Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD95
2006-01-11 10:59:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

SHIA ISLAMISTS SIGNAL THEIR DISCONTENT WITH US

Tags:  PREL PGOV IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000095 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SHIA ISLAMISTS SIGNAL THEIR DISCONTENT WITH US

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 0052 B) BAGHDAD 0051 C) BAGHDAD 0053

B. D) BAGHDAD 0058

Classified By: CDA DAVID SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000095

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SHIA ISLAMISTS SIGNAL THEIR DISCONTENT WITH US

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 0052 B) BAGHDAD 0051 C) BAGHDAD 0053

B. D) BAGHDAD 0058

Classified By: CDA DAVID SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS
1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: During the past week many of the Shia
political and religious figures in Baghdad have sharpened
their tone against Sunni Arab political figures. Their
public and private signals of unhappiness with American
policy are also stronger now than at any time since the
transfer of sovereignty in June 2004. They are responding
in part to very real unhappiness on the Shia street about
continued spectacular terror attacks. They also are
responding with visible unease to American efforts to bring
Sunni Arabs into the government and trying to forestall our
pressure on them during pending government formation
negotiations. In particular, they are deeply unhappy with
our criticism of the Interior Ministry's actions and our
desire for change. While the tone against us in Baghdad is
sharper than we can remember for a long time, we have not
reached a point of no return with the Shia Islamists. The
Najaf clerical establishment and Ayatollah SISTANI hves
said nothing publicly against us. Our posts in the Shia
heartland report no big change in the attitudes of their
local contacts so far. Instead, as Baghdad Shia Islamist
politicos dig their heels in publicly, we can expect them
to negotiate very hard on the make-up of the new
government, and in particular the security ministries, once
the government formation talks begin in earnest.

--------------
SHIA ISLAMISTS SHARPEN THEIR TONE
--------------


2. (SBU) The Shia political and religious leadership in
Baghdad reacted very sharply against the surge in terror
attacks in early January. Shia al-Furat TV broadcast the
January 6 sermon of Hazim al-Araji (brother of prominent
Sadrist politician Baha al-Araji) at the Kathimiya Shrine
in Baghdad, the main Shia mosque of the capital. Araji
denounced Sunni Arab political leaders Salih Mutlak, Adnan
ad-Dulaymi and Khalaf al-Ayyan of being Baathists or
terrorists who instigated the wave of violence to change
the election outcome. Pointing to the murder of the
Prophet Mohammed's grandson Hussayn by the Ummayid dynasty
1,300 years ago, Araji said history is repeating itself

with Sunni Arab killers and Shia victims. Brandishing a
rifle, Araji warned that the Shia were inheritors of an
honorable cause (ahl al-bayt) who would fight against the
"sons of the Ummayids" (Sunni Arabs). At the conclusion of
the prayer service Araji led a rally in Kathemiya, also
broadcast in detail by al-Furat TV.

--------------
INCLUDING AGAINST THE U.S.
--------------


3. (C) The Shia leadership also aimed plenty of bile at
the U.S. Shaykh Jalal ad-Din as-Sagheer, the imam of the
well-attended Baratha mosque in north Baghdad, who had been
relatively friendly towards Embassy personnel until
recently, told PolFSN on January 8 that the Americans had
changed their approach with the Shia and had become more
confrontational. He bitterly criticized what he called
American plans to storm the Baratha mosque to search for
detainees. (Comment: many Sunni Arabs charge that there
is a detention facility inside the Baratha mosque. End
Comment.) Sagheer charged that the Sunni Arabs were
threatening violence to influence the political process and
the Americans were accepting this. The Shia will not
accept threats, he warned.


4. (U) Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwaffaq Rubai'e
told the BBC Arabic Service on January 8 that "certain
western embassies and certain western diplomats" are
talking to Sunni Arabs with ties to armed groups. These
contacts, Rubai'e asserted, are "encouraging" acts of
violence in Iraq. Rubai'e emphasized in the interview that
Iraqi security forces were able to do more but were being
restrained. He added that half the foreign troops in Iraq
would be withdrawn by the end of CY 2006 and the remainder
would withdraw by the end of CY 2007. (Comment: Abdel
Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the SCIRI Islamist party and the
Shia Islamist Coalition used many of the same themes in a
January 8 CNN interview. End Comment.)

-------------- --------------
BEHIND THE BLUSTER: WORRY ABOUT OUR SUNNI POLICY
-------------- --------------


5. (C) The Shia leadership is uncomfortable with Embassy
contacts with the Sunni Arabs in general, and with Sunni
Arab hard-liners like Khalaf al-Ayyan in particular. They
have sought reassurance that we have not made secret
security deals to stop operations against insurgents (see
ref a). Shia Islamist politicians also perceive that the
Sunni Arabs seek to reverse the December 15 election
results by threatening or using violence; in meetings with
us this past week their ire towards the Allawi/Sunni Arab
bloc was palpable. They understand that behind the scenes
the Embassy is promoting an Allawi/Kurd/Sunni Arab bloc to
join in unity government talks, and they have heard our
comments that a repeat of the Shia-Kurd deal of the spring
2005 is not satisfactory. In response, they indicate that
they will resist American pressure for Shia concessions to
the Sunni Arabs in the government formation process.
Indeed, figures such as Husayn Shahristani (Shia
independent),Nuri Kamel (Dawa) and Hadi al-Amari (Badr
Organization) all have signaled that seats in the next
government must be allocated on the basis of shares in the
new parliament where the Shia Coalition has the strongest
single bloc (refs a and b). The wildest rumors, which our
FSNs tell us are common on the street, have the U.S.
planning to restore Saddam Hussayn to power against the
Shia Islamists. (Comment: A reporter asked PolCouns
exactly this question in a January 6 news interview, and
the vehement denial came out in some January 8 Iraqi
newspapers. End Comment.)

