Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD977
2006-03-24 15:10:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

DISTRICT COUNCIL MEMBERS DECLARE NO TRUST IN

Tags:  PGOV PINS IZ 
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VZCZCXRO1020
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0977/01 0831510
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 241510Z MAR 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3527
INFO RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000977 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ
SUBJECT: DISTRICT COUNCIL MEMBERS DECLARE NO TRUST IN
IRAQI POLICE

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000977 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS IZ SUBJECT: DISTRICT COUNCIL MEMBERS DECLARE NO TRUST IN IRAQI POLICE Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. On March 21 members of the Sunni Arab neighborhood of Al-Adhamiyah's district advisory council emphasized that while they welcomed the presence of the Iraqi Army, the Iraqi Police were unreliable and involved in much of the terrorism hurting local residents. men stressed that fearful district residents had organized nightly neighborhood watches to fire on unknown armed groups - including the police - and were coordinating these watches with local Iraqi army units. General Jewad Al- Dayny, the commander of the local Iraqi Army brigade who was present at our meeting, confirmed this. General Jewad with us agreed that the MOI forces were not dependable, and his troops had several times since February stopped police involved in kidnappings. The general (a Shia) and the councilmen applauded the Ambassador's public statements stressing the need for non-sectarian ministers at the defense and interior ministries and urged the U.S. hold firm. Jawad added that the only way to gain peace in Iraq was to disarm the militias and citizens. The councilmen wondered why American forces operated in al-Adhamiya, but were largely absent from the Sadr-militia dominated district of Sadr City immediately to their east. End Summary. -------------- MEMBERS REQUESTED MEETING WITH POLCOUNS -------------- ¶2. (C) Since the attack on the Samarra Mosque the northern Al-Adhamiyah District of Baghdad City has been experiencing a high level of violence and attacks on residents and mosques. Frustrated by the unrest, members of the community asked PolCouns to meet with district representatives to discuss security issues. Attending the meeting was Dr. Riyadh Al-Adhadh, Deputy Chairman of the Baghdad City Council and Al-Adhamiyah Council Member. Also attending were DAC members Khalid Ibrahim, Abdul Kadir Al- Deliamy, Lukman Jasim, Abdul Razak, and General Jewad Al- Dayny. General Jewad is the commander of the Iraqi Army Battalion assigned to the district. The members wanted to express their frustration at what they claimed are sustained Shia militia raids on homes, arrests of individuals by militia and police who disappear, and "insults to our families," as one councilman said. General Jewad attended the meeting at the re
quest of the council to clarify the mission of his forces and provide an analysis of the tactical situation. -------------- RESIDENTS CRITICAL OF IRAQI POLICE -------------- ¶3. (C) Members of the DAC were blunt with their assessment of the current situation. Abdul described the atmosphere among residents as distressed, fearful, and angry. Dr. Riyadh claimed citizens were satisfied with the performance of the Iraqi Army but wanted more Army forces in the district. Riyad claimed Shia militias still operate on streets of the neighborhoods of eastern al-Adhamiyah, such as Al-Saad and al-Ur; there were frequent killings of Sunni Arabs merely on the basis of their identity cards, he claimed. (Another councilman recounted how three wholesale merchants recently were murdered in the al-Saad district at the large Allawi market adjoining Sadr City. Merchants will no longer buy at that market, he claimed as the others nodded.) More IA troops were necessary to secure the district, Riyad concluded. PolCouns noted that the Americans and IA would step up security operations in Baghdad. The councilmen welcomed this tentatively but said they had seen no impact on Shia militia activities. ¶4. (C) Lukman Jasim described neighborhoods resorting to establishing checkpoints and blocking access to their streets. Lukman described the Iraqi police as incompetent, ill-trained, rude, and corrupt. He also claimed that the Shia militia had penetrated them thoroughly such that citizens could not know if those coming to raid homes at night were police or militia. Riyad chimed in that no Adhamiya resident trusted the police; no one wanted them in their neighborhoods, and if they became more active in the district there would be real antipathy to their presence. He recalled that in former times the police came with the neighborhood mukhtar whose presence verified that the arresting authority was indeed the police. There is no such verification now. Riyad added that police cars setting up traffic checkpoints frequently were painted with Karrada, Sadr City or Zahra district station markings. BAGHDAD 00000977 002 OF 002 Allegedly, when they detained people, the families had to travel from police station to police station looking for their detained relatives. This was adding to the frustration. -------------- GENERAL BLAMES MOI AND MILITIAS -------------- ¶5. (C) General Jewad agreed that though his troops were well trained he needed more troops to patrol and control the al-Adhamiyah and Sadr City areas assigned to his brigade's command. The general quickly blamed the state of unrest and terrorism on the top leadership of the MoI and the tolerance shown by the Americans and the Iraqi leadership towards militias. He also stated the country needed laws that prevent the existence of armed militias. He then exclaimed that Iraq needed nationalists to head the security services, not sectarian political leaders. He got many murmurs of approval from the councilmen who then welcomed PolCouns' observation that the Ambassador was saying much the same thing. Jewad and the councilmen urged the U.S. not to retreat from this position. ¶6. (C) The DAC members praised Jewad and his forces, highlighting for our benefit that here was an example of how Sunni Arabs and Shia could work together. Riyad then politely but forcefully complained that peaceful citizens who were trying to protect their homes due to the evident limitations of Jewad's local forces were in turn being arrested by American forces raiding homes looking for weapons. He wondered who was to protect the public if the Iraqi Army still had insufficient numbers and the police were not credible. Lukman then chimed in that it was noticeable to the residents of Adhamiya that American forces operated in their area where there were no Sunni militias operating. At the same time, they were avoiding operating east of al-Adhamiya where they could "draw fire" from the Shia militias that he claimed had proliferated there. He asked why the Americans were avoiding a fight with the militias when the Americans and Iraqi Army should be disarming them. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (C) We would expect complaining about security conditions from the local council of a predominantly Sunni district, and we heard it. What was striking was the difference between evident respect and sympathy for the Iraqi Army troops and their commander, and the Iraqi police. We also heard a few complaints about American forces' actions, but mainly because they wanted us to be a stronger security presence, not a smaller one. It may be short-lived, but that is a big change from what we heard in al-Adhamiyah a year ago. End Comment. KHALILZAD

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