AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON DEPUTY PRIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAKU 001501 SIPDIS SIPDIS DEPT FOR EUR DAS BRYZA AND PRM A/S SAUERBREY E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/02/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM PREF PBTS MARR SNAR AJ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S INTRODUCTORY CALL ON DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER ALI HASSANOV Classified By: Ambassador Anne E. Derse for Reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. (C) Summary. In a September 27 introductory meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime Minister Ali Hassanov reiterated the GOAJ commitment to improving the conditions of Azerbaijan's IDP population. Hassanov said that he has transformed the GOAJ relationship with the international donor community as Chairman of State Committee for IDP/Refugee Issues. Hassanov reported the GOAJ would spend $200 million in 2006 to address IDP issues. He also said he was committed to advancing GOAJ planning for the future repatriation of the IDP population in the event of settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh (N-K) conflict. Hassanov singled out Russia's interest in preventinga resolution as an obstacle to the Minsk Group pace process, which he described as a failure. Separately, Hassanov said that the GOAJ supports the development of Non-Banking Financial Institutions in Azerbaijan, a key element of USAID's Small and Medium Enterprises project, given NBFI's potential to improve the economic conditions of the general population and specifically of the IDP community. Hassanov welcomed the future visit of PRM Assistant Secretary Sauerbrey and agreed to a subsequent discussion on drug trafficking which he described as a problem. End Summary. STATE COMMITTEE COOPERATION WITH DONORS NEVER BETTER -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In a September 27 meeting with the Ambassador, Deputy Prime Ali Hassanov, Chairman of the State Committee on IDP, Refugee Issues and Humanitarian Assistance, detailed the extent of his office's cooperation with the international community. Hassanov, elevated in 1997 to the Deputy Prime Ministership, said that former President Heydar Aliyev tasked him with restructuring GOAJ programs to improve the welfare of Azerbaijan's "one million" IDPs and to strengthen the GOAJ relationship with the international community. (Note: UNHCR estimates that there are approximately 650,000 IDPs in Azerbaijan.) ¶3. (C) Hassanov said that in 1998 many international aid agencies were pulling out of Azerbaijan, fed up with red tape, corruption and a lack of GOAJ cooperation. While the GOAJ was largely to blame for these problems, Hassanov added that Section 907 of the US Freedom Support Act further complicated the GOAJ efforts to coordinate IDP assistance programs since the GOAJ at that time was ineligible to receive direct assistance. Since then, Hassanov reported, the GOAJ has reinvented its IDP aid program, eliminating bureaucratic obstacles to assistance delivery, exempting donors from taxes and creating a previously unheard of level of transparency in Azerbaijan's government. (International donors praise Hassanov's efforts as largely successful.) Hassanov added that today his office coordinates the work of 74 international donor organizations, many of them American, without difficulty. Hassanov remarked that in the end "donors could be confident that the aid reaches the IDP population, where it's needed most." GOAJ WORKING ON REPATRIATION PLANNING, IMPROVING IDP CONDITIONS -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Hassanov said that the GOAJ spent $200 million in 2005 to improve IDP conditions and will spend another $200 by the close of 2006 - $100 million drawn from the state budget and $100 million from the State Oil Fund. Hassanov reported that by the end of 2007, the GOAJ plans to have closed all existing tent camps and replaced them with newly constructed settlements. He acknowledged that currently still far too many IDPs live in schools and abandoned buildings. ¶5. (C) The Ambassador underscored the importance of the GOAJ developing a comprehensive repatriation plan in the event of a settlement of the N-K conflict. Hassanov agreed, noting that he has been closely collaborating with leading international organizations, principally UNHCR and ICRC, to develop a repatriation planning framework. Hassanov said the GOAJ will work with the international community to divvy up responsibility for post settlement repatriation planning along sectoral lines (e.g. health, education, demining, infrastructure) with the USG, UNHCR, and ICRC acting in key roles. However, Hassanov said a comprehensive needs assessment would be required to ascertain the post conflict BAKU 00001501 002 OF 002 condition of the region before any detailed, operational plan could be carried out. ¶6. (C) The Ambassador told the DPM that PRM A/S Sauerbrey planned to visit Azerbaijan from November 16-17. The Ambassador stressed that aside from monitoring USG IDP/refugee assistance programs, the Assistant Secretary would want to learn more about GOAJ planning for a future IDP repatriation in the event of a settlement of the N-K conflict. The DPM welcomed A/S Sauerbrey's visit and indicated that his office would provide any assistance requested to make it a success. DEPUTY PM: MINSK GROUP PROCESS A FAILURE -------------- ¶7. (C) Hassanov strongly criticized the OSCE Minsk Group process, saying that "After 14 years, (the Minsk Group) has little to show for its efforts." Hassanov argued that the Co-Chairs' failure stemmed from the Group's composition: Russia, whom Hassanov said was responsible for the conflict to begin with and has no interest in resolving it, and France, a country, Hassanov commented, with a large and influential Armenian population. Neither could be trusted to carryout a legitimate peace process. Hassanov said that even in Washington the Armenian diaspora is the "second most powerful political lobby." He told the Ambassador that the N-K conflict began because Azerbaijan refused to permit Russian troops to be stationed on Azerbaijani soil in the aftermath of its independence from the Soviet Union. ¶8. (C) Russia, Hassanov alleged, exploited the weakness of Azerbaijan's first post-independence government and provided material support to the Armenian military to invade Azerbaijan's territory. Underscoring his view of Russia's role in preventing a settlement, Hassanov pointed to Armenian President Robert Kocharian's early willingness to negotiate with former President Heydar Aliyev only to renege after the 1999 assassination of Armenia's speaker of parliament, deputy speaker and prime minister. Armenia, Hassanov remarked, is the instrument of Russia's attempt to divide and control the South Caucasus. Hassanov added this was a Russian policy across the FSU, pointing to Russia's hand in the conflicts of South Ossetia and Transnistria as further evidence of its objectives. ¶9. (C) Hasanov said it was too soon to evaluate the efficacy of the new American co-chair, but cautioned that the Co-Chairs' failure to meet with the IDP community during their frequent trips to the region was a serious mistake. Hassanov said he told GOAJ Foreign Minister Mammadyarov that it was important to involve the IDPs in the process from the outset and not to foist any agreement on the population most affected by its terms. Hassanov said that the Co-Chairs' belief that "some of the IDPs will stay" in their current locations and "some will return" to the post-conflict area is wrong and reflects their lack of interaction with the IDP community. COOPERATION ON NBFI -------------- ¶10. (C) The Ambassador also highlighted the need for the GOAJ to support the development of Non-Banking Financial Institutions, a key element of USAID's Small and Medium Enterprise development project. The Ambassador said that it is vital that NBFI's obtain legal registration and permission to operate under commercial terms in order to make NBFIs strong providers of credit to the IDP community and to other underserved segments of the population. Hassanov expressed his support for the NBFI initiative and promised to address further cooperation with the USAID's Country Coordinator. ¶11. (C) Hassanov confirmed he has responsibility for combating drug trafficking, offered the view that Azerbaijan has a problem and agreed to a subsequent meeting to discuss the issue further. DERSE