Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
06BAGHDAD610
2006-02-26 19:15:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

RELATIVE CALM IN BAGHDAD; JAFARI MEETS WITH SISTANI

Tags:  PGOV PINS PNAT KDEM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
VZCZCXRO9091
PP RUEHBC RUEHDE RUEHIHL RUEHKUK RUEHMOS
DE RUEHGB #0610/01 0571915
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 261915Z FEB 06
FM AMEMBASSY BAGHDAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2935
INFO RUCNRAQ/IRAQ COLLECTIVE
RHEHNSC/WHITE HOUSE NSC WASHINGTON DC
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000610 

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: RELATIVE CALM IN BAGHDAD; JAFARI MEETS WITH SISTANI

REF: BAGHDAD 594

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000610

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/06/2016
TAGS: PGOV PINS PNAT KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: RELATIVE CALM IN BAGHDAD; JAFARI MEETS WITH SISTANI

REF: BAGHDAD 594

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Incidents of sectarian violence
dropped further February 26. There were reports of
mortar fire on a mosque in Sadr City and of an IED
outside a mosque in Basra. Jafari's Chief of Staff
reported that the PM had traveled to Najaf where Grand
Ayatollah SISTANI "approved" of the process leading to
the Shia Islamist Coalition (List 555) PM nomination
decision. SISTANI also reportedly stressed that the
Shia Coalition must remain united. In a meeting with
the Political Counselor, IIP leader Tariq al-Hashimi
called for the abolition of all militia groups and the
cleaning up of the Iraqi police. President Talabani's
Chief of Staff told PolOff that many Kurds are losing
patience with the slow pace of government formation
negotiations and want Kurdish leaders Talabani and
Barzani to focus on internal Kurdistan issues rather
than national Iraqi politics. END SUMMARY


2. (C) MNF-I noted two reports of Mosques attacked on
February 26. According to Al-Furat television, mortars
were fired at the Al Ansar mosque in Sadr City with no
casualties. According to REO Basrah, an IED was
detonated outside the Al Amir Mosque, located in the
center of the city. REO reported that the only
reported injuries were of construction workers and
(according to a REO media contact) possibly
individuals responsible for the explosion. There also
was a bomb in al-Hillah, but it drew little street
reaction. Separately, more than 56 Shia families have
left their homes in the Abu Ghraib district after
receiving threats from Sunni extremists, according to
al-Alem TV. Shaykh Jalal ad-Din as-Saghir told
PolCouns late February 25 that Sunni Arab militants
had forced some Shia families out of their homes in
Tarmiya. (Comment: We cannot verify reports of
displacements so far. End Comment.)

--------------
JAFARI TRIP TO NAJAF
--------------


3. (C) During a February 26 late afternoon telephone
call, PM Chief of Staff Abdul Aziz al-Tamimi told

PolOff that Jafari had traveled to Najaf earlier in
the day to visit Ayatollah SISTANI. Al-Temimi said
that the purpose of Jafari's two-hour visit was to
inform SISTANI of the joint steps to reduce sectarian
tensions. (Comment: This visit comes after SISTANI
twice gave stinging rebukes to the Iraqi government
for security lapses. End Comment.) According to al-
Tamimi, Jafari also discussed the government formation
progress and gave an update on the status of the Shia
Coalition. Tamimi, who did not travel to Najaf,
claimed that Jafari had told him that SISTANI approved
of the democratic process whereby the Shia Coalition
had selected him as its PM candidate. Al-Temimi said
that SISTANI made clear to Jafari that the Shia
Coalition must remain intact.

--------------
SUNNI ARAB PARTY SAYS IT'S BETTER
--------------


4. (C) PolCouns February 26 informed Tariq al-
Hashimi of the Iraqi Islamic Party that MNF-I forces
will increase patrols in Baghdad to quell possible
violence in the coming days. Hashimi welcomed the
move and said he perceived that violence was
diminishing. He had only one report to share on
February 26 involving a mosque in the al-Dora
district. (Comment: MNF-I gave a different report
from al-Hashimi which indicated no actual gunfire;
again we found the IIP's information suspicious. End
Comment.) Hashimi and Emboffs reviewed Baghdad maps
as al-Hashimi and IIP spokesman Zafir al-Ani pointed
out the districts they thought were most threatened
with violence. (They opined that the most suffering
Baghdad neighborhoods are ash-Shu'ala in northwest
Baghdad -- the most difficult -- along with nearby
Huriya and Ghazaliya.) They pleaded for increased
American patrols in these areas and removal of ING
from them.


5. (C) Hashimi explained he must respond to Sunni Arab
pleas for action in the wake of last week's violence
following the Samarra mosque bombing. PolCouns

BAGHDAD 00000610 002 OF 002


replied the Islamic Party must counsel restraint.
Ultimately, he noted, the best action would be for
Hashimi and other elected officials to participate in
the new Iraqi government.

--------------
URGING IIP TO STAY IN THE GAME
--------------


6. (C) Hashimi told PolCouns that he might rejoin
talks on the government but he had a list of demands
that Jafari had to move on. (He observed that Jafari
had promised to call him February 26 but so far had
not done so.) PolCouns urged al-Hashimi to rejoin
talks promptly. When al-Hashimi complained that he
lacked cards, PolCouns shot back that if the Sunni
Arabs boycott the talks they should not be sure the
Shia and Kurds would not cut a deal without them.


7. (C) Hashimi called for a thorough restructuring of
the Iraqi Police. He said many IP officers are past
criminals. PolCouns countered that this is exactly
why Hashimi needs to help negotiate who the next
security ministers would be as well as the contents
the government program. Hashimi said that the Iraqi
government must quickly disband militia. He agreed
with Pol Couns that this would occur only when the
militias evolve an affiliation with the Iraqi Police.


--------------
Kurds Gathering Inwards?
--------------


8. (C) On February 26, Presidency Council Chief of
Staff Kamran Karadaghi told Pol and Legal Offs that
the Kurdish public was losing patience with the slow
pace of government formation negotiations. He
reported that both Kurdistan Democratic Party leader
Masoud Barzani and President Jalal Talabani were under
pressure from their constituencies to return
permanently to Kurdistan and take care of matters at
home, namely the long-awaited merger of the two
Kurdistan Regional Governments (KRGs). Karadaghi
explained that the Kurdish people, having observed the
political and social upheaval in the rest of Iraq, are
more determined than ever to withdraw into their
cocoon in the North. PolOff argued that that attitude
came too close to independence, and that both Talabani
and Barzani needed to explain to their people how to
be "Iraqis," vice "Kurds." Karadaghi agreed, but
noted that it would be difficult to get Kurds to take
a broader perspective on Iraq.
KHALILZAD