--------------
AND ANGER AT CRITICISM OF INTERIOR MINISTRY
--------------


6. (C) The angry tone also stems directly from our public
and private criticism of the Interior Ministry and our
pointing to human rights abuses and militia influence at
the Ministry. The head of the Badr Corps, a major Shia
militia, told the Ambassador January 4 that criticism of
the Interior Minister for abuses committed by Interior
Ministry forces was unfair (ref a). A prominent Shia
politician bitterly criticized American attitudes towards
the Interior Ministry, noting we do not criticize the
peshmerga publicly (ref c). We hear in public and private
that while the Shia Islamist leadership believes in human
rights, fighting terror is the priority. The Interior
Minister said public American criticism was undercutting
morale among the police (ref d). The second-ranking leader
of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI) told PolCouns in mid-December that while he could
understand expressing our concern privately, the public
criticism was encouraging the Sunni Arabs. He saw the
issue very much as a zero-sum game.

--------------
AND REAL FEAR OF BAATHISTS
--------------


7. (C) The Shia leaders still harbor a very real fear of
Baathist penetration of the security services. Nuri Kamel
of Dawa, which has little organized militia of its own,
agreed with PolCouns on January 5 that the next Interior
and Defense ministers should not be tied to militias. He
was adamant, however, that a much bigger problem is the
continued presence of Baathists secretly helping terror
groups from inside the security apparatus (ref b).
Pointing to an article in the Washington Post that had made
the Iraqi press January 5 about a Sunni colonel MNF-I
reportedly wanted to assign to a unit guarding the
International Zone, Kamel was incredulous. He wondered why
the Americans could not understand that the Sunni colonel
could connect with Baathist insurgents to seize control of
the International Zone, and hence the government. When
PolCouns pushed back that the colonel appeared loyal, and
that in any case MNF-I still had plenty of troops in
Baghdad, Kamel responded that the risks far outweighed any
possible gains. This is not mere posturing. As many Shia
Islamist political and religious leaders have been murdered
in recent months, the top leadership views the Baathist
threat as not only a national problem but an immediate and
personal threat.

--------------
LESS ANGER AT U.S. SHOWN OUTSIDE BAGHDAD
--------------


8. (SBU) We don't sense a sharper tone in the Shia
heartland yet. At the Friday sermon at the Sadr-affiliated
Kufa mosque on January 6, Sheik Salah Al-Ubaidi condemned
the Karbala attack as serving "the invaders and their goal
of occupation" - standard Sadrist fare. The Najaf SCIRI
head, Sadder Al-Deen Al-Qubanji, in his Friday sermon said
all Saddamists should be removed from the national
government, calling them "the cause of the security
breaches in the national security forces" - again, the old
standard line.

9. (C) Basrah RC spoke January 9 with Basra Governor
Mohammed (from the Shia Islamist Fadillah party) and Hassan
Al Rashid (former governor and an official of the Badr
Corps),but neither voiced concerns similar to those
expressed by the Shi'a leadership in Baghdad. Governor
Mohammed said there was not much cooperation with British
military, but he was referring mainly to assistance and
training instead of operations against insurgents.

--------------
Comment
--------------


10. (C) The anti-American tone among the Shia Islamist
political leadership is probably at its highest decibel
count since Iraq regained sovereignty. The Shia Islamist
Coalition leaders are responding to very real unhappiness
on the Shia street about continued spectacular terror
attacks. Given the fierce competition inside the Shia
Islamist Coalition over its prime minister nominee, we
should not expect a rapid mprovement. SCIRI/Badr, Dawa
and independents all will not want to look weak while the
PM drama plays itself out behind closed List 555 doors.
That said, we have not reached breaking point with the Shia
Islamists, either. We have not heard the vitally important
Najaf clerical establishment criticize us in the same
fashion as the Baghdad-based politicians; there have been
no public blasts from Ayatollah SISTANI or other senior
Najaf clerics. The past week's bluster in Baghdad aims at
forestalling our pressure before serious government
formation negotiations. They are feeling real pressure
from us about the Interior Ministry and the need to cut a
deal with Sunni Arabs at the same time they worry about
perceived Baathists burrowed in the security apparatus. As
they dig their heels in publicly, we can expect them to
negotiate very hard on the make-up of the government,
especially the security ministries, once the government
formation talks begin in earnest.
SATTERFIELD