SHIA COALITION HARDLINER'S VIEW OF ATTACKS ON SHIA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000848

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016
TAGS: PGOV PHUM MOPS PTER IZ
SUBJECT: SHIA COALITION HARDLINER'S VIEW OF ATTACKS ON SHIA
COMMUNITIES

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. In a March 14 meeting, SCIRI member
Shaikh Jalal ad Din al-Sagheer (from Baratha mosque) told
PolCouns about Shia families fleeing their homes fearing
violence from Sunnis. He warned that continued violence
against the Shia may trigger a more violent reaction than
seen after the February 22 attack on the Samarra shrine.
Al-Sagheer scolded PolOffs for the lack of USG involvement
in this crisis and urged the USG to deal with the displaced
families "crisis" while it is still relatively small. We
will meet with Shia Islamist and Baghdad provincial
authorities on March 18 to discuss the issue of displaced
families in greater detail. End Summary.

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Two Arcs of Crisis
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2. (C) On March 14 prominent SCIRI member and cleric
Shaikh Jalal ad Din al-Sagheer described two arcs of
crisis, where Shia and Sunni communities are mixed, around
Baghdad and from which the migration of Shia families is
occurring. One arc spans from Taji south through
Ghazaliya, Abu Ghraib, Radwaniyah, and Dora to the river.
The other arc spans from Mada'in to Naharwan to Diyala.
With the exception of the Arab Jabour area, these two arcs
almost encompass Baghdad and its suburbs. They also are
areas where, he said, Sunni Arabs moved in since the 1970s.
Al-Sagheer reported that people in Taji launch mortars at
Sadr City, Hooriya and Kadhimiya. Those in Abu Ghraib
launch mortars on Amarat, Ghazaliya and Nur (Shouala).
Arab Jabour launches mortars on Abu Chir. Arab Jabour
connects to Latafiya and a straight line into Fallujah.
When PolCouns commented that neighborhoods firing mortars
at other neighborhoods sounded like Beirut, al-Sagheer
corrected him: the Shia have not fired back - yet. He
asserted that in the days following the February 22 Samarra
attack, Shia militias roamed and attacked throughout
Baghdad. (He didn't apologize for it but rather said it
was a fact.) He warned that such violence could erupt
again if there is a major terror attack against the Shia.
He anticipated that Shia violence would trigger a counter
reaction from the Sunnis.

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Background
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3. (C) Al-Sagheer provided PolCouns with a historical
background on Saddam's security circle around Baghdad. In
the 1970's Saddam imported Sunni farmers to areas
surrounding Baghdad (such as Shurta, Rasalah, Jadriya and
Amarkaat). Descendants of these farmers entered into the
Saddam's security services, creating a Sunni security belt
around the city. In addition, Saddam penetrated
predominantly Shia areas by importing Sunni families into
various districts like Muthanna Zayuna. The legal
framework also discriminated against Shia seeking to buy
property, he claimed. These policies severely altered the
demography, resulting in dwindling Shia majority
neighborhoods in Baghdad like Karada and Yarmouk.

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Displaced Families
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4. (C) Al-Sagheer told PolCouns that Shia families are
being forced from their homes and fleeing to their extended
families in Najaf, Karbala, Hillah, Diyala, Kut, Wasit,
Kirkuk and Baghdad. In his opinion, the Shia are fleeing
under threat from mixed areas to places where there is a
strong Shia majority, increasing sectarian divisions. He
claimed to have spoken with the governors of Najaf, Karbala
and Wasit that day and that each had spoken of "hundreds"
of displaced families coming into their provinces from the
Baghdad area.

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Iraqi Government Not Engaged
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5. (C) Al-Sagheer blasted the Iraqi Government for paying
no attention to the issue of the displaced families; he
sneered that those who should be helping, like the Red
Crescent, are merely stealing. There is no count of
because displaced Iraqis do not known to whom they can turn
for help. They merely rely on Iraqi culture and seek help
from their families.

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6. (C) In addition to providing immediate assistance to
displaced families that have no means of subsistence, al-
Sagheer suggested that the most important thing is to give
Iraqis a sense that something is being done on security and
that they have a role in it. He suggested three solutions
to the current crisis:

- Reinsert capable Iraqi security forces into the
Baghdad suburbs and the city center and enforce strict
security measures. He called this the best solution, but
he was unsure whether the Iraqi forces were capable alone.

- Step up coalition operations dramatically in the
Baghdad suburbs, in conjunction with Iraqi forces. He
cautioned that more patrols would not suffice; traffic
controls had to be instituted.

- Apply Constitution Article 58, paragraph three of the
TAL to Baghdad, because an alteration of demography has
occurred. He said this need not mean that Sunni families
would be moved out of the Baghdad suburbs. Rather, it
should be government policy to reverse the demographic
change by settling large numbers of Shia in new housing
projects on agricultural land in predominantly Sunni Arab
suburbs of Baghdad like Abu Ghreib. Al-Sagheer said the
next government could take Shia from densely populated
areas (like Sadr City and Shouala) to live in these new
projects. Al-Sagheer reasoned that with density comes more
infrastructure, police, government institutions, and civil
society development. These newly developed areas would
then deter terrorist infiltration into the city center and
help stabilize the suburbs themselves.


7. (C) Al-Sagheer urged that the U.S. take the issue of
displaced persons more seriously now while the problem is
relatively small and manageable. This required both more
security steps to make families feel safer and to mobilize
the Iraqi government to do more. He urged the Embassy to
identify and bring together different parts of Iraq (MoDM,
MOI, Shahid Sadr and the Shia Coalition) to address this
crisis. He lauded the Ambassador for his ability to
energize the entities into providing a rapid response.
PolCouns said he would help identify a working group.

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Comment
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8. (C) We still have no precise numbers of how many
displaced families there are in the Baghdad area. Al-
Sagheer's observation that there is no central government
or NGO office working the issue suggests one reason why the
data about them is so hard to find. Moreover, we recall
that in the November 2004 Fallujah operation, hundreds of
thousands of Iraqis left that city but we never saw tent
cities or refugee centers handling anywhere close to that
number of displaced persons. Instead, the Fallujans went
to stay with families in Baghdad and other locales.
Sagheer has motives to paint the displaced persons picture
darkly: the Shia Islamists that run Baghdad province don't
look particularly competent now and he understands they
could use American help. We should also be sensitive,
however, to the image on Shia TV stations that compare the
expulsion of relatively small numbers of Shia families to
the 1991 experience when Saddam cracked down on the Shia
uprising. We are organizing a meeting with the Baghdad
authorities for March 18.
KHALILZAD