SHIA ISLAMISTS SIGNAL THEIR DISCONTENT WITH US

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000095 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/11/2016 TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ SUBJECT: SHIA ISLAMISTS SIGNAL THEIR DISCONTENT WITH US REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 0052 B) BAGHDAD 0051 C) BAGHDAD 0053 ¶B. D) BAGHDAD 0058 Classified By: CDA DAVID SATTERFIELD FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: During the past week many of the Shia political and religious figures in Baghdad have sharpened their tone against Sunni Arab political figures. Their public and private signals of unhappiness with American policy are also stronger now than at any time since the transfer of sovereignty in June 2004. They are responding in part to very real unhappiness on the Shia street about continued spectacular terror attacks. They also are responding with visible unease to American efforts to bring Sunni Arabs into the government and trying to forestall our pressure on them during pending government formation negotiations. In particular, they are deeply unhappy with our criticism of the Interior Ministry's actions and our desire for change. While the tone against us in Baghdad is sharper than we can remember for a long time, we have not reached a point of no return with the Shia Islamists. The Najaf clerical establishment and Ayatollah Sistani hves said nothing publicly against us. Our posts in the Shia heartland report no big change in the attitudes of their local contacts so far. Instead, as Baghdad Shia Islamist politicos dig their heels in publicly, we can expect them to negotiate very hard on the make-up of the new government, and in particular the security ministries, once the government formation talks begin in earnest. -------------- SHIA ISLAMISTS SHARPEN THEIR TONE -------------- ¶2. (SBU) The Shia political and religious leadership in Baghdad reacted very sharply against the surge in terror attacks in early January. Shia al-Furat TV broadcast the January 6 sermon of Hazim al-Araji (brother of prominent Sadrist politician Baha al-Araji) at the Kathimiya Shrine in Baghdad, the main Shia mosque of the capital. Araji denounced Sunni Arab political leaders Salih Mutlak, Adnan ad-Dulaymi and Khalaf al-Ayyan of being Baathists or terrorists who instigated the wave of violence to change the election outcome. Pointing to the murder of the Prophet Mohammed's grandson Hussayn by the Ummayid dynasty 1,300 years ago, Araji said history is repeating itself with Sunni Arab killers and Shia victims. Brandishing a rifle, Araji warned that the Shia were inheritors of an honorable cause (ahl al-bayt) who would fight against the "sons of the Ummayids" (Sunni Arabs). At the conclusion of the prayer service Araji led a rally in Kathemiya, also broadcast in detail by al-Furat TV. -------------- INCLUDING AGAINST THE U.S. -------------- ¶3. (C) The Shia leadership also aimed plenty of bile at the U.S. Shaykh Jalal ad-Din as-Sagheer, the imam of the well-attended Baratha mosque in north Baghdad, who had been relatively friendly towards Embassy personnel until recently, told PolFSN on January 8 that the Americans had changed their approach with the Shia and had become more confrontational. He bitterly criticized what he called American plans to storm the Baratha mosque to search for detainees. (Comment: many Sunni Arabs charge that there is a detention facility inside the Baratha mosque. End Comment.) Sagheer charged that the Sunni Arabs were threatening violence to influence the political process and the Americans were accepting this. The Shia will not accept threats, he warned. ¶4. (U) Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwaffaq Rubai'e told the BBC Arabic Service on January 8 that "certain western embassies and certain western diplomats" are talking to Sunni Arabs with ties to armed groups. These contacts, Rubai'e asserted, are "encouraging" acts of violence in Iraq. Rubai'e emphasized in the interview that Iraqi security forces were able to do more but were being restrained. He added that half the foreign troops in Iraq would be withdrawn by the end of CY 2006 and the remainder would withdraw by the end of CY 2007. (Comment: Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, the head of the SCIRI Islamist party and the Shia Islamist Coalition used many of the same themes in a January 8 CNN interview. End Comment.) -------------- -------------- BEHIND THE BLUSTER: WORRY ABOUT OUR SUNNI POLICY -------------- -------------- ¶5. (C) The Shia leadership is uncomfortable with Embassy contacts with the Sunni Arabs in general, and with Sunni Arab hard-liners like Khalaf al-Ayyan in particular. They have sought reassurance that we have not made secret security deals to stop operations against insurgents (see ref a). Shia Islamist politicians also perceive that the Sunni Arabs seek to reverse the December 15 election results by threatening or using violence; in meetings with us this past week their ire towards the Allawi/Sunni Arab bloc was palpable. They understand that behind the scenes the Embassy is promoting an Allawi/Kurd/Sunni Arab bloc to join in unity government talks, and they have heard our comments that a repeat of the Shia-Kurd deal of the spring 2005 is not satisfactory. In response, they indicate that they will resist American pressure for Shia concessions to the Sunni Arabs in the government formation process. Indeed, figures such as Husayn