BADR LEADER AGREES THE MILITIA SHOULD DEMOBILIZE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000930

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/21/2016
TAGS: PGOV MOPS PHUM PREL PTER IZ
SUBJECT: BADR LEADER AGREES THE MILITIA SHOULD DEMOBILIZE
BUT COMPLAINS THAT INCENTIVES UNAVAILABLE

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Council of Representatives member and
Badr Organization leader Hadi Farhan Abdullah al-Amiri told
PolOffs on March 19 that the Al-Askariya shrine bombing was
the work of Saddamists. PolOffs pressed al-Amiri that all
militias needed to be under the control of the State.
Amiri agreed in principle but cautioned that since the
Government was unable to protect the Shia community
adequately Shia militias have a security role. Moreover,
the incentives during the CPA period to reintegrate militia
members were unfunded and unavailable. He said that if the
Iraqi Government could not provide them then the U.S.
Government should do so. Poloffs also insisted that the
Ministry of the Interior hold accountable those responsible
for killings, disappearances, and human rights abuses,
including those MoI officers who came from the Badr Corps.
Al-Amiri said the Coalition needed to do more to prevent
Sunnis from forcing Shia families from their homes in
Nahrawan, east of Baghdad. Al-Amiri is a smart man who has
not yet fully digested how his militia's actions (and
excesses) in defense against Sunni Arab extremists actually
spur violence from the broader Sunni Arab community. End
summary.

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Update on Al-Askariya Shrine Bombing
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2. (C) Council of Representatives (CoR) member and Badr
Organization head Hadi Farhan Abdullah al-Amiri said the
Al-Askariyah Golden Shrine in Samarra was bombed by
terrorists and criminal Saddamists, as shown by the method
of the attack. He indicated that the Ministry of Interior
is close to questioning some of the people who may be
involved. Al-Amiri regretted the Shia's violent reaction
to the bombing. This attack, al-Amiri said, was an alarm
bell to signal the need for both Sunni and Shia to combat
terrorism together.

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Militia Reintegration Complaints
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3. (C) Al-Amiri wholeheartedly agreed with PolOff that
extra-governmental militias make the GOI look weak and
ineffective, that the militias must ultimately be
demobilized, and that only the government should be able to
use force, and then only according to Rule of Law. But he
complained that the USG has not fulfilled its promise to
provide the money to help demobilize and reintegrate
militias. He recalled that CPA Order 91 guaranteed that
militia elders would receive pensions, militia academics
would re-enter the workforce, and the young militia members
would receive training and could join the armed forces on
an individual basis. (Note: Funding for this is up to the
Government of Iraq. End note.) PolOff stated that it is
GOI's responsibility to fund reintegration through the
budget. Al-Amiri replied that more money was going to pay
pensions for the Peshmerga and even Saddam's army than for
the fighters of the Badr Organization. The Peshmerga were
absorbed into the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) and became
the National Guard for Kurdistan. Al-Amiri complained that
only two percent of the Badr forces were integrated into
the ISF and that he is faced with the families of more than
3,000 martyrs whose families are owed pensions. Al-Amiri
countered that since the GOI cannot fund these pensions,
then the USG should do so.

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Militias Are Needed Because the Government
Cannot Do the Job; Coalition Should Help
Prevent Sunni Deportation of Shia Families
in Nahrawan
--------------


4. (C) Al-Amiri's constant refrain was that independent
Islamist Shia militias were necessary because neither the
Coalition nor the Government could protect the people. For
example, al-Amiri said, the Coalition was not doing enough
to protect Shia families in Nahrawan (east of Baghdad),
where Shia families were being displaced in large numbers
by Sunni militias or insurgents. Al-Amiri demanded that
the Coalition protect the people of Nahrawan and said if
they did not, "the people" would protect themselves by
forming their own militia. PolOffs responded that the
Government, of which al-Amiri was an important leader, had
the responsibility to protect its people, and that it
should take over responsibility for security from militias.

