POWERPOINT AND PSYCHO-BABBLE: SECOND-TIER JAFARI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000944 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/22/2026 TAGS: PGOV PNAT IZ SUBJECT: POWERPOINT AND PSYCHO-BABBLE: SECOND-TIER JAFARI ADVISERS BRING INUK MANAGEMENT GROUP TO REORGANIZE PM OFFICE Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (S) Summary. In a March 20 meeting with PolCouns and PolOff, PM advisors (and brothers) Bashar and Zuhair al-Naher, who aspire to join Jafari's inner circle, presented a plan they said PM Jafari had approved to reorganize the PM's office substantially and creating policy development and follow-up units. With guidance from the the al-Nahers, the UK managment consulting firm Capgemini-crafted plan also utilizes "Deep Democracy" and "Neuro-Linguistic Programming (NLP)." Some of what is in the plan in terms of strengthening liaison to the ministries and tracking policy implementation makes sense, given the weaknesses in the previous Jafari administration. Improving the working relationship between PM and his ministers would also be a marked achievement. However, elements of the plan that talk about "motivating" Iraqi political figures and government employees strikes us as idealistic at very best. Jafari has a way of keeping his advisors unsure of their influence, and the Nahers are clearly trying to increase theirs at the expense of Jafari's Dawa al- Islamiyya old guard. End Summary. -------------- Capgemini's Plan -------------- ¶2. (C) After a seven month absence, PM Advisor Bashar al-Naher returned from London with his twin brother Zuhair and a comprehensive plan to reorganize the PM's office. Bashar admitted that the PM's Office has lacked vision and organization. For the last six months, he has worked with several international consultant firms to craft an specific plan for the Iraqi Prime Ministry. ¶3. (SBU) Zuhair al-Naher claimed that the UK management consulting firm Capgemini has prepared a structural plan modeled after the UK PM's office. Central to the plan is establishment of a Strategic Policy Advisory unit to link broad guidance from the Prime Minister to actual implementation of policies at the ministerial level. Zuhair said its function would resemble something like the USG National Security Council. (Note: This is not to be confused with the Political Committee for National Security now under discussion by the Iraqis. Capgemini's idea is an office responsive only to the Iraqi PM.) ¶4. (SBU) This strategic policy unit would consist of 20-25 experts in their field. Al-Naher anticipated that the experts would be recruited from all over the world and Iraq, though he considers Iraq lacking highly skilled technocrats. It would be responsible for producing an integrated strategic plan for the government. The strategic policy unit would have sub- units in direct contact with ministers and government agencies in the following functional areas: - Strategic Management Training - Human Resources and Recruitment - External and Foreign Relations - Internal Government Relations - Strategic Policy - Political Operations - Advisory - Events Visits Scheduling - Media/Communications - Executive Follow-up The staffs of these ten sub-units would work in the PM's office but would be in direct contact with the ministers and their top staffs, the Nahar brothers noted. They would guide ministers to ensure that policies were better coordinated. ¶5. (C) PolCouns welcomed the effort to enhance inter- ministerial coordination but expressed concern about the amount of time it would take and office space to set up such a comprehensive structural organization. Zuhair stated that PM Jafari has given the al-Naher brothers "unlimited resources" to get this done. Bashar added that they expect to take over one floor of the ITG building to accommodate the anticipated influx of highly skilled expatriate consultants. Bashar took note of PolCouns' mention of the severe BAGHDAD 00000944 002 OF 002 shortage of Green Zone housing. -------------- "Deep Democracy" and "Neuro- Linguistic Programming" -------------- ¶6. (S) PolCouns also noted that the PM would have to engage his ministers directly from time to time; he could not leave it only to the ten sub-unit chiefs above since Iraqi protocol meant that a minister did not take direction from a mere staffer. Basher explained to PolCouns that the Capgemini plan incorporates two methodologies: "Deep Democracy" and "Neuro-Linguistic Programming." These aim at motivating Iraqi political leaders and government employees to accept the prime minister's vision about policy direction. It would also help reconciling Sunni Arab and Shia differences. PolCouns said training government staff for their functional jobs might be a good thing. He expressed much greater reservations about the utility of consultants coming to Iraq to provide motivation or resolve deep-seated cultural divides. The Nahars remained convinced of the value of "Deep Democracy" and "Neuro-Linguistic Programming" to help solve Iraq's problems. -------------- COMMENT -------------- ¶7. (S) Adding vision and structure to the PM's office, starting with an expanded staff blessed with management and strategic direction, would be a definite improvement. Improving the working relationship between the PM and his ministers, aligning their objectives would also be a big plus. There are plenty of problems with this particular plan, however. It would take months to set up, and does not take into account the practicalities of the Green Zone or lack of office space. Moreover, the al- Naher brothers are naive about the political blowback of having so many expat consultants in a strategic policy unit trying to run the government; we already see problems with IRMO consultants here. There is also a negative optic that expat Iraqis carry a second passport and often appear less committed to staying in Iraq. ¶8. (S) The political class might give Jafari a chance at implementing an idea like this, minus some of its loopier elements, if/if Jafari could get the rest of the country to buy into his vision for Iraq. Jafari's problems gaining 184 votes to start the process of selecting the cabinet show that he has failed thus far to successfully articulate such a vision, let alone get the Iraqi political class, which has its own problems, to buy into it. In the face of a skeptical political class, this idea will either face a stormy reception or other Iraqis will find a way to marginalize it completely. ¶9. (S) Jafari has promised to change his advisors and build an office that is more representative of Iraq. The Naher brothers, who were around before in ill- defined roles, found themselves marginalized and departed for London. Now they are back, and Jafari is clearly reshuffling his advisers to improve both the prospects of his becoming Prime Minister and in trying to govern the country better. The Naher brothers are hoping we will embrace "deep democracy" and "neuro- linguistic programming" as a means both of improving Jafari's office and increasing their own standing in Jafari's eyes. Even if they have the right diagnosis, they are writing the wrong prescription. We should give Jafari credit for recognizing some of the major problems, but if he ultimately becomes prime minister, we will have to work to get them to focus on immediate, practical steps they can take to improve policy direction from the Prime Ministry and how to boost interagency coordination within the Iraqi Government. KHALILZAD