Shahristani (Shia independent),Nuri Kamel (Dawa) and Hadi al-Amari (Badr Organization) all have signaled that seats in the next government must be allocated on the basis of shares in the new parliament where the Shia Coalition has the strongest single bloc (refs a and b). The wildest rumors, which our FSNs tell us are common on the street, have the U.S. planning to restore Saddam Hussayn to power against the Shia Islamists. (Comment: A reporter asked PolCouns exactly this question in a January 6 news interview, and the vehement denial came out in some January 8 Iraqi newspapers. End Comment.) -------------- AND ANGER AT CRITICISM OF INTERIOR MINISTRY -------------- ¶6. (C) The angry tone also stems directly from our public and private criticism of the Interior Ministry and our pointing to human rights abuses and militia influence at the Ministry. The head of the Badr Corps, a major Shia militia, told the Ambassador January 4 that criticism of the Interior Minister for abuses committed by Interior Ministry forces was unfair (ref a). A prominent Shia politician bitterly criticized American attitudes towards the Interior Ministry, noting we do not criticize the peshmerga publicly (ref c). We hear in public and private that while the Shia Islamist leadership believes in human rights, fighting terror is the priority. The Interior Minister said public American criticism was undercutting morale among the police (ref d). The second-ranking leader of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) told PolCouns in mid-December that while he could understand expressing our concern privately, the public criticism was encouraging the Sunni Arabs. He saw the issue very much as a zero-sum game. -------------- AND REAL FEAR OF BAATHISTS -------------- ¶7. (C) The Shia leaders still harbor a very real fear of Baathist penetration of the security services. Nuri Kamel of Dawa, which has little organized militia of its own, agreed with PolCouns on January 5 that the next Interior and Defense ministers should not be tied to militias. He was adamant, however, that a much bigger problem is the continued presence of Baathists secretly helping terror groups from inside the security apparatus (ref b). Pointing to an article in the Washington Post that had made the Iraqi press January 5 about a Sunni colonel MNF-I reportedly wanted to assign to a unit guarding the International Zone, Kamel was incredulous. He wondered why the Americans could not understand that the Sunni colonel could connect with Baathist insurgents to seize control of the International Zone, and hence the government. When PolCouns pushed back that the colonel appeared loyal, and that in any case MNF-I still had plenty of troops in Baghdad, Kamel responded that the risks far outweighed any possible gains. This is not mere posturing. As many Shia Islamist political and religious leaders have been murdered in recent months, the top leadership views the Baathist threat as not only a national problem but an immediate and personal threat. -------------- LESS ANGER AT U.S. SHOWN OUTSIDE BAGHDAD -------------- ¶8. (SBU) We don't sense a sharper tone in the Shia heartland yet. At the Friday sermon at the Sadr-affiliated Kufa mosque on January 6, Sheik Salah Al-Ubaidi condemned the Karbala attack as serving "the invaders and their goal of occupation" - standard Sadrist fare. The Najaf SCIRI head, Sadder Al-Deen Al-Qubanji, in his Friday sermon said all Saddamists should be removed from the national government, calling them "the cause of the security breaches in the national security forces" - again, the old standard line. ¶9. (C) Basrah RC spoke January 9 with Basra Governor Mohammed (from the Shia Islamist Fadillah party) and Hassan Al Rashid (former governor and an official of the Badr Corps),but neither voiced concerns similar to those expressed by the Shi'a leadership in Baghdad. Governor Mohammed said there was not much cooperation with British military, but he was referring mainly to assistance and training instead of operations against insurgents. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶10. (C) The anti-American tone among the Shia Islamist political leadership is probably at its highest decibel count since Iraq regained sovereignty. The Shia Islamist Coalition leaders are responding to very real unhappiness on the Shia street about continued spectacular terror attacks. Given the fierce competition inside the Shia Islamist Coalition over its prime minister nominee, we should not expect a rapid mprovement. SCIRI/Badr, Dawa and independents all will not want to look weak while the PM drama plays itself out behind closed List 555 doors. That said, we have not reached breaking point with the Shia Islamists, either. We have not heard the vitally important Najaf clerical establishment criticize us in the same fashion as the Baghdad-based politicians; there have been no public blasts from Ayatollah Sistani or other senior Najaf clerics. The past week's bluster in Baghdad aims at forestalling our pressure before serious government formation negotiations. They are feeling real pressure from us about the Interior Ministry and the need to cut a deal with Sunni Arabs at the same time they worry about perceived Baathists burrowed in the security apparatus. As they dig their heels in publicly, we can expect them to negotiate very hard on the make-up of the government, especially the security ministries, once the government formation talks begin in earnest. SATTERFIELD