GOVERNMENT FORMATION UPDATE, FEBRUARY 22 -

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 000570

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2026
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: GOVERNMENT FORMATION UPDATE, FEBRUARY 22 -
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

REF: BAGHDAD 569

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, reason 1.4 (b)


1. (S) The effort to oust Ibrahim Jafari from the
Prime Ministry is on two tracks. February 21 and
February 22 the Kurdish/Allawi/Sunni Arab group began
developing the principles from the meeting a month in
Kurdistan into a broader government program. This
program would be introduced be the Kurds as the basis
of a "National Salvation Front" to which the Shia
would be invited to join. There was another, quieter
meeting February 21 between Kurdish PUKer Barham Salih
and SCIRI's Adil Abd al-Mahdi aimed at developing a
government program to which SCIRI could adhere with
the Kurdish-Allawi-Sunni Arab group. It also began
discussing the choreography by which SCIRI would drop
its support for the Shia Coalition's official prime
minister nominee, Ibrahim Jafari. SCIRI wants the
biggest payoff they can obtain while paying
themselves the smallest price possible in terms of
their image as standard-bearer of the Shia Islamist
Coalition. Saleh and Abd al-Mahdi are reviewing
names for Prime Minister such as Qassim Daoud and
Finance Minister Ali Allawi. They will develop a
longer list of names in the coming days. They have
told the Ambassador that they will widen the
discussions to include a top Allawi aide, and an
aide to Kurdish President Barzani, along with a
representative from the Sunni Arab Islamic Party.


2. (C) On February 22, Kurdish Deputy Prime Minister
Rowsh Shaways told PolOffs that the primary obstacle
to forming a national unity government is the
refusal of the entire Shia Coalition to accept former
Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and his National Iraqi List
as part of the new government. Given Ayatollah
SISTANI's instructions to both SCIRI's Abd al-Aziz al-
Hakim and Prime Minister-elect Ibrahim al-Jafari to
maintain the unity of the Shia Coalition, Shaways
doubted that it would be possible to field an
alternate candidate - such as Allawi - for Prime
Minister. Shaways thought it would be possible to
dump Jafari, however. He ruled out SCIRI's Adil
Abd al-Mahdi, noting that he would be considered
too controversial.


3. (C) Shia independent Qassim Daoud told PolOff
February 22 that any attempt to nominate a
Prime Minister outside of the Shia Coalition could
provoke a Shia uprising in Iraq. He had also heard
rumors that an alternate candidate might be
nominated if Prime Minister-elect Jafari failed to
garner enough support. He expressed bitterness
at the result of the internal Shia vote on February
12, stating that deciding a nomination by a margin of
one vote "is not democracy." Daoud sympathized with
the difficulties of working in a Jafari government
again after the experiences of this past year. As
long as the alternate candidate came from within the
Shia Coalition, however, Daoud indicated that no one
would fight to keep Jafari. He firmly maintained,
however, that only the Shia had the right to select
the Prime Minister.


4. (C) The Ambassador's press remarks on February
20 generated both criticism and praise from political
observers. Shia Islamists rejected his call for the
security ministries to be non-sectarian as an
obvious slam against the SCIRI Interior Minister and
thus an indirect call for Sunni Arab extremists to
increase their attacks. Kurdish and Allawi List
parliamentarians, by contrast, registered strong
agreement with the Ambassador.


5. (C) President Talabani will host the top
political leaders on February 23 to show national
unity in the wake of the February 22 attack on the
Shia holy mosque in Samarra. A Sadrist told Poloff
he was upbeat that the political process would not
suffer, since Jafari allegedly had stopped
widespread violence between Shia and Sunni Arabs.
By contrast, Rowsch Shaways thought the sectarian
violence over the bombing in Samarra would only
make government formation more difficult.

KHALILZAD