AL-DABBAGH SAYS MARJA'IYYA UNHAPPY AT DELAY;

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000975 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/23/2026 TAGS: PREL PGOV PHUM KDEM IZ SUBJECT: AL-DABBAGH SAYS MARJA'IYYA UNHAPPY AT DELAY; JAFARI DOESN'T UNDERSTAND HE NEEDS 184 VOTES TO START GOVERNMENT FORMATION REF: (A) BAGHDAD 944 Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford, reasons 1.4(b) and (d) ¶1. (S/REL UK) Summary. Independent Shia political figure Ali al-Dabbagh (strictly protect) told us on March 23 after his late March 22 phone call with Mohammed Ridha Sistani that the Shia clerical establishment in Najaf (marja'iyya) was unhappy at the delay in government formation. PM Jafari's stubbornness was so strong that the marja'iyya reportedly do not think he can be removed. Dabbagh recommends trying to set conditions on Jafari's service that would make him as effective a Prime Minister as possible. End summary. -------------- Marja'iyya Unhappiness -------------- ¶2. (S/REL UK) Independent Shia political figure and media commentator Ali al-Dabbagh (strictly protect) told Poloff on March 23 that he had spoken to Sayyid Muhammad Ridha al-Sistani (MRS) March 22 evening, after MRS had had a meeting with unnamed Iraqi political figures, and that MRS had conveyed the message that the marja'iyya were unhappy with everyone for the delay in forming the government. The unhappiness of the marja'iyya extended to PM Jafari. Jafari's stubbornness was as strong as ever, Dabbagh said. "Even if we told Jafari to go, he would not go," Dabbagh described MRS as saying. ¶3. (S/REL UK) The marja'iyya understand that Jafari does not have the necessary support outside of the United Iraqi Coalition (UIC). Dabbagh said he personally would have preferred Adil Abd al-Mahdi, but can work with Jafari. He also said that his impression is that the marja'iyya perceive Abd al-Mahdi is no longer a viable candidate for the time being. If Abd al- Mahdi took Jafari's place, it would look like Abd al-Mahdi brought down Jafari. "Maybe in six months or a year," Dabbagh said, if Jafari stumbles as Prime Minister, Abd al-Mahdi could come back stronger than he is. Dabbagh said that Abd al-Mahdi would be a viable candidate in the future only if he is not seen as pushing Jafari aside now. Dabbagh reviewed the list of alternative Shia Islamist Coalition candidates -- Qasim Daoud, Nadim Jabiri and Ali Allawi -- and said that none had enough political support or the right mix of qualities to be Prime Minister. ¶4. (S/REL UK) Dabbagh predicted an ongoing impasse unless something is done from outside to bring pressure on the parties. The marja'iyya may urge that the matter be put to a vote in the parliament. "Who can object to a vote?" he said. Everyone would have to accept the vote and be more unified thereafter, he said. The problem was the principle of consensus has led Iraq to go to great lengths to avoid a vote and the consequential loss of face to the loser. ¶5. (S/REL UK) Dabbagh believes Jafari will not yield, and wondered aloud if the best course was to work with him but constrain him. Dabbagh offered several ways that this could be done. -------------- Constrain Jafari -------------- ¶6. (S/REL UK) Dabbagh said Jafari has established two committees to advise him on personnel choices. One is a committee largely of independents with some Dawa al-Islamiya members, including Dabbagh, Dr. Ali al-Attar, Emad Dhia al-Khirsan, Mustafa Kadhimy, Zuhair al-Naher (ref A),Abd al-Amier Zahid (of the think tank Bayt al-Hikma) and a few others. This committee will make recommendations to Jafari for his staff. For example, if Jafari sets up sub-units as described in Ref A, this committee would recommend 3-4 people for each staff position. BAGHDAD 00000975 002 OF 002 Dabbagh is hoping more independents will be added to this committee. ¶7. (S/REL UK) The second committee consists almost entirely of old-line Dawa loyalists: Jawad al-Maliki, Ali al-Adeeb, Faleh al-Fayadh and two others. Their role in the personnel selection process, Dabbagh said, would be to pare the list down to 2-3 names to go to Jafari, for him to pick one person. ¶8. (S/REL UK) These committees, Dabbagh said, could provide a useful way of improving Jafari's office by ensuring that only qualified, reasonably independent-minded people were hired. Ineffective, old-line party figures could, Dabbagh hoped, be marginalized through this procedure. ¶9. (S/REL UK) Dabbagh reasoned that this illustrated the correct approach for working with Jafari. Constrain his actions by prior agreement, so he cannot act in a peremptory way. Find highly qualified deputy prime ministers to be in charge of certain groups of portfolios. And give him a support staff that will give him the support he needs. ¶10. (U) Poloff agreed with Dabbagh that the government needed to be formed as quickly as possible, and reiterated the U.S. position that we do not have a vote for Prime Minister, and it is not up to the United States to pick a winner. He underlined that we will work with whomever the Iraqi Council of Representatives chooses. (Comment: Dabbagh was not much mollified by this, but he has come to expect it. End comment.) -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (S/REL UK) Comment. The implication of Dabbagh's statement was that the marja'iyya was not happy with Jafari but cannot, or will not, force Jafari to step down to end the deadlock. If Dabbagh's account is correct, Sistani's circle perceive limits to their influence and authority in the PM contest. End comment. KHALILZAD