AMIDST VIOLENCE IN BAGHDAD, KURDS AIM TO BLOCK

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000653 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 03/01/2026 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: AMIDST VIOLENCE IN BAGHDAD, KURDS AIM TO BLOCK JAFARI Classified By: PolCouns Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY: Military and press reports indicate significant incidents of violence February 28 and March 1. Eighty percent of a Shia mosque in Kathamiya was destroyed in an IED explosion February 28. Military sources reported 23 civilian deaths on March 1 as of 1600 hrs. In a March 1 conversation with Pol Couns, senior Dawa Shia Islamist party official Ali Adeeb vehemently insisted that the Sunni Arab political leadership is not credible on the terrorism issue, and he insisted that Shia patience with Sunni Arab-driven terror was near its end. He said that talks to set up a government under PM Ibrahim Jafari were stalled amidst the simmering sectarian violence. Deputy Prime Minister Rowsh Shaways told PolOff that the Kurds, Allawi and Sunni Arab parties will coalesce into a front to oppose the Jafari nomination for prime minister. Kurdish government negotiating team member Mahmud Othman said that the Kurdish Alliance came to view Jafari's February 28 trip to Ankara as the last straw. END SUMMARY -------------- BAGHDAD -------------- ¶2. (C) Press reports noted that at least two car bombs exploded in Baghdad March 1. While these attacks have not yet been confirmed by coalition forces, military sources did confirm 23 deaths on March 1 as of 1600 hrs. MNF-I statistics show an increase in civilian deaths in the two days since the vehicle ban was lifted on February 27. ¶3. (C) Military sources confirmed an IED attack on a Shia mosque in Kadhimiya on the morning of February 28. According to military reports, eighty percent of the Al Haura Mosque was destroyed in the blast. This was the most serious report of damage to a religious site since the first day of violence following the February 22 Samarra bombing. -------------- Political Reactions to the Violence -------------- ¶4. (C) Senior Dawa Party official Ali Adeeb was adamant with PolCouns March 1 that the Sunni Arab political leadership is at a minimum exploiting the threat of violence if not instigating attacks. He warned that Shia patience was nearly exhausted. PolCouns said both sides needed to step back and look at the other's complaints. Adeeb would have none of it. The Sunni Arab terror had triggered tough Shia responses, but he insisted PolCouns not confuse "the cart and the horse." ¶5. (C) Al-Adeeb said that the Ambassador's campaign to include Sunni rejectionists is a big mistake because we will never be able to change their minds about who should be in power in Iraq. As an alternative to Sunni outreach, Al-Adib suggested that GOI approach tribal leaders to police their own areas. If tribal leaders cannot, it would provide justification for the MOI to enforce security. PolCouns cautioned that there were past efforts to use the tribes to improve security. We are still waiting for results. ¶6. (C) Later, Sunni Arab Deputy Prime Minister Abid Mutlak al-Jaburi said there is no other name for concentrated attacks on mosques and civilians "except civil war." He said it was vital to get militias off the streets. Jaburi warned that Sunni Arab groups in the Baghdad area are ready to fight the Shia. -------------- GOVERNMENT FORMATION -------------- ¶7. (C) In a March 1 meeting, re-elected Shia independent member of the Council of Representatives (CoR) Abidah Ahmad Dakhil al-Tai urged PolOffs to disregard rumors of political parties attempting to leave the Shia Coalition. Al-Tai said she welcomed and accepted strong divergent opinions within the Coalition but opposed any machinations by politicians to wrangle the PM nomination away from Ibrahim Jafari. She added that the close PM nomination vote was an indication that both Adil Abd al-Madhi and Jafari were considered worthy of the position. She admitted to PolOffs that the Sadrists called her prior to the PM vote, asserting that Jafari was more religious than Abd al-Mahdi. Al-Tai considered this campaign propaganda offensive, but not coercive and insisted that it had no effect on the BAGHDAD 00000653 002 OF 002 outcome of the vote. ¶8. (C) On March 1, Dawa's Ali al-Adib gave PolCouns was pessimistic on government formation. Talks with the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs have not started again in earnest, given the contentious climate on security. , claiming it is absolutely "impossible" to form a unity government; the Sunni Arabs will not be reliable partners, he warned. He added that by incorporating divergent groups into the new government, constant bickering will continue, no one will be pointed in the same direction, and nothing will get accomplished. Al-Adib declared that Iraq does not need a fragile unity government, but a strong unified one (read Shia controlled). Pol Couns replied that since so many Iraqis are talking about civil war, clearly national unity is fragile. A national unity government, staffed by competent persons with partisan agendas, would best begin to address Iraq's many problems. ¶9. (S) Deputy Prime Minister Rowsh Shaways, meanwhile, told PolOff March 1 that the Kurdish Alliance, Tawafuq, and the Iraqi National Accord (led by former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi) have decided to ask the Shia Coalition to reconsider Ibrahim Jafari's nomination for Prime Minister. In a separate meeting, Kurdish independent and member of the government negotiating team Dr. Mahmud Othman claimed that the Kurdish Alliance had decided to oppose Jafari after much internal debate, with Iraqi President and leader of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Jalal Talabani in favor of removing Jafari and Kurdistan Democratic Party leader Masud Barzani being more cautious. Othman said the last straw was Jafari's sudden decision to go to Ankara without informing anyone else in the government. He reported that, of the Sunni Arabs who participated in the talks, only Saleh Mutlak did not appear, but Allawi will work to bring him into the anti-Jafari front. When pressed by PolOff as to whether any attempt would be made to talk directly with Jafari, Othman flatly said no. He angrily said that Jafari had sent word through his assistants calling for a meeting of the leaders of all the parties in Iraq at his residence at on March 2. As of late afternoon on March 1, reported Othman, neither Talabani nor Barzani planned to heed the summons. SATTERFIELD