Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAKU1622
2006-11-08 07:14:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baku
Cable title:  

AZERBAIJAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT EXPECTED TO

Tags:  PGOV PREL PBTS RU IR AJ 
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VZCZCXRO2797
RR RUEHDBU
DE RUEHKB #1622/01 3120714
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
R 080714Z NOV 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAKU
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 1639
INFO RUCNCIS/CIS COLLECTIVE
RHMFISS/CDR USEUCOM VAIHINGEN GE
RUEKDIA/DIA WASHDC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
RUEHNO/USMISSION USNATO 0498
RUCNDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0190
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 001622 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS RU IR AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT EXPECTED TO
BE FINISHED BY END 2006

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DERSE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B, C)

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 001622

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/01/2026
TAGS: PGOV PREL PBTS RU IR AJ
SUBJECT: AZERBAIJAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY CONCEPT EXPECTED TO
BE FINISHED BY END 2006

Classified By: AMBASSADOR DERSE FOR REASONS 1.5 (B, C)


1. SUMMARY: At a November 3 meeting, the UK representative
of International Advisors Working Group (IAWG),retired UK
General Sir Garry Johnson said that Azerbaijan's National
Security Concept (NSC) will likely be finished and approved
by the end of 2006. Johnson reported that his role as
advisor continued to be that of helping to guide the process,
and not to contribute to the document's substance. Johnson
believed that NSC will not contain mention of a specific
intent to join NATO, nor will it contain language that West
would oppose. Deputy Foreign Minister Araz Azimov told
Johnson that he hoped that the IAWG which advised Azerbaijan
on the interagency process would remain intact after the NSC
was completed. Johnson advised that while the Azerbaijanis
would likely welcome more U.S. involvement, the value of
inserting a U.S. advisor at this late stage in the
preparation of the NSC were unclear, and suggested that the
U.S. "missed the boat". Most NATO Ambassadors in Baku agree
that, regardless of the NSC's content, the process behind it
with an emphasis on strategic analysis and interagency
process --is itself an important reform step. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) During a November 3, 2006, meeting with retired UK
General Sir Garry Johnson, Ambassador Derse, A/DATT and
poloff (notetaker),Johnson reported that based on his
discussions in Baku with relevant MFA and other officials,
Azerbaijan's NSC will likely be completed by the end of
November 2006. Upon completion, the document will be
submitted to President Aliyev for review and finally to the
Azerbaijani Parliament for approval, which Azimov told
Johnson could happen by the end of 2006. The writing of the
document, which has been over two years in the works, is an
important part of Azerbaijan's NATO Individual Partnership
Action Plan (IPAP).

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SUBSTANCE REMAINS A MYSTERY
--------------


3. (C) Johnson, who is the UK representative of the IAWG,

which on paper includes representatives from Germany, Turkey
and the United States, has been advising the Azerbaijani
Foreign and Defense Ministries about how such a document
should be formed for over two years. Johnson's role has
primarily been that of facilitator, and not an advisor on
substance. Johnson said that the document would likely "not
include a statement with a specific intent to join NATO."
Furthermore, Johnson said that IAWG's role was to help
Azerbaijan present a document that would not embarrass the
GOAJ or that the West would oppose. Despite these
intentions, Johnson said that he knew very little about the
substance of the document.

--------------
IAWG'S ROLE TO CHANGE?
--------------


4. (C) Johnson said that although he and the German
representative had been active, there has been little
representation from the U.S. and that the Turkish delegate
has been sick, and has participated little in the past
several months. Johnson said that as the NSC neared
completion that the role of the IAWG would change to be one
to "push them along, as much as to comment." The role the
IAWG would play in the drafting of the Military Doctrine and
Foreign Policy Strategy was not clear to Johnson, although
Azimov told Johnson of his strong intention to keep the group
together. More interestingly, Johnson said that Azimov told
him that the role of the group in the future could be to
"work on other topics" as they come up. When Johnson queried
Azimov further on this, Azimov did not give more specifics,
and mentioned that it may have been an idea that Azimov was
simply batting around.

--------------
MOVING FORWARD
--------------


5. (C) In a late October 2006 meeting with poloff, Gaya
Mammedov of the Azerbaijani MFA, and one of the primary
drafters of the NSC said that upon completion of the NSC,
Azerbaijan's interagency working group would begin the
drafting of the "Military Doctrine" and the "Foreign Policy
Strategy" documents. These documents would stem from the
more general NSC document. Mammedov said that the Military

BAKU 00001622 002 OF 002


Doctrine was already fifty percent finished, despite the fact
that the drafting process had not officially started.
Mammedov said that the completion of the NSC document was the
result of a two year process, which began when President
Aliyev signed a presidential decree on September 17, 2004,
which authorized the "Interagency Working Group" specifically
to draft the three documents.


6. (C) Mammedov explained that the first year was spent
simply learning about how an interagency coordination process
happened from international experts (including IAWG),and
that there was little coordination or writing that took place
in the first year. Over time the Interagency Working Group
became less reliant on IAWG. According to both Mammedov and
Johnson, representatives of the MFA and Ministry of Defense
consulted the IAWG more on process rather than substance.
The process has been a long one because Azerbaijan's
interagency working group consists of 23 separate individuals
representing different offices, ministries or state
committees, from the MFA to the Ministry of Finance, Ministry
of Economic Development, the State Special Engineering and
Conversion Committee, and the head engineer of the Department
of Fuel and Energetics, to name just a few.

--------------
ROLE FOR U.S. ADVISOR
--------------


7. (C) Both Mammadov and Johnson said that the Azerbaijanis
were interested in having more U.S. participation in the
IAWG. However, Johnson cautioned that a U.S. advisor, like
him, would likely not be asked to contribute substantively to
the writing of the document, but would rather play an
advising role on process and stylistic issues which could
help keep the process moving. Johnson also mentioned that
good progress has been made to date and that the costs of
having a U.S. advisor would have to take into account
Azerbaijan's desire to be perceived has having a moderate and
balanced approach to NATO accession. Johnson said that given
that Azerbaijan has been somewhat secretive about the NSC's
content, he was not confident that inserting a U.S. advisor
at this point in the process would necessarily be productive,
saying that "in some respects, the U.S. has missed the boat",
and that instead he believed that it may be better to engage
Azerbaijan directly at the government-to-government level.

--------------
PROCESS OVER SUBSTANCE
--------------


8. (C) During several late October and early November 2006
discussions, the broad consensus amongst Baku-based NATO
member country Ambassadors is that Azerbaijan wants to
proceed cautiously and deliberately with NATO, and that there
is likely no unified view as yet within the GOAJ with respect
to its ultimate intention vis-a-vis NATO. However, senior
GOAJ leaders recently have dropped hints that Azerbaijan may
now want to proceed toward NATO integration in a more
determined fashion. Regardless of the pace and ultimate goal
of Azerbaijan's NATO IPAP process, the military and defense
sector reforms undertaken as part of the IPAP commitments are
needed and are already creating results. In the case of the
NSC, the strategic thinking and interagency process created
as a result of the drafting process will improve Azerbaijan's
foreign policy process and will advance NATO interests.
DERSE