AMBASSADOR RALLIES KEY PLAYERS AROUND PM'S CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000602

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RALLIES KEY PLAYERS AROUND PM'S CRISIS
PLAN


Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: After a day of prodding, Sunni Arab leaders
agreed over February 24-25 to join a government advisory
committee that will unite key leaders and convene the evening
of February 25 to plan the next steps following the Samarra
tragedy. Prime Minister Jafari issued a plan February 24
calling for, among other steps, a continued curfew, increased
security deployments, and a ban on public weapon possession.
The Sunni Arab Tawafuq leadership learned of the plan in an
evening meeting with Ambassador and subsequently issued a
statement February 25 welcoming it, calling for its
implementation and expressing interest in returning to the
negotiating table for government formation talks. They
stopped short of withdrawing their announced suspension of
government formation engagement, however, and they complain
that some Sunni mosques remain occupied by Mehdi Army
elements -- a charge that we and the GOI are working to
verify and address.


2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The Sunni Arab leadership promised
the Ambassador that they will rein in media incitement and
said they are holding "positive" meetings with Mehdi Army
leaders to de-escalate the situation. Allawi recommended
that the government summon governors from key Iraqi provinces
for a meeting in Baghdad to coordinate a unified approach to
quelling unrest. In a separate meeting the evening of
February 24, a still-shaken Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim told the
Ambassador that he backs the Prime Minister's plan but warned
that the Shia community would put its faith in the Mehdi Army
if the government does not deliver results soon. Leaders
outside the Shia alliance have acknowledged that a national
unity government remains the only escape from this crisis,
and they say that they are going to work closely with SCIRI
to agree on an end-game before taking the first deliberate
steps to push Jafari aside. END SUMMARY.

--------------
Rallying Around the PM's Plan
--------------


3. (C) PM Jafari announced a security plan on February 24
after multiple Ministerial Committee on National Security
(MCNS) meetings (see septel). The Ambassador worked to rally
Sunni Arab, Kurdish, and Shia leaders around the plan, which
called for, among other things, increased security force
deployment, an extended curfew, and the creation of a
political advisory team to bring together key leaders to
consult on the crisis and build national unity.

--------------
Sunni Arabs Reluctantly Agree to Come Forward
--------------


4. (C) The Ambassador worked with Ayad Allawi to host a
meeting the evening of February 24 for Sunni Arab leaders and
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani in an
effort to convince them to rally around the PM's plan. Adnan
al-Duleimi, Tariq al-Hashimi, Khalaf Alayan, Salah Mutlak,
and Hassan Zeidan al-Luheibi all attended. All present
praised the decision to put a daytime curfew in place and
approved its extension. They backed the PM plan and, with
some cajoling from the Ambassador, agreed to attend the first
meeting of the new advisory council on the evening of
February 25. The Ambassador urged the group to announce its
return to political negotiations regarding both the crisis
and the government formation process. Hashimi resisted
initially, claiming that his boycott is one of his only
"cards," but he soon backed down after the Ambassador,
Allawi, and Barzani warned him that he is playing into the
hands of forces that want the Sunni Arabs kept out of the
government.


5. (C) Ultimately, the Tawafuq Front issued a statement the
morning of February 25 welcoming the Prime Minister's plan
and calling for its implementation on the ground. The
statement parses words on its final point, emphasizing that
the Tawafuq Front "is moving forward with participation in
the political process and will not hesitate to reconsider its
decision and come back to the negotiating table regarding the
formation of the government in the event that its legitimate
demands are met."


6. (C) The Ambassador criticized the Iraqi Islamic Party's
(IIP's) "Baghdad" TV station for airing a provocative sermon
supporting vigilantism. Hashimi contacted the station and
pledged to keep programming focused on a call for calm. The
leaders present made clear, however, that the crisis is far
from over in their view. They asserted that several mosques
remain occupied by militia elements; raids and clashes

BAGHDAD 00000602 002 OF 002


continue; and they want any investigation into the Samarra
violence and its aftermath to be conducted by an independent
committee, not one tied to government ministries that they
believe are responsible for or complicit in some of the
violence. The Ambassador urged the leaders to raise these
points in the new committee's meeting and promised to ensure
that any still-occupied mosques will be evacuated
immediately. Allawi recommended that the PM also convene
governors from throughout Iraq's sensitive areas, possibly
accompanied by their police directors, in order to ensure a
unified government stand against further sectarian violence.

--------------
SCIRI Warns the Public, Remains Skeptical
--------------


7. (C) The Ambassador made a similar effort to bring SCIRI on
board with the PM's plan in a subsequent meeting with Abd
al-Aziz al-Hakim and Vice President Adel Abd al-Mehdi. Hakim
said that he would back the plan but is still stunned by the
Samarra attack, which he sees as an Iraqi 9/11. Many voices
still are calling for a broader response, he warned. The
attack brought to mind a host of failures on the security
front, Hakim said, particularly inaction on the
counter-terrorism law, the "meandering" Saddam trial, and a
passive military posture. Hakim confidante Humam al-Hamudi
warned the Ambassador that the PM's plan is necessary but
insufficient. It amounts, he said, to a list of prohibitions
but no list of initiatives.


8. (C) Hamudi suggested two initiatives: First, the GOI,
working with the USG, should lead the effort to send a major
delegation to Samarra before Sadrist elements beat them to
the city. Second, the GOI and MNF-I should find a way to
bring Shia families who have fled Baghdad in fear a chance to
return to their homes. He said that Dura and Sayidiyya have
seen a Shia exodus. Hamudi warned that the Mehdi Army
represents a major threat that can be defeated only if the
GOI is seen as a competent provider of security. If the GOI
fails to project that image, he predicted, more and more Shia
will think the Mehdi Army is their only hope. Adel Abd
al-Mehdi echoed those concerns to POLOFF and warned that a
major confrontation with the Mehdi Army might be needed, but
such a decision has to be studied more carefully.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) COMMENT: As we head into the convening of an advisory
committee, the climate of mutual suspicion remains thick.
The Sunni Arabs claimed to the Ambassador on February 24 that
the Mehdi Army campaign against them remains in effect.
Khalaf Alayan has recommended a week-long curfew and claims
that more than 1,050 bodies have turned up in Baghdad so far,
a number far above our estimates (of under 250). SCIRI
leader Hakim, for his part, claimed separately to the
Ambassador that some 80,000 have died since the U.S. arrival
in Iraq and that the vast majority have been Shia. The
various sides will aim to sit down together at the advisory
committee, but every side in this ongoing crisis clearly
feels aggrieved. Even as we move forward with steps to
address the security crisis, Allawi and the Kurds tell us
that the formation of a national unity government remains the
larger solution. They plan to accelerate their efforts in
talks with SCIRI and the Sunni Arabs in order to reach
consensus on an alternative ticket to Jafari in the coming
days. END COMMENT.
KHALILZAD