MCNS DISCUSSES MILITIA DEATH SQUADS, RECENT

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000981 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016 TAGS: PGOV PTER MOPS IZ SUBJECT: MCNS DISCUSSES MILITIA DEATH SQUADS, RECENT MILITARY OPERATIONS Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (A),(B),AN D (D) ¶1. (S//REL GBR AUS) SUMMARY: At a meeting of the Iraqi Ministerial Committee for National Security (MCNS) on March 22, MNF-I Commanding General Casey presented information indicating militia death squads are most likely responsible for recent spikes in murders and executions that have followed terrorist bombings since February 22. The Prime Minister directed him, with some reluctance, to present a plan to address this problem. In addition, the committee discussed recent military operations, including Operation Swarmer and Operation Scales of Justice. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (S//REL GBR AUS) On March 22, 2006, Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'afari convened a meeting of the MCNS at his residence at the request of GEN Casey. Other members present included Ambassador, National Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Minister of Defense Saadoun al-Dulime, and Minister of State for National Security Affairs Karim al-Anzi. Absent were Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr and British Ambassador. Prime Minister's Chief of Staff al-Tamimi and Military Advisor Kanini were also present. -------------- MILITIA DEATH SQUADS -------------- ¶3. (S//REL GBR AUS) GEN Casey began the meeting by presenting evidence that indicates recent spikes in murders and executions are the work of militia death squads. The trends indicate that although the average number of attacks overall in both Baghdad and throughout Iraq have not varied since early February, the number of murders and executions in Baghdad has spiked on three occasions: following the bombing of the al-Askariya mosque in Samarra on February 22; after a multi-carbomb attack on Baghdad on March 6; and on March 14 when four car bombs exploded in the Sadr City region of Baghdad. GEN Casey explained that there is no specific evidence to prove who is behind these killings. However, there are indications that many of them have been carried out by Moqtada al-Sadr's Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM) militia. These indicators include the arrest of nine confirmed JAM members on March 13 who were stopped and found to be in possession of an assassination list that contained the names and addresses of individuals to be shot on sight, and the torture/murder on March 14 of three Iraqi Army Special Forces soldiers who had been sent on an undercover mission to JAM-controlled Sadr City to observe an area where a number of executed bodies have been dumped. ¶4. (S//REL GBR AUS) PM Ja'afari responded by asking what is to be done to address this problem. MinDef Dulime responded that the real problem is not that individuals are committing these acts. The real problem is JAM. He reported that many times he has received calls from brigade and battalion commanders reporting that their troops are being fired on by suspected JAM elements, asking how to respond. Dulime said he always tells them to resist firing back, afraid that a confrontation between Iraqi Army troops and JAM fighters would lead to civil war. Dulime said he believes the solution to the JAM problem is not military -- not because his forces aren't capable of defeating JAM -- but rather political. ¶5. (S//REL GBR AUS) Al-Anzi tried to divert the blame from Shia militias such as JAM to Sunni "terrorists." He argued the only way to deal with such a problem is to be tough on the predominantly Sunni terrorists who precipitate these killings. He observed that the fact these killings occur after major terrorist attacks is an indication that tensions are high and the situation is "ripe for civil war." The fact that Sunnis are now participating in the political process does not mean that the Sunni-dominated terrorists will cease their attacks. He also predicted the Sunni politicians who are now part of the process will themselves become the targets of terrorists. He argued that if the government is not seen to be responding to terrorist assaults in a tough manner, than people will lose confidence in the government and take matters into their own hands. The terrorists are seeking to stoke the sectarian fires with provocative attacks. Because the government is not seen to be crushing them, people are beginning to act on their own. Al-Anzi then sought to change the subject by asking pointed questions about the nature and successes of recent military operations led Coalition forces (CF). ¶6. (S//REL GBR AUS) Despite al-Anzi's attempts to steer the discussion away from suspected Shia death squads, GEN Casey and Ambassador kept the subject alive. Ambassador urged that in addition to focusing operations against terrorists, steps must be taken to address the equally threatening problem of sectarian killings carried out by militias such as JAM. "We need to focus on militias in addition to terrorists." GEN Casey urged that terrorists and militia death squads be placed in the same category: "Terrorists and killers murdering innocent people." When questioned about the number of operations CF and Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) conduct against terrorists, GEN Casey told Ja'afari that every day there are between 30 to 50 small, focused, intelligence-based operations. By stark contrast, there are currently zero operations being conducted against militia death squads who are killing more people in Baghdad every day than are the terrorists in the rest of the country. This forced Ja'afari to acknowledge the scope of the problem, and at the end of the meeting he asked GEN Casey to work with the Ministers of Defense and Interior to formulate a plan to address the militia problem. -------------- MILITARY OPERATIONS -------------- ¶7. (S//REL GBR AUS) Throughout the meeting the subject of recent and ongoing military operations was raised by al-Anzi, most likely to divert discussion away from the issue of Shia militias. He was critical of the fact that the Prime Minister and he, the Minister of State for National Security Affairs, had first learned of Operation Swarmer from the television. He questioned whether Operation Scales of Justice was being pursued according to plan, arguing that the confidence of the Iraqi people in the capabilities of the ISF will not be bolstered by increased patrols and checkpoints in Baghdad but, rather, by large-scale, hard-hitting operations and raids that are based on intelligence and aimed specifically at terrorists. He hinted that he believes CF often hold back the ISF and prevent them from taking effective action against terrorist targets, and insinuated that the Prime Minister was not being fully or frankly informed about Coalition operations. ¶8. (S//REL GBR AUS) Prompted by al-Anzi's remarks, Ja'afari asked for a report on the status of Operation Scales of Justice. MinDef Dulime responded that it is going very well. The first phase is to let the people of Baghdad see more police and army patrols in their neighborhoods, and the number of such patrols has been increased. GEN Casey, responding to a question from Ja'afari, reported that additional U.S. forces have been brought into the Baghdad area to participate in the operation. He agreed with Dulime that it was going well, pointing out that the Council of Representatives had been seated without incident, that the Arba'een pilgrimages and observances which had involved two to three million people took place with no major security incidents, and that the number of killings in Baghdad has decreased since the operation commenced, although they remain higher on average than they were prior to the February 22 attack in Samarra. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶9. (S//REL GBR AUS) Although by the end of the meeting Ja'afari had agreed to permit the formulation of a plan to deal with militia-inflicted violence, he was clearly not anxious to do so. Given that his future as Prime Minister is dependent on the support of Moqtada al-Sadr, he is clearly skittish about doing anything that will offend his new political benefactor. Approving any plan to confront and defang the JAM will do just that. Al-Anzi meanwhile sought to support Ja'afari with a clearly sectarian agenda. Rubaie, who is usually not shy about speaking up in these meetings, sat silently throughout except to question once how GEN Casey concluded the evidence presented pointed to JAM. Dulime clearly went on record, yet again, to say that the JAM is a major threat and gamely tried to defend the effectiveness of his forces that he himself admitted are not acting against militias. While all parties seem willing to acknowledge for the sake of political correctness that militias must be controlled, finding the political will to actually take action will prove to be quite challenging. KHALILZAD