RELATIVE CALM PREVAILS

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 000626 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/27/2016 TAGS: PGOV PINS PNAT KDEM IZ SUBJECT: RELATIVE CALM PREVAILS REF: BAGHDAD 609 Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: The overall security situation in Baghdad is relatively calm and reports of sectarian violence once again decreased overnight. The ban on vehicular movement in Baghdad was lifted at 0600 hrs on February 27, and our contacts appeared to be largely consumed with personal errands for much of the day. The Deputy Mayor of Baghdad reported a February 27 missile attack on a girls' school resulting in casualties. Although the violence has tapered, sectarian and ethnic tensions are still high. END SUMMARY. ¶2. (C) MNF-I noted two reports of attacks on Shia mosques overnight. According to the Basrah police, shortly before midnight on February 26, an improvised explosive device (IED) exploded inside the Imam Ali Mosque in Basrah. The National Police reported that a Shia shrine in the Madean District of Baghdad was hit by three mortar rounds an hour later. Two of the rounds hit the dome of the Selman Al Muhemdi shrine; the third struck the outside of the shrine. ¶3. (C) Deputy Mayor of Baghdad Hussein Al-Bahraini told PolOff that on February 27 a missile was fired into a girls' school in the Al-Salaam district of Al-Monsour, reportedly killing seven teachers and several students. Hussein and officials in the district are attempting to confirm casualties and damage to the school. No group has taken responsibility for the attack. ¶4. (C) Fadhila parliamentarian Mohammed Ismail al-Kusai told PolFSN in a February 27 phone conversation that the challenge Iraq is currently facing is sectarian, not political. He added that the Fadhila Party will work to preserve the unity of the Shia coalition in order to present a united front and to keep the "Ba'athists" at bay. ¶5. (C) Ala'a Mekki of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP) told us February 27 that Sunni Arabs were watching the Shia militia carefully, especially Jaysh al-Mahdi. He was unsure whether the militia would stand down, although he had only one report of an attack on a Sunni area (which we later learned was an approved MoI operation). Mekki expressed some discomfort with the Sadrists. The talks on February 23 and 24 had been difficult, he observed, as Sadrist negotiators Abdel Hadi ad-Darraji and Hazem al-Araji had been "almost violent." ¶6. (C) In a telephone conversation on February 27, Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) senior member Masrur Barzani expressed the Kurds' frustration with the slow pace of government formation negotiations and blamed both Shia and Sunni Arabs for the delay. "It seems as though only the US Government and the Kurds are interested in helping Iraq progress toward democracy and self-sufficiency," complained Barzani. Barzani then reported that the KDP is avoiding large gatherings in the Green Zone after a mortar landed in its compound yesterday. While no one was hurt, the Barzanis are uncomfortably aware that their late-night conferences are attracting attention. ¶7. (C) Iraqi National Security Advisor Muwaffaq Rubai'e told PolCouns February 27 that he would brief Sistani's office on February 28 about events. He perceived that Sistani's mention in his February 22 fetwa about the faithful protecting holy sites themselves was "not helpful." Rubai'e opined that Shia patience with terror attacks is still very thin; one major terror attack could alter the scene immediately, he thought. KHALILZAD