AL-DABBAGH SAYS MARJA'IYYA UNHAPPY AT DELAY;

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000975

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2026
TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: AL-DABBAGH SAYS MARJA'IYYA UNHAPPY AT DELAY;
JAFARI DOESN'T UNDERSTAND HE NEEDS 184 VOTES TO START
GOVERNMENT FORMATION

REF: (A) BAGHDAD 944

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford,
reasons 1.4(b) and (d)


1. (S/REL UK) Summary. Independent Shia
political figure Ali al-Dabbagh (strictly
protect) told us on March 23 after his late March
22 phone call with Mohammed Ridha SISTANI that
the Shia clerical establishment in Najaf
(marja'iyya) was unhappy at the delay in
government formation. PM Jafari's stubbornness
was so strong that the marja'iyya reportedly do
not think he can be removed. Dabbagh recommends
trying to set conditions on Jafari's service that
would make him as effective a Prime Minister as
possible. End summary.

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Marja'iyya Unhappiness
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2. (S/REL UK) Independent Shia political figure
and media commentator Ali al-Dabbagh (strictly
protect) told Poloff on March 23 that he had
spoken to Sayyid Muhammad Ridha al-SISTANI (MRS)
March 22 evening, after MRS had had a meeting
with unnamed Iraqi political figures, and that
MRS had conveyed the message that the marja'iyya
were unhappy with everyone for the delay in
forming the government. The unhappiness of the
marja'iyya extended to PM Jafari. Jafari's
stubbornness was as strong as ever, Dabbagh said.
"Even if we told Jafari to go, he would not go,"
Dabbagh described MRS as saying.


3. (S/REL UK) The marja'iyya understand that
Jafari does not have the necessary support
outside of the United Iraqi Coalition (UIC).
Dabbagh said he personally would have preferred
Adil Abd al-Mahdi, but can work with Jafari. He
also said that his impression is that the
marja'iyya perceive Abd al-Mahdi is no longer a
viable candidate for the time being. If Abd al-
Mahdi took Jafari's place, it would look like Abd
al-Mahdi brought down Jafari. "Maybe in six
months or a year," Dabbagh said, if Jafari
stumbles as Prime Minister, Abd al-Mahdi could
come back stronger than he is. Dabbagh said that
Abd al-Mahdi would be a viable candidate in the
future only if he is not seen as pushing Jafari
aside now. Dabbagh reviewed the list of
alternative Shia Islamist Coalition candidates --
Qasim Daoud, Nadim Jabiri and Ali Allawi -- and
said that none had enough political support or
the right mix of qualities to be Prime Minister.


4. (S/REL UK) Dabbagh predicted an ongoing
impasse unless something is done from outside to
bring pressure on the parties. The marja'iyya
may urge that the matter be put to a vote in the
parliament. "Who can object to a vote?" he said.
Everyone would have to accept the vote and be
more unified thereafter, he said. The problem
was the principle of consensus has led Iraq to go
to great lengths to avoid a vote and the
consequential loss of face to the loser.


5. (S/REL UK) Dabbagh believes Jafari will not
yield, and wondered aloud if the best course was
to work with him but constrain him. Dabbagh
offered several ways that this could be done.

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Constrain Jafari
--------------


6. (S/REL UK) Dabbagh said Jafari has
established two committees to advise him on
personnel choices. One is a committee largely of
independents with some Dawa al-Islamiya members,
including Dabbagh, Dr. Ali al-Attar, Emad Dhia
al-Khirsan, Mustafa Kadhimy, Zuhair al-Naher (ref
A),Abd al-Amier Zahid (of the think tank Bayt
al-Hikma) and a few others. This committee will
make recommendations to Jafari for his staff.
For example, if Jafari sets up sub-units as
described in Ref A, this committee would
recommend 3-4 people for each staff position.

BAGHDAD 00000975 002 OF 002


Dabbagh is hoping more independents will be added
to this committee.


7. (S/REL UK) The second committee consists
almost entirely of old-line Dawa loyalists:
Jawad al-Maliki, Ali al-Adeeb, Faleh al-Fayadh
and two others. Their role in the personnel
selection process, Dabbagh said, would be to pare
the list down to 2-3 names to go to Jafari, for
him to pick one person.


8. (S/REL UK) These committees, Dabbagh said,
could provide a useful way of improving Jafari's
office by ensuring that only qualified,
reasonably independent-minded people were hired.
Ineffective, old-line party figures could,
Dabbagh hoped, be marginalized through this
procedure.


9. (S/REL UK) Dabbagh reasoned that this
illustrated the correct approach for working with
Jafari. Constrain his actions by prior
agreement, so he cannot act in a peremptory way.
Find highly qualified deputy prime ministers to
be in charge of certain groups of portfolios.
And give him a support staff that will give him
the support he needs.


10. (U) Poloff agreed with Dabbagh that the
government needed to be formed as quickly as
possible, and reiterated the U.S. position that
we do not have a vote for Prime Minister, and it
is not up to the United States to pick a winner.
He underlined that we will work with whomever the
Iraqi Council of Representatives chooses.
(Comment: Dabbagh was not much mollified by
this, but he has come to expect it. End
comment.)

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Comment
--------------


11. (S/REL UK) Comment. The implication of
Dabbagh's statement was that the marja'iyya was
not happy with Jafari but cannot, or will not,
force Jafari to step down to end the deadlock.
If Dabbagh's account is correct, SISTANI's circle
perceive limits to their influence and authority
in the PM contest. End comment.
KHALILZAD