IRAQI SECURITY FORCES IN SADR CITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000984 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/24/2011 TAGS: IZ MARR MCAP MOPS NATO PGOV PINR PREL PTER SUBJECT: IRAQI SECURITY FORCES IN SADR CITY Classified By: Acting Deputy Chief of Mission David Litt for reasons 1. 4 (A),(B),AND (D) ¶1. (C/REL MNC-I) SUMMARY. The Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) presence in Sadr City remains problematic, although the area is much more under control than described by reports. There is a tremendous amount of everyday urban activity - a heavy volume of vehicle traffic, large numbers of pedestrians, shops open, children playing, and an abundance of products for sale. Coalition patrols travel freely through Sadr City. However, Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) are not patrolling often enough to discourage all JAM activity. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (U) On March 22, PolMilOff accompanied Multi-National Division-Baghdad (MND-B) Commanding General MG Thurman on a flying (UH-60 helo) and driving (armed and armored HUMVEE convoy) tour of eastern Baghdad, including Sadr City. Along with a first-hand look at local conditions, several ISF locations were inspected. -------------- BUSY STREETS -------------- ¶3. (U) The most notable feature of Sadr City (and much of Baghdad),both from the air and from the ground, is the poor infrastructure resulting from Saddam's decades-long neglect of this heavily-Shia populated urban area. Sadr City reflects its history of being a slum, with potholed roads and buildings in disrepair. Still, several Coalition civic improvement projects have been completed improving life there, and more are underway. Most notable are water treatment facilities that are providing potable water to residents, some for the first time. ¶4. (U) A tremendous amount of local activity was seen. Streets were filled with cars and buses, which frequently caused traffic jams. Shops were open with many products on display. One furniture store had almost one hundred sofas and easy chairs on display. Open air markets had an abundance of fresh produce. There was a constant flow of foot traffic with people going in and out of stores. Children were seen playing on dirt soccer fields packed with youngsters. ¶5. (U) The local mood, as best that could be discerned from a HUMVEE, was positive to neutral towards our passing patrol. There is local appreciation for the Coalition-funded civic projects that have been completed. Many smiling children waved enthusiastically. (NOTE: Other PolOffs have traveled 
to Sadr City and have seen children pretend to shoot their convoys with makeshift toy guns.) But in general, most people ignored our presence. Local men sometimes gave sullen stares as our convoy traversed the streets, but mostly our vehicles drew fleeting impassive looks indicating that the sight of a U.S. military convoy is a regular and unremarkable event. Posters of Muqtada al-Sadr were seen throughout the area. Many homes were flying black flags which signify the Shia recognition of the death of Hussein (martyr),but also imply informal support for JAM. No armed JAM members were seen, as they melt away when Coalition Forces approach. When armed men are seen, MND-B soldiers approach and confiscate their weapons. So far, there has been little-to-no resistance by these armed men when such actions are taken. -------------- VIEW ON ISF -------------- ¶6. (C/REL MNC-I) Several stops were made to inspect Iraqi Army (IA),Iraqi Police (IP) and a combined IA-Coalition operation. ISF troop morale was good, with the IA generally appearing better-equipped and trained than the IP. At each stop, Thurman, as the overall commander of Coalition and Iraqi forces in the Baghdad Area of Operations, queried them on their status, what problems they had, and what support he could offer. Excellent camaraderie was displayed between the ISF and accompanying U.S. Army forces with whom they operate. In response to Thurman's queries to each senior officer at every stop, all reported minimal problems with tactical incidents. Instead, when they did express concerns, they were focused on logistical issues, particularly fuel shortages. ¶7. (C/REL MNC-I) The operation inspected was Operation Cannae, a combined battalion-sized U.S. Army-Iraqi Public Order Battalion cordon-and-search in south eastern Baghdad. At the time we were present, the Coalition and Iraqi BAGHDAD 00000984 002 OF 003 commanders were reviewing their progress to date. Things had been going well, with one weapons cache of approximately 30 weapons (AK-47s, mortar shells, RPG launchers, rockets, ammo and pistols) already confiscated. (NOTE: the weapons were laid out and all appeared fully functional). These units were working through a neighborhood searching for more caches. No resistance had been encountered and local residents had generally been cooperative by opening