MILITIAS AND OTHER ARMED GROUPS IN IRAQ -

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 BAGHDAD 000812 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/12/2016 TAGS: KJUS MCAP MOPS PGOV PINR PINS PNAT PREL PTER IR, IZ SUBJECT: MILITIAS AND OTHER ARMED GROUPS IN IRAQ - CONFRONTING THE SECTARIAN DIVIDE REF: A. BAGHDAD 04 256 ¶B. BAGHDAD 05 3015 ¶C. BASRA 05 112 ¶D. BAGHDAD 05 1512 ¶E. BAGHDAD 05 2724 ¶F. BAGHDAD 05 3565 ¶G. TDX 315/48484-05 ¶H. TDX 315/38132-05 ¶I. TD 314/57235-05 ¶J. TDX 314/57597-05 ¶K. TDX 314/53565-05 ¶L. DIA IIR 6 847 8016 05 ¶M. DIA IIR 6 847 0012 05 ¶N. DIA IIR 6 847 0013 05 ¶O. DIA IIR 6 847 0014 05 ¶P. DIA IIR 6 847 0015 05 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S//REL MNCI) SUMMARY. Militia organizations, acting both as extra-legal bodies and within government structures at multiple levels, will continue to pursue sectarian agendas that will undermine the government's ability to improve the security environment and will exacerbate sectarian tensions. Shia militia support of political agendas during upcoming provincial elections will be potentially destabilizing and may complicate outreach to insurgents who might otherwise start a dialogue with us. Although illegal militias are inimical to the rule of law in Iraq, under present security conditions, there is little political will within the constituencies that sponsor these militia groups to disband them. Militia integration efforts under CPA Order 91 depended on the support and cooperation of willing participants and thus met with little success. ¶2. (S//REL MNCI) SUMMARY CONTINUED. The current dynamic of back-alley, and more recently broad-scale, sectarian conflict, combined with continued suspicion and fear, suggests that none of the relevant political players are motivated to tackle the issue of eliminating illegal militias. The demilitarization of Iraqi society should be considered in the context of resolving a broader and increasingly worrisome sectarian division. Encouraging discussion of a formal reconciliation program as the basis for militia integration and enlisting greater international involvement will be important steps in meeting the necessary preconditions for disarmament and in ultimately cementing a durable national compact. Post and MNF-I have formed a task force to develop a strategy on how best to address the issue of militias and other extra-governmental armed groups. END SUMMARY. -------------- THE DIVERSITY OF MILITIAS IN IRAQ -------------- ¶3. (S//REL MNCI) Iraqi society is flush with weapons and people ready to brandish them. Given the number of groups bearing arms under various agendas and motivations, it is necessary to categorize the groups that are commonly termed "militias": -- POLITICAL PARTY MILITIAS RECOGNIZED BY CPA ORDER 91: In June 2004, nine militia groups were identified for participation in the CPA Militia Transition and Re-integration (T&R) program based on their historical opposition to the Ba'athist regime. These nine groups are associated with the political parties that emerged as the principal political contenders immediately following the regime's collapse (ref A). Although CPA Order 91 provided for all militias that fought against the Ba'athist regime of Saddam Hussein, formal agreements were reached only with the nine parties. These are: - Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) - Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) - Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution Iraq (SCIRI) - Dawa - Iraqi National Congress (INC) - Iraqi National Accord (INA) - Iraqi Hizbollah - Iraqi Islamic Party - Iraqi Communist Party BAGHDAD 00000812 002 OF 006 These groups' associated militias are just a subset of the illegitimate armed groups that abound in Iraq. Of these nine, the only ones that have any real political or military significance are the SCIRI-affiliated Badr Organization (estimated at up to 16,000 Shia militiamen); the KDP and PUK Peshmerga forces (the official armed forces of the Kurdish Regional Government, estimated at approximately 75,000); and the Jaysh al Mahdi (JAM, the militia of Muqtada al-Sadr). -- ARMED GROUPS WITH LOCAL TRIBAL OR ECONOMIC INTEREST: Numerous armed groups are affiliated with tribal leaders whose interests are local and less overtly political, such as the Strategic Infrastructure Battalions (SIBs),which are legitimately constituted units under the Iraqi Army. Another typical example is the Najaf Emergency Response Unit (NERU), formed largely by Najafi tribesmen to rid the streets of Najaf and Kufa of JAM militiamen. (NOTE: The SCIRI provincial council, upon its election, disbanded NERU in early 2005 for fear of violent competition with the Badr Organization. END NOTE.) The impact of these groups ranges: some have been convenient stop-gaps for security shortfalls, whereas others have proven to be troubling menaces to public order. -- SHIA EXTREMIST GROUPS: Groups such as 15 Sha'ban, Tharallah, and others -- each fueled by its own brand of Shia Islamic ideology -- are generally