IRAQI GOVERNMENT FORMATION: WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE ?

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000867

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/17/2026
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI GOVERNMENT FORMATION: WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE ?

REF: A. BAGHDAD 822

B. BAGHDAD 629

C. BAGHDAD 653

D. BASRAH 029

E. BAGHDAD 610

F. HILLAH 030

G. BAGHDAD 534

H. BAGHDAD 682

I. BAGHDAD 620

Classified By: Classified by: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford
for Reasons 1.4 (D)


1. (C) Summary: As we watch the political
machinations unfolding over national government
formation, it seems increasingly clear that there is
not one party able to drive the process by itself,
particularly in regards to selecting the next Prime
Minister. The Shia Coalition, with its 128 seats in
the new Council of Representatives (COR),has claimed
the right to nominate the Prime Minister. Its outward
facade of strength, however, has been undermined by
internal disputes over who would be the nominee of a
progressively more fractured Shia Coalition. Within
the landscape of the Shia political and religious
leadership, only two figures emerge who have a limited
ability to influence, in very different ways, the face
of the new government: radical Shia cleric Muqtada al-
Sadr, and Grand Ayatollah Ali al-SISTANI. End
Summary.

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Rebel With a Cause
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2. (C) In the past year, we have seen the one-time
fugitive from the law Muqtada al-Sadr transition into
a power broker whose recent political successes have
won him grudging respect from the other Shia leaders.
Sadr's votes made up half of Prime Minister Ibrahim
Ja'afari's vote totals to win the premiership. If
Sadr's deputies had voted for someone else, Ja'afari
would be out of power. Many Iraqi political contacts,
Kurds, Shia and Sunni Arabs, think that Sadr will be
the real political power behind a Ja'afari government.
Ja'afari's Dawa Party did poorly in the January 2005
contests against SCIRI at the provincial level; Dawa
is perceived as a weaker brother within the Shia
Coalition. Only by joining with the Sadrists has
Ja'afari been able to hold a (narrow) advantage within
the Coalition.


3. (C) Sadr's strength, in turn, lies in his
willingness and capability to mobilize support for his
candidates. In a recent appearance in Basrah, over
ten thousand people reportedly flocked to see Sadr for
a 15-minute speech, which was immediately broadcast by
state-owned Al-Iraqiya television (see reftel D).
However, some politicos within the Shia Coalition
regret that the Coalition's leadership (headed by
SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim) ever agreed to
giving the Sadrists 30 seats within the Coalition as
the price for Sadr joining the Coalition. Pointing to
the Sadrist Risaliyun party's capturing only two seats
in the December 2005 election, they say that Sadr bid
very high for his support and the Coalition's
leadership paid an exorbitant price that is at the
root of the Coalition's prime minister candidate
problems now.


4. (C) While Sadr appears strong now - at least, until
someone stronger calls him on his bluff - even he
cannot deliver the premiership to Ja'afari. As the
political opposition to Ja'afari increases, Sadr is
finding himself unable to ensure his political ally
prevails against strong opposition. In a sense,
Muqtada's strength and influence is at its peak now
with Ja'afari clinging on due to Sadr's help. With
another prime minister less dependent on him, Sadr
could see his wings - or those of his militia -
clipped.

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The Quiet Iraqi
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5. (C) In contrast to the brash Sadr, Ayatollah
Sustains influence is subtle, more notable in its
absence than in any active or overt expression of
support. All the main Shia candidates have made
pilgrimages to Najaf to meet with the Najaf marja'iya,

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led by SISTANI, before and during the government
formation process. These politicians seek to appear
pious and to get support on the prime minister battle
(see reftel E). SISTANI's office has repeatedly told
visitors, however, that the marja'iya will not pick a
candidate and has no intention to interfere in Iraq's
political scene. For example, Shia independent and
longtime Embassy interlocutor Qasim Daoud told
PolCouns March 7 that SISTANI is "neutral" about the
candidates in the Shia Prime Minister race. SISTANI
and the Najaf clerics instead are focused on
maintaining Shia political unity, and in particular
the unity of the Shia Coalition. We see no indication
that SISTANI particularly likes Ja'afari per se. The
marja'iya's insistence on Shia political unity has
helped Ja'afari, however. He has been able to insist
that he is the Coalition's nominee and the other
Coalition members have been reluctant to break ranks.

