ALLAWI OBJECTS TO PROPOSED POLITICAL BODY FOR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000922 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/20/2016 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM KDEM IZ SUBJECT: ALLAWI OBJECTS TO PROPOSED POLITICAL BODY FOR NATIONAL SECURITY Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY. Iraqiyya List (Allawi) member, former Planning Minister, and current Council of Representatives (CoR) member Dr. Mehdi al-Hafedh told PolOffs March 20 that the composition and powers of the "Political Committee for National Security" (PCNS) are not settled. He said that Iraqiyya and Tawaffaq disagreed with a Kurdish compromise proposal on March ¶19. Iraqiyya and Tawaffuq want ex officio representation from senior officials and party bloc leaders, whereas the Shia Coalition wants representation based on the number of seats in the CoR. Iraqiyya and Tawaffuq want the PBNS to bind the President and Prime Minister. The Kurds and the Shia Coalition want the PCNS to make recommendations, but not to be able to overrule the Prime Minister, the President, or the CoR. Hafedh said that the Iraqiyya List was willing to become an opposition party over this issue, but this may have been a negotiating position. Hafedh also told PolOffs that Ayad Allawi was not yet participating in the National Salvation Front but diplomatically professed ignorance whether Allawi would join the Front after it was announced, as many assume he will. Hafedh described a Shia Coalition proposal to distribute posts in the new government by a point system. Government formation negotiations will resume on Saturday, March 25. End Summary. -------------- Political Committee for National Security -------------- ¶2. (C) Council of Representatives (CoR) member, former Planning Minister, Iraqiyya List (Allawi) member, and senior Iraqiyya negotiator Dr. Mehdi al-Hafedh told PolOffs on March 20 that the composition and powers of the "Political Committee for National Security" (PCNS, Al-Hay'a al-Seeassa l'il-Amn al-Watani) are not settled, despite what was said by senior Iraqi officials at a press conference after the March 19 negotiating session. He said what was announced in the March 19 press conference was a comprise proposal presented by the Kurds, but that it was not acceptable to Iraqiyya or to Tawafuq. (He gave no description of Salih Mutlak's Hiwar Front position.) He said the Kurds presented their compromise proposal because they considered the Shia Coalition to be intractable in their opposition to the National Security Council proposal agreed to at Salahadin. ¶3. (C) Hafedh handed PolOffs a copy of Iraqiyya's proposal for the PCNS, which he said they had distributed to the negotiating parties that morning. He added that there are two main areas of disagreement between the Iraqiyya and the Kurdish proposals: -- Composition - The Iraqiyya proposal calls for the PCNS members to be ex officio the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker of the Parliament, their deputies, the KRG President, and the leaders of the five major blocs in Parliament, for a total of 15 people. (Note: Assuming there is a relatively even split within the blocs of the top jobs, this would mean four Islamist Shia, five Kurds, and six Sunnis/secular Shia. On a two-thirds voting system, the Kurds and the Sunnis/secular Shia could outvote the Islamist Shia. No wonder this formula is unacceptable to the Shia Coalition. End note.) The Shia Coalition's position is to make membership proportional to the seats in the CoR. Thus, nine reserved for the Islamist Shia, four for the Kurds, three for Tawafuq, two for Iraqiyya, and one for the Hiwar Front. Each bloc would have to decide who filled its membership slots. -- Powers - The Iraqiyya proposal says the decisions of the PCNS should be binding on the executive branch organs (Presidency and Prime Minister). The Kurdish compromise proposal calls for the Committee's recommendations on issues within the powers of the President be brought before the Presidency Council, and decisions within the powers of the Prime Minister or the Council of Ministers be brought to the Prime Minister or Council of Ministers for approval. ¶4. (C) Hafedh described the Shia Coalition as categorically opposed to the formation of the PCNS BAGHDAD 00000922 002 OF 003 because of constitutional concerns, because they wanted any body to reflect the size of each group in Parliament, and because they wanted the body to just be advisory. To this, Hafedh said the PCNS could be created by legislation. He tried to suggest that any questions of legality were invalid since the NSC could be considered a political agreement for one term only and therefore not require a constitutional amendment. He ended by saying the current situation requires extraordinary measures to address the country's problems. ¶5. (C) Hafedh told PolOffs that the Iraqiyya leadership confirmed its position at a meeting earlier on March 20, and that it was firm. When asked what the Iraqiyya List would do if its version of the PCNS was not adopted, Hafedh replied that they would become an opposition party. -------------- Other Government Formation News and Views -------------- ¶6. (C) Hafedh also told PolOffs that Ayad Allawi was not yet participating in the National Salvation Front, but diplomatically professed ignorance whether Allawi would join the Front after it was announced, as many assume he will. ¶7. (C) Hafedh offered his personal opinion that the creation of the PCNS would create problems within the Shia Coalition. Dawa and the Sadrists would oppose it, and SCIRI and others might support it. He said questions remain concerning SCIRI's intentions and the role of Iran in the government formation process. ¶8. (C) Hafedh also described a Shia Coalition proposal to distribute posts in the new government by a point system (similar to the way posts were allocated within the Shia Coalition). In this system, the following points are assigned: -- Prime Minister = 5 points; -- President and Speaker = 4 points each; -- DPMs, Deputy Presidents, and Sovereign Ministries = 3 points each; -- Deputy Speakers and Service Ministries = 2 points each; and -- "Political" Ministries = 1 point each. ¶9. (C) Hafedh said that the Shia Coalition told Iraqiyya they would get 3-4 points for their 25 seats in the Parliament. (Note: Coincidentally, not enough for the PM slot. End note.) The approach has a problem, however, he said. If the Iraqiyya list has 25 seats (1/11th of 275 seats) and was assigned 4 points, then the total number of points would be about 4 x 11 = 44. The total number of points to allocate all ministries exceeds 44 points. He planned to clarify the system, but indicated he did not think it a particularly useful one. PolOffs said, and Hafedh quickly agreed, that parties should not treat ministries as spoils to be bought at auction. He took particular note of PolOff's observation that recent conversations with political figures close to PM Jafari hinted that the Oil, Finance, Interior and Defense ministries ought to be considered apolitical and assigned to technocrats (septel). ¶10. (C) Hafedh said discussions on the PCNS, the government platform, and the Council of Ministers bylaws will continue on March 23. Discussion of the next Prime Minister might begin at that session. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) While Allawi has been ill in the past few days, Hafedh has moved into position as Ayad Allawi's chief negotiator. The formidable Hafedh will have his work cut out for him on Saturday. The Iraqiyya proposal for membership in the PCNS is clearly unacceptable in its present form, and we do not sense the outcome will go Iraqiyya's way. The threat to stay out of the government is likely a bluff. Too many senior members of Iraqiyya want the party to be in the government, not outside it. We believe Iraqiyya would fracture if Allawi tried to keep it outside the government. The relatively abstract principles of the PCNS would not be an obstacle if BAGHDAD 00000922 003 OF 003 Allawi is able to negotiate the position of Deputy Prime Minister for the national security portfolio. Either the PCNS will emerge close to the Kurdish formulation or the subject will be shelved until later. Bylaws and government platform talks will take some time at Saturday's session. Because of the Shia Arbay'een and Kurdish Now Ruz holidays, politicking has slowed somewhat the past few days. End comment. KHALILZAD