SECURITY STILL MAIN CONCERN FOR SUNNI LEADERS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000973

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: SECURITY STILL MAIN CONCERN FOR SUNNI LEADERS

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford for
reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary: In a March 21 meeting with Codel
Warner, Tawaffuq leaders Tarik Hashimi and Ayad
Samarai decried sectarian violence and claimed that
the Sunnis bear the brunt of it. Calling the current
distribution of power in Iraq unbalanced, and blaming
the US for that imbalance, the Sunnis asked for US
intervention in government formation talks and in
investigating human rights abuses linked to Iraqi
government security services. They demanded the
disarming of militias and complained about US inaction
on Iran's meddling in Iraqi affairs. Iranian agents
are interfering in government formation talks, charged
Hashimi, and all the political groups have been told
to support Jafari for the PM slot or chaos will
continue in Iraq and will extend to the Kurdish
region. End Summary

Iraq is in a Civil War Says Hashimi
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2. (C) Tarik Hashimi told the Senators that no one has
the courage to say so, but based on the number of
deaths, especially after the December 15 election,
Iraq is in a civil war. Both sides are suffering said
Hashimi, but it is mostly Sunnis who are being killed.
Al-Qai'da is targeting Shia to ferment sectarian
backlash. Families, both Sunni and Shia, are being
displaced and Shia fear travel to the north while
Sunnis fear traveling to the south. Noting that the
Sunnis are participating in the political process and
voted in large numbers in the December parliamentary
elections, Hashimi wondered who had an interest in
increased sectarian violence.

Power Imbalance Must be Corrected
--------------


3. (C) The power imbalance was created by the
Coalition after April 2003 when the Sunnis were
marginalized and blamed for all of Iraq's ills, said
Hashimi. The Sunnis now want to get beyond
sectarianism and talk about Iraq, whereas the Shia, in
Hashimi's view, still want to dominate the political
process. The Shia control government and have
militias and wish to maintain both advantages. Sunni
Arabs will not accept Shia militias acting with
government support, said Samarai.

Iranian Influence Harmful
--------------


4. (C) Ayad Samarai said that the US underestimated
the negative impact of Iran in Iraq. Inadequate
border security enabled the Iranians to infiltrate
people into Iraq easily. Now Iranian agents are
everywhere and their influence is felt on Iraqi
political life at every level, said Samarrai.
Hashimi, in agreement, stated that even in the current
government formation talks, Iranian agents are
directly influencing actions of all the political
parties, not just the Shia. Hashimi claimed that the
Shia, Kurds and the Sunnis were all approached by
Iranian delegations who told them to support Jafari's
candidacy for PM or chaos in Iraq would continue.
Kurds were specifically warned that Kurdistan will
also be affected, claimed Hashimi.

A Sunni View of How to Restore Security
--------------


5. (C) Hashimi cautioned that while he would not
publicly urge that Coalition Forces stay longer in
Iraq, the US is responsible for security in Iraq and
cannot leave until that is assured. Hashimi said he
liked President Bush's statement that troops will stay
until security is assured even though they want the
Coalition out of Iraq as soon as possible. The
militias must be disarmed, he added. The Sadr
militia's coordinated attacks on Sunni Arab civilians
and mosques after the Samarra incident showed that it
is now an army, he claimed. Hashimi added that it was
obvious that American forces were not patrolling in
Sadr City despite the obvious presence of the Jaysh
al-Mahdi. (He pointed to the contrast of steady
American operations in nearby al-Adhamiyah.) He
cautioned that the Americans are giving the appearance
of weakness and an unwillingness to fight that makes
the Mahdi army look stronger and act more boldly.

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6. (C) Hashimi also charged that the Iraqi
government cannot be trusted to investigate charges of
MOI abuses. Only the US could do this fairly. He
urged that we move forward with the Jadriyah bunker
investigation and announce whatever results there were
publicly. In sum, he concluded that the U.S. must

- stop MOI abuses;
- investigate prior abuses credibly, and
- ensure that the security portfolios go to non-
sectarian nominees with no ties to the militias.

Only with these changes, and a truly national unity
government, would the US be able to provide the
security that will allow for a withdrawal of US
troops, Hashimi told the delegation.

Commment
--------------


7. (C) This was standard fare from one of Iraq's key
Sunni Arab political leaders, and one of its most
outspoken. It is noticeable, however, that in the
wake of the Samarra bombing, Hashimi was not insisting
on a timetable for withdrawal of Coalition Forces.
Instead, he was urging - behind closed doors - that we
not depart too quickly. His frustration with the
silence about the Jadriyah bunker is a common theme we
hear from the Iraqi Islamic Party and other Sunni
Arabs. His pointed remark that the Sunni Arabs
perceive that the Americans look reluctant to confront
Shia militias is also a jab we are hearing from other
Sunni Arab contacts (who want us to squash the Mahdi
militia (you refer to JAM four different ways in this
cable: "Sadr's militia", "Jaysh al-Mahdi", the "Mahdi
army", and "the Mahdi militia". I recommend you refer
to it the same way throughout, or provide a bit more
context for readers who might not be attuned to this
issue)). Other Iraqis are observing the same American
behavior in Sadr City and some are probably drawing
the same conclusions that Hashimi drew even if they
are not saying it.


8. (U) Codel Warner did not have the opportunity to
clear this cable.
KHALILZAD