PST BAGHDAD: SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE ISLAMIC

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000840 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/14/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINR IZ SUBJECT: PST BAGHDAD: SUPREME COUNCIL FOR THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION IN IRAQ CONSOLIDATION OF KEY POLITICAL POSITIONS IN BAGHDAD PROVINCE Classified By: Joseph Gregoire for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary: Over the past several months the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) and its subsidiary, the Badr Organization, have consolidated power at the Baghdad provincial level by acquiring the Provincial Council (PC) chairmanship and other key governorate positions. This consolidation, along with positions already held by SCIRI, has tipped the balance of power firmly into the hands of SCIRI within Baghdad province. End summary. -------------- Governor of Baghdad Province -------------- ¶2. (U) The Governor of Baghdad Province, Hussein Al-Tahan, is a senior Badr Organization commander and brigadier general in the Iraqi Ministry of Defense. He was appointed governor in April 2005 by the Baghdad Provincial Council (PC). -------------- Provincial Council Chair -------------- ¶3. (U) In December 2005, during a closed session of the PC, Mueen Hameed, a senior local SCIRI official and at the time the Deputy Chairman of the PC, was elected PC chairman. He then replaced chairman Mazin Makiya, a Da'wa party member. -------------- Mayor of Baghdad City -------------- ¶4. (U) The Mayor of Baghdad City, Dr. Saber Nabat Al-Esawi, is a moderate self-described independent SCIRI member. While he has demonstrated a propensity for independent decision making, he is still bound by SCIRI guidance. On at least one occasion, he was threatened with removal if he did not follow the party line. -------------- Provincial Council Committees -------------- ¶5. (U) Eleven of the 17 committees of the Provincial Council are headed by SCIRI party members. The committees not chaired by SCIRI members are often influenced or pressured to fall in line with SCIRI priorities. -------------- Other Officials -------------- ¶6. (U) Baghdad's Deputy Mayor for Administration, Hussein Bahraini, is a SCIRI member. ¶7. (U) The Governorate Director for Economics and Planning, Bassim Al-Yakoubi is a SCIRI member. ¶8. (U) The Governorate Director of Administration and Chief Assistant to the Governor, Fehami Amedi, is a senior Badr Organization commander. ¶9. (U) Three other influential officials within the province, the Provincial Council Deputy Chairman Mohan Al-Saidi, the Deputy Governor Qassim N'ima Al-Dragy, and the Deputy Mayor for Municipalities Naeem Aboob (also a member of the PC),are either Sadrists or Fadila Party members. Both Al-Dragy and Aboob were appointed to their positions by a SCIRI-dominated provincial leadership. ¶10. (U) Within the Baghdad Provincial Governorate, there is one Sunni in a senior political position. Ziad Tariq Al-Zobie, deputy governor until he was removed from this position in fall 2005, is now the Governorate's Director for Engineering. He is also a member of the Baghdad Regional Council and the Mahmoudiyah Qada Council. Ziad recently survived an assassination attempt. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶11. (C) SCIRI has consolidated its power within the province by acquiring most of the key political positions. This action has diluted the influence in Baghdad of other Shiite political parties, such as Da'wa. For example, the removal of former PC chairman Mazin has left Da'wa without a senior position in the provincial governorate. BAGHDAD 00000840 002 OF 002 ¶12. (C) Worrisome indicators abound. There is only one Sunni in a key position in the governorate. We are not seeing increasing PC collaboration with Sunnis or their inclusion in provincial politics. The de-baathification (removal) of two of the three deputy mayors for Baghdad city in the last year points to a future with less inclusion rather than more. ¶13. (C) In the near term, SCIRI will likely continue to control most of the key political positions within Baghdad province. SCIRI may use this time to find ways to ensure future control of key offices in the governorate after the next round of provincial elections. The SCIRI bloc likely views this positioning as necessary to offset what otherwise might be the potential gains that other political parties could make in the next provincial election. KHALILZAD