AMBASSADOR RALLIES KEY PLAYERS AROUND PM'S CRISIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000602 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR RALLIES KEY PLAYERS AROUND PM'S CRISIS PLAN Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: After a day of prodding, Sunni Arab leaders agreed over February 24-25 to join a government advisory committee that will unite key leaders and convene the evening of February 25 to plan the next steps following the Samarra tragedy. Prime Minister Jafari issued a plan February 24 calling for, among other steps, a continued curfew, increased security deployments, and a ban on public weapon possession. The Sunni Arab Tawafuq leadership learned of the plan in an evening meeting with Ambassador and subsequently issued a statement February 25 welcoming it, calling for its implementation and expressing interest in returning to the negotiating table for government formation talks. They stopped short of withdrawing their announced suspension of government formation engagement, however, and they complain that some Sunni mosques remain occupied by Mehdi Army elements -- a charge that we and the GOI are working to verify and address. ¶2. (C) SUMMARY CONTINUED: The Sunni Arab leadership promised the Ambassador that they will rein in media incitement and said they are holding "positive" meetings with Mehdi Army leaders to de-escalate the situation. Allawi recommended that the government summon governors from key Iraqi provinces for a meeting in Baghdad to coordinate a unified approach to quelling unrest. In a separate meeting the evening of February 24, a still-shaken Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim told the Ambassador that he backs the Prime Minister's plan but warned that the Shia community would put its faith in the Mehdi Army if the government does not deliver results soon. Leaders outside the Shia alliance have acknowledged that a national unity government remains the only escape from this crisis, and they say that they are going to work closely with SCIRI to agree on an end-game before taking the first deliberate steps to push Jafari aside. END SUMMARY. -------------- Rallying Around the PM's Plan -------------- ¶3. (C) PM Jafari announced a security plan on February 24 after multiple Ministerial Committee on National Security (MCNS) meetings (see septel). The Ambassador worked to rally Sunni Arab, Kurdish, and Shia leaders around the plan, which called for, among other things, increased security force deployment, an extended curfew, and the creation of a political advisory team to bring together key leaders to consult on the crisis and build national unity. -------------- Sunni Arabs Reluctantly Agree to Come Forward -------------- ¶4. (C) The Ambassador worked with Ayad Allawi to host a meeting the evening of February 24 for Sunni Arab leaders and Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) leader Masoud Barzani in an effort to convince them to rally around the PM's plan. Adnan al-Duleimi, Tariq al-Hashimi, Khalaf Alayan, Salah Mutlak, and Hassan Zeidan al-Luheibi all attended. All present praised the decision to put a daytime curfew in place and approved its extension. They backed the PM plan and, with some cajoling from the Ambassador, agreed to attend the first meeting of the new advisory council on the evening of February 25. The Ambassador urged the group to announce its return to political negotiations regarding both the crisis and the government formation process. Hashimi resisted initially, claiming that his boycott is one of his only "cards," but he soon backed down after the Ambassador, Allawi, and Barzani warned him that he is playing into the hands of forces that want the Sunni Arabs kept out of the government. ¶5. (C) Ultimately, the Tawafuq Front issued a statement the morning of February 25 welcoming the Prime Minister's plan and calling for its implementation on the ground. The statement parses words on its final point, emphasizing that the Tawafuq Front "is moving forward with participation in the political process and will not hesitate to reconsider its decision and come back to the negotiating table regarding the formation of the government in the event that its legitimate demands are met." ¶6. (C) The Ambassador criticized the Iraqi Islamic Party's (IIP's) "Baghdad" TV station for airing a provocative sermon supporting vigilantism. Hashimi contacted the station and pledged to keep programming focused on a call for calm. The leaders present made clear, however, that the crisis is far from over in their view. They asserted that several mosques remain occupied by militia elements; raids and clashes BAGHDAD 00000602 002 OF 002 continue; and they want any investigation into the Samarra violence and its aftermath to be conducted by an independent committee, not one tied to government ministries that they believe are responsible for or complicit in some of the violence. The Ambassador urged the leaders to raise these points in the new committee's meeting and promised to ensure that any still-occupied mosques will be evacuated immediately. Allawi recommended that the PM also convene governors from throughout Iraq's sensitive areas, possibly accompanied by their police directors, in order to ensure a unified government stand against further sectarian violence. -------------- SCIRI Warns the Public, Remains Skeptical -------------- ¶7. (C) The Ambassador made a similar effort to bring SCIRI on board with the PM's plan in a subsequent meeting with Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim and Vice President Adel Abd al-Mehdi. Hakim said that he would back the plan but is still stunned by the Samarra attack, which he sees as an Iraqi 9/11. Many voices still are calling for a broader response, he warned. The attack brought to mind a host of failures on the security front, Hakim said, particularly inaction on the counter-terrorism law, the "meandering" Saddam trial, and a passive military posture. Hakim confidante Humam al-Hamudi warned the Ambassador that the PM's plan is necessary but insufficient. It amounts, he said, to a list of prohibitions but no list of initiatives. ¶8. (C) Hamudi suggested two initiatives: First, the GOI, working with the USG, should lead the effort to send a major delegation to Samarra before Sadrist elements beat them to the city. Second, the GOI and MNF-I should find a way to bring Shia families who have fled Baghdad in fear a chance to return to their homes. He said that Dura and Sayidiyya have seen a Shia exodus. Hamudi warned that the Mehdi Army represents a major threat that can be defeated only if the GOI is seen as a competent provider of security. If the GOI fails to project that image, he predicted, more and more Shia will think the Mehdi Army is their only hope. Adel Abd al-Mehdi echoed those concerns to Poloff and warned that a major confrontation with the Mehdi Army might be needed, but such a decision has to be studied more carefully. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶9. (C) COMMENT: As we head into the convening of an advisory committee, the climate of mutual suspicion remains thick. The Sunni Arabs claimed to the Ambassador on February 24 that the Mehdi Army campaign against them remains in effect. Khalaf Alayan has recommended a week-long curfew and claims that more than 1,050 bodies have turned up in Baghdad so far, a number far above our estimates (of under 250). SCIRI leader Hakim, for his part, claimed separately to the Ambassador that some 80,000 have died since the U.S. arrival in Iraq and that the vast majority have been Shia. The various sides will aim to sit down together at the advisory committee, but every side in this ongoing crisis clearly feels aggrieved. Even as we move forward with steps to address the security crisis, Allawi and the Kurds tell us that the formation of a national unity government remains the larger solution. They plan to accelerate their efforts in talks with SCIRI and the Sunni Arabs in order to reach consensus on an alternative ticket to Jafari in the coming days. END COMMENT. KHALILZAD