their homes for searches to be conducted. The IA troops were well-equipped, and their officers appeared confident and professional. ¶8. (C/REL MNC-I) Two separate IA checkpoints were inspected. Again IA troops appeared confident wearing standard body armor and weaponry. One checkpoint was manned by 8 IA troops tactically positioned along a major road with barbed wire set up to control traffic. The other location inspected was an IA platoon barracks along a road running east out of Baghdad, with a checkpoint set up just in front of it. Approximately 10 IA soldiers were present in the barracks (it was dinner time) with five troops, the regular contingent for this checkpoint, posted outside. The remaining 10 troops of this contingent were manning other checkpoints. Barbed wire and sand bags were set up defensively around the barracks. When Thurman offered assistance, this unit's commander only asked for additional barbed wire and sandbags to improve the barracks' defenses. ¶9. (C/REL MNC-I) Three separate IP stations bordering Sadr City were inspected. One station was in near-pristine condition, with an authorized strength of 188 police, although the Iraqi Police colonel stated he was staffed with only 137. The other two stations were in more worn and dirty buildings, whose commanders also reported they were under-staffed. ¶10. (C/REL MNC-I) Still, the IP units were upbeat in morale, but all lamented the lack of fuel for their vehicles, saying they are unable to operate until they receive adequate supplies. Likewise, IP members stated they had an insufficient number of patrol cars, radios and armament. Lack of fuel was a major issue for all IPs we spoke to, asking for Coalition intervention with the Ministry of Interior to provide them the resources needed to operate effectively. They all expressed frustration with their MOI superiors for not providing them with fuel, which has been a recurring theme we have heard recently from other IP units. ¶11. (C/REL MNC-I) When PolMilOff queried the IP commanders regarding their capability to enforce a weapons ban, the uniform reply was that, despite laws already on the books banning public display of weapons, they have not received guidance (or even support) from the Iraqi leadership to enforce such a ban. They did express confidence in their abilities to enforce a weapons display ban provided they had full Iraqi government support. Additionally, the IPs added they were under-gunned compared to JAM, as JAM has heavy machine guns, RPGs and mortars while the IP is only equipped with light weapons. -------------- COMMENT - IRAQI LEADERSHIP NEEDED MOST -------------- ¶12. (C/REL MNC-I) COMMENT. Sadr City, despite its poor superficial impresions, is showing vibrant and active urban activity. Some reports make it sound as though Sadr City is a locked-down wasteland that has been totally surrendered to JAM. It is not. There is plenty of movement and economic activity. While there is insufficient ISF presence in Sadr City, it has not been "surrendered to JAM" as some Iraqis have alleged. ¶13. (C/REL MNC-I) IA and IP units have been assigned security responsibility for the Sadr City area, however they rarely enter Sadr City, unless it is part of a combined operation with U.S. forces. U.S. forces do not enter it as often; when they do, they are unhindered. Also, Forward Operating Base Loyalty, which is less than two miles from Sadr City, has a 3000-strong U.S. Army brigade. These U.S. troops do not concentrate exclusively on Sadr City, but do interact with local officials, provide a security presence and are actively training the IA and IP units in the area. IP in particular avoid Sadr City, reportedly for sectarian loyalty to Sadr and JAM, but also because they lack Iraqi governmental support and sufficient equipment. Thurman is confronting the ISF commanders on this to urge them to be more active in Sadr BAGHDAD 00000984 003 OF 003 City. However, they will likely remain hesitant until they have strong GOI support to exercise their full security authority. Our belief is the Shia-controlled government wants to avoid any type of armed conflict with JAM and therefore does not encourage the ISF to engage in activities that might lead to a confrontation. ¶14. (C/REL MNC-I) The confidence expressed by the IP commanders to independently confront JAM is likely bluster, as strong Coalition support would be required if the ISF were to make any effective inroads against JAM. The lack of resources, especially the IP fuel shortage, stems partly from the overall national fuel shortage, but is aggravated by MOI inefficiencies and bureaucracy. In addition, the increased operations tempo of Operation Scales of Justice, which has added more patrols to the streets, is also creating a need for fuel that was not originally budgeted for. MNSTC-I is working with both the MOI and MOD to have the Ministry of Oil provide additional fuel resources to the ISF. END COMMENT. KHALILZAD