SUNNI ARAB LEADERS' REACTION TO SAMARA BOMBING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000591

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/24/2016
TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI ARAB LEADERS' REACTION TO SAMARA BOMBING
STRONG BUT MIXED

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: On February 23, Sunni Arab Tawafuq leaders
refused to join President Talabani at a gathering of top
Iraqi government officials in response to sectarian violence
that followed the February 22 bombing of the Golden Mosque in
Samara. At an afternoon press conference, Tawafuq leader
Tariq al-Hashimi blamed the Shi'a-led United Iraqi Coalition
(UIC) for attacks on Sunni mosques and demanded a halt to the
violence before discussions can continue. The private
reaction from Sunni Arab politicians is mixed. Iraqi Islamic
Party's Ayad al Samarai said the situation could quickly
return to "normal" if the violence ends soon. However,
fellow Tawafuq member Hassan al Bazzaz, referring to the new
Council of Representatives, told POLOFF "Seats mean nothing
now. Guns mean something." End Summary.


2. (C) The three leaders of the Sunni Arab Tawafuq Coalition,
Adnan Dulaymi, Khalif Alayan and Tariq al-Hashimi, refused to
join President Talabani February 23 in a gathering of top
Iraqi government officials to discuss solutions to the
sectarian violence resulting from the February 22 mosque
bombing in Samarra. Instead, they delivered a letter to
Talabani demanding Prime Minister Jafari take responsibility
for bringing calm to Iraq. Their demands included (a) a
clear denunciation by the government of all attacks of any
kind and using even a three-day curfew if needed to restore
law and order; (b) returning mosques occupied by gangs to
their rightful owners; (c) pledging to repair damaged
mosques; (d) compensating the IIP for damage to its offices
and compensating victims and their families; (e) political
parties to halt their incitement and especially the
programming on al-Furat and al-Fayha satellite TV channels;
(f) freeing persons kidnapped by armed gangs during the
violence; (g) an urgent government investigation to determine
those responsible for the Samarra bombing. In a public
statement, Secretary General of the Iraqi Islamic Party (IIP)
Tariq al Hashimi accused the Shia Islamist Coalition and
Sadrists of attacks on Sunni mosques throughout Iraq.


3. (C) IIP,s Ayad al Samarai told POLOFF privately that
Tawafuq would likely return to government discussions as soon
as they get a positive response to their demands. Samarai
said the political leaders must condemn violence against
Sunni mosques and protect Sunni areas. If the violence
decreases, he continued, &then the next step will be easy."
He added the Tawafuq leaders would likely meet Talabani
February 24. Samarai told POLOFF that Sunni leaders had
tried to protect Shia mosques and had hoped the Iraqi Police
and Army would do the same. Samarai accused Iraqi Security
Forces of having threatened Sunni mosques and not aiding
those who requested help. As an example, Samarai said that
in the Jamiyah area of Baghdad, National Guard troops went to
the Mullah Waysh mosque and wrote on the walls that the
mosque was closed. He said this caused the Sunni Arab leaders
to send their own armed personnel to the mosque. Samarai
lamented that the Sunni leaders did not have enough people to
provide this protection at every mosque.


4. (C) Tawafuq member and University of Baghdad Professor of
International Relations Hassan al Bazzaz asked for USG
efforts to influence PM Jafari and Grand Ayatollah Sistani.
Bazzaz said he wanted the USG to pressure Minister of Defense
Sa'adoun Dulaimi to recruit more former Iraqi Army officers.
When POLOFF countered that there has been an ongoing
recruiting effort with just that goal, Bazzaz replied
Dulaimi's leadership has been too slow and that the MoD has
not recruited effectively.


5. (C) Bazzaz explained that the Tawafuq leaders refused to
attend Talabani's event because the Tawafuq are working from
a position of weakness. "They (Shi'a leaders) have all the
guns and power." When POLOFF countered that the Tawafuq now
has power through their Council of Representative seats and
broader alliances, Bazazz replied, "Seats mean nothing now.
Guns mean something."


6. (C) Sunni Arab leaders expressed divergent opinions
regarding possible action by Coalition Forces (CF). Abdul
Nasir al-Janabi - Iraqi National Dialogue Council (ICND)
member and newly elected to the Council of Representatives -
pleaded with PolCouns for Coalition Forces to patrol Baghdad.
The political process was under direct threat because of the
violence, he warned. PolCouns replied the USG wants the
political process in Iraq to succeed, but deploying troops
under these circumstances would likely lead to Sunni
extremists battling CF. Janabi conceded the problem and said
he would ask the Sunni Arab religious leadership to issue a
statement renouncing retaliations by Sunni extremists.

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(Comment: Al-Janabi in the past was at the forefront of
those calling for the withdrawal of CF from cities. End
Comment.)

7. (C) Mithal al-Alusi, Council of Representatives member and
liberal/independent Sunni, told POLOFF that IIP's Tariq
al-Hashimi's public comments Feb 22 incited violence. He
opined that Coalition Force presence on the Baghdad streets
would cause further bloodshed and send the wrong message. He
felt the Iraqi security forces must be competent and
accountable - starting immediately.

8. (C) In Baghdad, Allawi ally Saad al-Janabi told POLOFF
that MOI Police Commandos had taken over at least one mosque
in Adamiyah. (MNF-I has not yet confirmed other reports of
alleged mosque raids locally.) IIP's Ala Mekki told POLOFF
he received several calls February 23 alleging Jaysh al-Mahdi
soldiers in Sha'ab and Hiour areas of western Baghdad were
taking young Sunni men from their homes "because they're
Sunni." He also claimed Sunni mosques were burning in the
same areas.

9. (C) Regionally, Diyala Provincial Council member Sheik
Dhari Thuban traveled to south Buhriz in Diyala province. He
confirmed to Diyala SETOff that 47 Sunni and Shia brick
factory workers were pulled from their cars and killed
February 23. However, in contrast, State Department officers
in Anbar, Ninewa, and Salah ad Din provinces reported little
violence.

10. (C) Comment: Publicly, Tawafuq is putting forward a
message of "no discussions" to maintain credibility with
their angry and frightened Sunni Arab constituency. Their
rhetoric mirrors that of Shia leaders who have made equally
inflammatory statements in the aftermath of the attack on the
Samara mosque. The ITG and the Coalition are seized with
dealing with the violence -- a series of measures has been
ordered during several back-to-back MCNS meetings, including
one on February 24 (reported septels). The immediate
challenge is to get both sides to desist from provocative
pronouncements that carry the risk of increasing sectarian
violence past the point of no return. Ultimately, we must
ensure both sides rejoin the effort to establish a
cross-sectarian government. End Comment.
KHALILZAD