anti-Coalition and have varying degrees of actively violent intent. The degree to which these groups are receiving assistance from Iran, and specifically from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC),also varies. Reports suggest that certain Shia Islamist groups are increasingly willing to attack Coalition forces and are responsible for a deadly wave of explosively-formed penetrator (EFP, aka shaped charge) improvised explosive devices (IEDs) that have resulted in several coalition KIA (ref B). These extremist groups also are linked to a trend of intimidation and forced Islamification throughout southern Iraq as well as penetration of local police forces as demonstrated by the September 19 crisis in Basra (ref C). -- FORMER INSURGENT GROUPS (SHIA AND SUNNI "REJECTIONISTS"): The line between militias and insurgents is not always clear. The Office of the Martyr Sadr (OMS) militia's claims to have embraced the political process following months of bloody combat between the JAM and Coalition Forces, along with its relative passivity since November 2004 (post-Samarra incidents notwithstanding),suggest that some avenues for transition and reintegration ought to be considered for insurgent groups willing to lay down arms. Iraqi leaders increasingly have voiced interest in a possible political amnesty for insurgent groups (such as the Islamic Army and the Army of the Mujahedeen) should they cease hostilities, develop legitimate political representation, and support the political process (ref D). Although this proposition is anathema to many, these groups nonetheless are representative of a large element of Iraqi society. Given the history of other successful disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs (e.g., in Afghanistan, Rwanda, and South Africa),possible transition options should be considered for these groups if and when they renounce violence. ¶4. (S//REL MNCI) To date, there is no encompassing DDR regime in Iraq to handle the breadth and diversity of these groups. Our policy has been to support the implementation of CPA Order 91, which established nominal options for career transition and individual integration into the legitimate security forces for participating militias. The directive was intended to strengthen the legitimate security forces through the voluntary disbandment of militias. In reality, however, despite the re-employment and other financial incentives offered by the CPA (and the Iraqi Interim Government (IIG) and the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) thereafter),there is now little political motivation to participate. Given a persistently tenuous security situation, neither the majority of Shia nor Kurdish constituencies have had reason to relinquish what they consider the guarantors of their political self-determination and physical security. -------------- BAGHDAD 00000812 003 OF 006 CAUGHT IN A POLITICAL THICKET -------------- ¶5. (S//REL MNCI) We have attempted to mitigate the negative influence of illegal militias largely through specific interventions to inhibit the widespread penetration of militias into the military and police. As the Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq (MNSTC-I) continues to organize, train, equip, and mentor credible and capable Iraqi Security Forces (ISF),MNF-I expects the reliance on militias outside the legitimate security forces to fade progressively. This is a long-term process that makes immediate results hard to identify. Post has included the presence of illegal armed groups as an issue to be considered during transfer of security responsibility to the Iraqis. ¶6. (S//REL MNCI) Per CPA Order 91, the Coalition has advised the GOI to integrate former militia members into the ISF as individuals, not as entire units. Actual patterns of ad hoc militia recruitment vary, but MNSTC-I currently tries to uphold strict adherence to the approved recruitment vetting process for security force candidates, which involves scrutinizing criminal and political backgrounds, among other checks. Although some Peshmerga units effectively serve as Iraqi Army battalions, and Badr Organization units have entered service in a less overt collective fashion, under the current recruitment and development plan for the ISF, there are just too many militiamen for ISF units to effectively bring into their own ranks. ¶7. (S//REL MNCI) Recently, there has been ongoing reporting (reftels) that militias are commanding greater influence within the ISF as well as indications of militias' criminal behavior. Post will continue to emphasize to the GOI our position that illegal militias have no role within the government, particularly the Ministries of Defense and Interior. Wary of the possibility of Shia militias assuming ministerial control, Post strongly warned the then-newly-formed ITG in spring 2005 against allowing such a takeover. The Ministry of Defense (MoD) appears to be devoid of significant militia influence. Reports from multiple sources, however, indicate that Shia militias have penetrated