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--------------
Solution for the Ministry of the
Interior: More Purges Needed
--------------


5. (C) The solution, al-Amiri said, was to continue to
purge the Ministry of the Interior and the related, smaller
security services of those who supported the former regime.
When PolOff asked how many of those to be purged would be
Sunnis in the Ministry, al-Amiri evaded the question. "We
can purge the MOI," al-Amiri said, "but the first ones who
will object will be the Americans." PolOff replied that
the removal of those who actually committed crimes would
not be perceived as a purge if incompetent and corrupt Shia
and Sunni were all released. Al-Amiri said that the
problem was that 80-90 percent of the police in the
Ministry during Allawi's time needed to be removed.


6. (C) Al-Amiri agreed that if any Badr Organization
member in the Ministry of the Interior breaks the law, the
MOI should punish him. Al-Amiri, however, then tried to
deflect the conversation into a critique of Mishan al-
Jaburi and the Facility Protection Service.

--------------
We Are the Victims
--------------


7. (C) Al-Amiri said that there is a misconception that
the Shia are not the victims but the reason for all the
violence. The problem in Iraq is not the militias, MOI or
MOD but the terrorists and the Saddamists. Al-Amiri said
that the Shia need to protect themselves since the GOI has
failed to protect the Shia and so has MNF-I. PolOffs
reminded al-Amiri that he and the other leaders of the Shia
Coalition play major roles in the government, and could
hardly consider the government to be someone else. The
solution was to improve the capacity of the government, not
to turn the government's responsibilities over to private
militias. Al-Amiri said the government did not have enough
trained police to protect the people, but he could not
explain why the government could not move police from quiet
areas in the deep-south to hot spots like Nahrawan. Al-
Amiri said he has been in meetings with the Ambassador and
General Casey requesting MNF-I assistance with forced
deportations in Nahrawan. Al-Amiri claimed that USG help
has been uneven, giving MNF-I assistance to Sunni tribal
shaykhs in Anbar, but none (so he claimed) to the Shia.
The government said that Nahrawan was under USG control.
If the USG could not make Nahrawan secure, he said, "the
Iraqi Government should handle the security file totally."

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Inclusion of Sunnis
--------------


8. (C) Al-Amiri agreed the time to form the new government
is now but doubts that it can happen soon. PolOffs urged
that the Iraqis get on with the process and finish it
quickly. Al-Amiri said it is hard enough to negotiate
bilaterally, and now there are four groups. Al-Amiri said
the Shia Coalition could ally either with the Sunni
Islamists in Tawafaq or the Kurds, in order to get just
above the 184 (two-thirds of 275) votes required in the
CoR. He said, however, that this would not create a stable
government. Bringing all four groups together will take
some time because of mistrust and fear between parties, he
said. The Sunnis are the have-nots and fear under-
representation. The Kurds remember Anfal and Halabja, and
the Shia fear the return of the Saddamists. This
situation, he warned, allows for extremists to drive the
agenda toward civil war.

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Comment
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9. (C) Al-Amiri agrees in principle that all militias
should be demobilized -- he just does not want the Shia to
go first. We told him other examples in history where
militia leaders took this approach and it was a recipe for
a cycle of violence that was difficult to stop. Watching
carefully what al-Amiri was writing down, it is clear he
got the intended message that the militias, especially the
Jaysh al-Mahdi, need to be brought under government
control. At one level, given the rivalry between Badr and
Jaysh al-Mahdi, which came to violence in August 2005, al-
Amiri might agree with us. Al-Amiri was oblivious to the
irony that while he would argue it was wrong to have Sunni

BAGHDAD 00000930 003 OF 003


politicians who keep one foot in supporting the insurgency
while the other foot is in politics, Badr is doing exactly
the same thing. Badr clearly benefits from having Sadr as
a more extremist group. What we have not yet heard him
acknowledge is that fear of the Badr Corps drives some
Sunni Arabs to arms. Al-Amiri is an example of a leader
who has not fully digested how to make the transition from
being the leader of an insurgent group to being the leader
of a mature, evolving democracy. At one level, he
understands what needs to be done, but at another level, he
seems incapable of understanding how his fighters'
defensive actions (and excesses) against Sunni Arab
extremists actually spur violence from the broader Sunni
Arab community. End comment.
KHALILZAD