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SCIRI On the Outs
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6. (C) SISTANI's refusal to take a clear stance has
effectively hobbled Sadr rival and SCIRI leader Hakim.
Hakim failed to line up the votes within the Shia
Coalition to get his candidate, Adil Abd al-Mahdi, the
premiership - a serious misstep on his part. This
failure has fueled his fear of rival Sadr, whom he
sees as Iran's new partner in Iraq (see reftel G).
SISTANI's insistence on Shia unity has compelled Hakim
to tread very carefully on talks with the Kurds,
Tawafuq, and Allawi about a new national political
front. We can expect some interesting SCIRI political
contortions if Hakim publicly breaks ranks with the
Shia Coalition over the prime minister issue.

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Tehran Also Stuck in Neutral
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7. (C) While it appears that Tehran still wields
considerable influence behind the scenes, many of our
Iraqi interlocutors have remarked that the Iranians'
willingness to meet with a variety of Iraqi leaders
indicates weakness, not control. Kurdish Planning
Minister Barham Saleh told Charge on March 4 that the
Iranians seemed to understand that they are not fully
in charge of the Prime Minister race (see reftel H).
Saleh stated that Tehran appears to be backing several
horses ? Sadr, SCIRI, and Ja'afari. This is
reminiscent of the tactics Iran uses in Kurdistan too,
he wryly noted. However, even Tehran is making no
headway in getting Tawafuq, Allawi, or the Kurds to
agree to their chosen candidate, Ja'afari. Presidency
Council Chief of Staff Kamran Karadaghi said on March
16 that Tehran has alienated SCIRI and Hakim by openly
endorsing Sadr. According to Karadaghi, the Iranians
appear progressively weaker each time they press the
Kurds for a meeting. Iran lacks the power and the
votes to push his through, especially if the U.S.
continues to push on the Kurds and Sunni Arabs for a
national unity front.

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Kurds Slipping Away ?
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8. (C) Finally, the Kurds are also stuck between
seeking to maintain their fragile coalition between
the two main Kurdish parties (the PUK and KDP),and
trying to find a candidate they can agree to endorse.
While they all agree that Ja'afari is a non-starter,
there has not yet been a consensus on either Abd al-
Mahdi or any of the other names. For the Kurds,
however, the most pressing question is not who they
will ultimately support for Prime Minister, but how
long they will continue to engage. Karadaghi told
PolOffs that both President Talabani and KDP leader
Masud Barzani were under increasing pressure from
their constituency to return to Kurdistan and take
care of matters there (see reftel I). On March 6,
Barzani informed the DCM that the Samarra aftermath
"is a Shia-Sunni Arab conflict of which the Kurds have
no part." Given this attitude, and the Kurds'
longstanding desire for autonomy - if not full
independence - from Baghdad, many of our contacts
wonder how long the Kurds will remain engaged
seriously in the national government's formation.
American leverage with the Kurds will be especially
important in this regard.

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Comment
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9. (C) After the first session of the Council of
Representatives on March 16, Karadaghi confirmed to
PolOff that no one - not the Shia, Sunni Arabs, Kurds,
or Iran - has enough clout to force the others to
accept its candidate. Shia, Sunni Arab, and Kurdish
political contacts told PolOffs on March 16 that they
were all waiting for "someone" to make the first move.
Despite President Talabani's optimism that the
government will be formed by the end of March 2005,
many fear that Iraqi society will fragment into a
broader sectarian conflict well before the new
government is functioning, especially if Zarqawi
scores a major terror success against the Shia.


10. (C) In addition, SISTANI may be more of a
hindrance than a help in the current political
stalemate. Although all the political figures
mentioned above have their limitations, only SISTANI
has failed to use the influence at his disposal.
While appreciating his ethical scruples, SISTANI's
half in, half out approach has only succeeded muting
the conflict within the Shia, not settling it. His
insistence on Shia unity, no matter the cost, might
ultimately end in a politically fragmented Shia
society filled with resentment at its inability to
take advantage of its power.
KHALILZAD