the Ministry of Interior (MOI) and the provincial police forces in central and southern Iraq -- where Coalition influence on the accession of militia members into the security forces has not been as strong. ¶8. (S//REL MNCI) The vexing nature of the militia problem also is represented in the new Iraqi constitution. Although Article 9(B) clearly states that "the formation of military militias outside the framework of the armed forces is prohibited," Article 117 stipulates that regional governments are responsible for the "establishment of internal security forces...and guards of the region." In the Kurds' view, this (and similar language in the TAL) legitimizes the existence of the Peshmerga. The CPA recognized such legitimacy by agreeing with the KDP and PUK political leadership on a program that would have eliminated approximately half the active Peshmerga and reorganized the remaining forces into domestic policing forces of three types: "mountain rangers," counter-terrorism forces, and quick reaction forces. If the political structure of the country includes other regions as permitted by the Constitution, it may open the door for the possible legitimization of Shia militias should a Shia-dominated region be established. This highlights the underlying contradiction: although the existence of sectarian militias is prohibited, militias operate (and probably will continue to operate) as a matter of practice, contrary to the intent of CPA Order 91. -------------- AN OPEN DOOR FOR "CREATIVE POLICING" -------------- ¶9. (S//REL MNCI) The IIG under then-PM Ayad Allawi, despite grand public announcements failed to execute any of the transition and re-integration process for several reasons -- among them the political parties' determination to keep their militias. Under PM Ibrahim Al Jafari, the ITG also hesitated, with mainline Shia and Kurdish parties still evidently preferring the status quo (ref E). In August 2005, Jafari issued a directive reiterating the MOI's obligation to disband militias under CPA Order 91; reportedly, the MOI in BAGHDAD 00000812 004 OF 006 turn requested $60 million from the ITG to jumpstart the process. The motivations for this maneuver, however, were suspect, and nothing was accomplished (ref F). ¶10. (S//REL MNCI) Militia groups closely affiliated with the Shia-dominated ITG have been employed to fill a perceived security vacuum. These groups use back-alley intimidation tactics (such as beatings and killings of Sunni political opponents) and operate under the guise of legitimate ISF (refs G, H, I, J, K). There have been long-standing concerns about the control of provincial police units by the Badr Organization throughout south-central Iraq and by the JAM and Tharallah in Basrah (ref L). Reporting indicates, however, that the ITG has been considering more aggressive initiatives to employ militias effectively (ref B). Both the Minister of Interior and the Minister of State for National Security have proposed the employment of "interested citizens" to enhance security in their residential areas, a program often referred to as "neighborhood watches." To alleviate Coalition concerns, the Ministers have qualified that such groups would be unarmed. ¶11. (S//REL MNCI) What is actually transpiring appears to be more nefarious. Military reporting indicates that human rights abuses at the hands of MOI police forces, directed principally at Sunnis, are rife. Residents throughout Baghdad speak in hushed whispers about the "Khafesh al Lael" (the Bats of the Night),an alleged nocturnal hit squad reportedly built around a nucleus of Badr Organization operators who raid houses to abduct, torture, and kill their victims in a shadowy campaign of retaliation -- often while wearing police uniforms. Reports also suggest the formation of other groups aligned with the Office of the Martyr Sadr that are waging similar retaliatory campaigns (refs M, N, O, P). The problem is serious in Basrah as well. -------------- CONFRONTING THE SECTARIAN DIVIDE -------------- ¶12. (S//REL MNCI) Although the insurgency in Iraq is often depicted as a localized Sunni phenomenon contrasted with a comparatively tranquil situation in Shia and Kurdish areas, the potential for open sectarian conflict simmers just beneath the surface throughout the country. Both Shia and Kurds justifiably fear terrorist attacks by Sunni former regime elements seeking a return to Sunni Arab domination. Hence, rather than disband their militias, Shia and Kurds have depended on them to protect their interests. In the case of the Shia, this protection increasingly includes extra-judicial, retaliatory violence. ¶13. (S//REL MNCI) Several additional obstacles inhibit our ability to contend adequately with the current environment: -- A continued reliance on the inherently limited CPA Order 91 as the principal mechanism for addressing militias, without regard to the broader sectarian problem; -- Limited capacity to quantify the level of Iranian financial and material support to armed Shia extremist groups, and the complicity of