DE-BAATH COMMISSION DISFUNCTIONAL, COMMISSIONER

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000978 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM KJUS IZ SUBJECT: DE-BAATH COMMISSION DISFUNCTIONAL, COMMISSIONER SAYS REF: 05 BAGHDAD 004997 Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. In a March 21 meeting, parliamentarian and National De-Baathification Commission (NDC) board member Yonadam Kanna told PolOffs that the De-Baathification Commission was too politicized and was not comprised of the "right" people. He claimed that the commission had not met in over a year, and that formal procedures to handle cases were not being followed. Instead, he alleged that SCIRI, Dawa and the Iraqi National Congress are in full control of the Commission and signing De-Baath orders without consulting other members of the Board of Directors. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Kanna complained that the NDC had become too politicized, and wistfully recalled the days when "Allawi's guys" were on the commission. He told PolOffs that out of 85,000 Iraqis who had been dismissed from their jobs for Baathist ties, almost 15,000 had been granted exceptions and allowed to return to their jobs. He said that 10,000 Iraqis had been declared "criminals with no right to return to their positions," and 5000 Iraqis had been forced into early retirement without pension. 6000 cases are still under investigation. ¶3. (C) Despite these statistics, Kanna insisted that the current Board of Directors has never met to discuss even a single case. He noted that three members of the board had split the key Directorates amongst themselves, filling the Director General (DG) jobs with partisan cronies. Kanna alleged that Iraqi National Congress leader Ahmed Chalabi controls the Information Gathering & Investigations Directorate, SCIRI's Shaikh Jalal al-Din al-Sagheer (from Baghdad's Baratha mosque) controls the Legal Affairs Directorate, and Dawa's Jawad al-Maliki controls the Follow-up and Implementation Directorate. He accused all three of illegally signing De-Baathification orders without consulting the board, although "it's mostly al-Maliki." When PolOff asked about the 10 step process for De- Baathifying an individual (reftel),Kanna snorted that there were "never even two steps." He reported that the DGs prepared the orders and the board members signed them. ¶4. (C) Kanna insisted that problems within the commission had to be addressed in the Council of Representatives. However he initially stated that he would wait for Sunni Arabs to raise the matter, rather than bringing it up himself. He insinuated that it could be dangerous for him to blow the whistle, as the commission could decide to go after him (NOTE: Twenty minutes before that statement, he had rattled off a long list of anti-Baathist qualifications and Saddam era threats against his life. End Note). PolOffs expressed concern over the extra-procedural functioning of the De-Baath Commission, and urged Kanna to raise his concerns at the earliest opportunity. He robustly agreed that he would do so. ¶5. (C) COMMENT: The information Kanna provided is credible and expands on accusations from other board members (reftel). Kanna did not call this meeting to discuss De- Baathification Commission issues, but rather to lobby the USG for favors. While he did bring party favors, in the form of gossip and a few statistics, he did not come to make promises. His hearty "agreement" to raise his concerns in the CoR cannot be seen as anything other than polite pandering. KHALILZAD