GOAJ had not issued a public statement on the P5 2's agreement that the IAEA should report Iran to the UN Security Council. Following the meeting, Americas Desk Officer Elchin Bashirli confided that he believed the GOAJ would never issue public statements on this or any other issue related to Iran's nuclear programs, as the GOAJ had too much to lose -- including real security threats and access to the isolated exclave of Nakhchivan -- to risk making public statements critical of Iran. ¶2. (C) Presidential Foreign Policy Advisor Novruz Mammadov separately confirmed on February 1 that the GOAJ would not issue public statements on Iran's nuclear programs. While the GOAJ has serious concerns about Iran's pursuit of nuclear capabilities and subsequent ability to threaten Azerbaijan's security, Mammadov said the GOAJ believes it would harm, rather than advance, its security interests by criticizing Iran publicly. For these reasons, Mammadov said, President Aliyev in particular will never/never comment on Iran's nuclear programs. Moreover, the GOAJ as a policy only comments publicly on Iran's nuclear programs when absolutely necessary, as when Mammadov personally corrected statements made -- without instructions -- by Azerbaijan's Ambassador to Tehran that indicated the GOAJ supported Iran's nuclear weapons program. (Following the Ambassador's statement, Mammadov made a statement to IRNA expressing Azerbaijan's hope that Iran would find an understanding with the UN Security Council members that would lead to a peaceful resolution of the situation.) Mammadov also noted that the Ambassador had been punished for his statement. ¶3. (C) When forced to comment on Iran's nuclear programs, the GOAJ generally walks a fine line that recognizes the right of nations to develop nuclear energy while calling on all nations to respect international agreements. As Deputy Foreign Minister Khalaf Khalafov explained Azerbaijan's position on Iran to emboffs on January 25, Azerbaijan believes that all nations have the right to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under international agreements and each state should conduct nuclear energy programs within this international framework. He quickly added, however, that Azerbaijan does not desire or support the idea of a nuclear weapons program in Iran. Khalafov noted that Iran is a signatory of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and therefore has international responsibilities. He emphasized that Azerbaijan supports stability and security in the region and would continue to support international efforts in this regard, including the activities of the European Union. He stressed that any non-implementation of international agreements by any state could lead to misunderstanding and undesirable consequences and that resolution of any disagreements must be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy. In keeping with the concerns outlined by Mammadov, however, this flat rejection of a nuclear weapons program for Iran never makes it into GOAJ public statements. ¶4. (C) Comment: Azerbaijan is in a difficult position vis-a-vis Iran, with serious concerns about the threat its much larger neighbor poses to Azerbaijan's security, and with an equally serious need to maintain good, working relations with Iran on a host of border and trade issues (ref b). Azerbaijan clearly would like to see Iran's nuclear weapons question resolved but it is reluctant to play any role in the public or private pressuring of Iran to heed the international community's warnings. Absent any security assurances from the United States regarding possible provocations from Iran, the GOAJ is unlikely to change its quietly neutral stance on Iran's nuclear programs. HARNISH