some ITG members in their extra-judicial activities; -- Inability to bridge the sense of inequity felt by both Shia and Sunni communities by the existence and legitimization of the Peshmerga; -- The extent to which the Sunni insurgency is considered only "rejectionist" and devoid of legitimate political grievance (thereby eliminating any distinction between redeemable and irredeemable resisters); -- The continued support, even if passive, for unrestrained de-Ba'athification; and -- Rampant unemployment, which fuels the anger, discontent, and boredom in the streets that drive some young Iraqi men to join a militia in order to belong and earn some money. All of these factors hinder efforts to encourage disarmament and to foster a willingness among Iraqi counterparts to address the broader problem of a well-armed and deeply BAGHDAD 00000812 005 OF 006 divided society. -------------- APPLYING RECONCILIATION -------------- ¶14. (S//REL MNCI) Invoking the sanctity of rule of law is a necessary, but insufficient, condition for a successful disarmament regime. A long-term effort to disarm Iraqi society depends on two other fundamental preconditions: -- 1) a durably peaceful stasis or post-conflict balance-of-power; and -- 2) the competing parties are willing participants in a process of disarmament and a genuine political dialogue to resolve collectively outstanding grievances related to issues of ethnic recognition. -- 3) the Iraqi government exercises a monopoly on the use of force (i.e., a fully capable ISF). DDR regimes rarely are implemented without the corollary mechanisms of what is formally termed "reconciliation." Contemplating such an initiative in Iraq requires: acknowledging the need for these preconditions; overcoming a one-dimensional, rule of law-centered perspective; and confronting the challenge of bridging a formidable sectarian divide. ¶15. (S//REL MNCI) The tools and methodologies available to support an integrated reconciliation program are varied and include weapons turn-in programs, militia transition programs, targeted economic development incentives, and political amnesty initiatives, among others. Pursuing any one of these mechanisms in isolation and outside the context of a more encompassing effort to achieve lasting harmony among Iraq's constituents stands only a limited chance of success. Initiating an effective dialogue among the Iraqis to determine which structured combination of these instruments will achieve the desired end will be a pivotal milestone towards lasting disarmament. -------------- DEALING WITH "FORMER" INSURGENTS -------------- ¶16. (S//REL MNCI) An immediate focus of our attention is moving insurgents away from violence and "resistance" and toward political participation as the proper vehicle for achieving political goals. Many of the more well-known insurgents (particularly Sunni Arabs) and their senior henchmen, as with the militia (mainly Shi'a and Kurdish) groups, inevitably will be part of any reconciliation or national unity program. In fact, the GOI might -- as with the militias -- face the prospect of some of the former insurgents seeking to join the ISF. Like all recruits, they will undergo fitness and background checks. Those without criminal records or distinct political profiles might pass unnoticed and, if hired, would have to take an oath of loyalty to the nation and the constitution. The fate of those with a political but no criminal profile will be determined by the national unity/reconciliation program, which will be difficult. At a minimum it would involve a credible renunciation of violence, disavowal of or agreement to disband armed groups to which they belong, and an acceptance of Iraq's new legitimate institutions. ¶17. (S//REL MNCI) A media outreach program also has been devised to televise the confessions of former insurgents. This program features disillusioned former insurgents who explain to viewers why their actions were wrong and how insurgent groups are not struggling for Iraq or Islam. Viewers are told that the insurgents' campaign is contrary to Islam. Because many Iraqi insurgents decided to fight against Coalition Forces after seeing images of detainee abuse in Abu Ghraib prison, former insurgents tell viewers how well Coalition Forces treated them while in detention. -------------- THE WAY AHEAD -------------- BAGHDAD 00000812 006 OF 006 ¶18. (S//REL MNCI) We recognize militia organizations will continue to pursue sectarian agendas that undermine the enduring establishment of national unity and the government's ability to improve security and human rights. As a result, Post and MNF-I have formed a Task Force on militias and extra-governmental armed groups. This Task Force is forming a specific action plan consisting of actions for both the Iraqis and the Coalition to take which will neutralize the threat militias pose, and which is also part of the Mission's overall strategy to foster national reconciliation. Once this militia strategy is finalized and approved at Post we will present it SEPTEL. KHALILZAD