RESPONSE RE: GOT INVITATIONS TO SADR, MUTLAK, AND

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 000568

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/21/2016
TAGS: PREL PGOV PTER PHUM TU IZ
SUBJECT: RESPONSE RE: GOT INVITATIONS TO SADR, MUTLAK, AND
JAFARI

REF: A. ANKARA 721

B. BAGHDAD 517

C. KIRKUK 251

D. KIRKUK 21

E. STATE 27111

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: Reftel A requests Embassy Baghdad's views on
invitations by the Government of Turkey to Iraqi political
leaders. As we have reported, it is not yet certain that
current Prime Minister Jafari will retain his position; there
are a flurry of discussions underway in Baghdad. Although it
seems unlikely that Jafari would leave Iraq to visit Turkey
amid these talks, we do not object to the Turks hosting him
in principle. Indeed, his leaving the country might make it
easier to bring the talks to a close with a compromise
candidate. Embassy Baghdad, however, strongly discourages
the Turks from inviting Muqtada Sadr, who remains tied to
acts of violence and intimidation and is not the political
statesman he tries to portray. Salih Mutlak is not tied
directly to acts of violence, but his public statements
frequently are unhelpful. As he would likely use his
meetings in Ankara to boost his credibility, we do not think
the Turks receiving him now will be particularly useful. The
Kurdish Islamic Union (KIU) has joined the broader Kurdish
Alliance and is playing by democratic rules. We therefore
see no problem with the Turks receiving the KIU. Embassy
recommends that the invitation for PM Jafari be delayed until
there is certainty on who will form the next Iraqi
government. END SUMMARY.

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IBRAHIM JAFARI: Not Yet a Lock
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2. (C) As we have reported, intense discussions are
underway about the prime ministership. Since it is not clear
that the controversial Ibrahim Jafari will retain the
position, we doubt that he would leave Baghdad in the middle
of these talks. However, his departure for Turkey might help
those who are operating quietly to remove Jafari as PM and
open the way for a final deal that achieves the unity
government we seek. Furthermore, a Jafari trip to Turkey
could further strengthen the resolve of Kurdish leaders to
back another Shia Coalition figure for the premiership. It
is also possible that the Turks could use the opportunity to
convince Jafari to raise his standing with Sunni Arabs on
issues vital to Sunnis -- such as the selection of the
Interior Minister.

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MUQTADA AL-SADR: A Divisive Influence
--------------


3. (C) Muqtada al-Sadr is a divisive influence in Iraqi
politics and should not be invited by the GOT. Sadr's
militia, the Jaysh al-Mahdi (JAM),has fought MNF-I twice,
causing U.S. and Iraqi casualties. Armed groups connected to
the JAM continue to attack Coalition Force (CF) targets,
especially in southern Iraq. In addition, JAM groups have
been implicated in extra-judicial killings of Sunni Arabs and
other murders and intimidation in Baghdad and the Shia
heartland of Iraq. Sadr has never renounced what the JAM is
doing. Indeed, in his recent trips throughout the region he
has said that, if the U.S. attacks Iran or Syria, JAM would
fight U.S. forces once again to help defend these Islamic
countries.


4. (C) Sadr likes to portray himself as a defender of
Islam, and his regional travel thus far has given him a forum
to proclaim his views to the Arab street. Meanwhile, in his
stronghold of Sadr City, we have confirmed the existence of
extra-legal sharia courts, which Sadrist elements use to
harass and threaten Iraqi citizens. Sadr supported the same
kind of sharia courts in Najaf prior to being forced out of
the city by CF action in September 2004. He has never
denounced the killings committed by the Najaf sharia court
(which CF and Iraqi authorities documented). Instead,
despite fellow Sadrist claims to the contrary (reftel),he
accepts and promotes such courts and his militia as elements
of an extremist state within Iraq.


5. (C) Post therefore shares Ref E's view that receiving
Sadr sends a distorted message. Sadr keeps one foot in the
political process and one in the camp of armed resistance,
and such straddling cannot be accepted as a pass to
international legitimacy when Iraq has a democratically
elected government. The USG seeks to limit his exposure and

BAGHDAD 00000568 002 OF 002


influence and would not support providing Sadr with the
increased stature that an official visit to Ankara would
bring. Any GOT contacts with Sadr should be avoided. Any
contacts that occur should be crafted so as not to increase
his perceived legitimacy and should include a blunt message
about his destabilizing role.

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SALIH MUTLAK: Unworthy Interlocutor
--------------


6. (C) Salih Mutlak, whose coalition won eleven seats in the
December election, may retain control of a few seats as the
next parliament assembles to vote on the Presidency Council
(and the PM as part of the package). As we encourage the
formation of a unity government, Mutlak and his small group
of supporters need to be inside the Sunni Arab-Allawi-Kurdish
group negotiating with the Shia Islamist Coalition. His
defection separately to the Shia Islamists would make
achieving a balanced unity government more difficult. If the
Turks can convince him to avoid cutting a separate deal, then
his visit to Ankara might be useful.


7. (C) However, Mutlak repeatedly has made statements that
encourage Sunni Arab hard-liners and foster sentiment against
the presence of Coalition Forces in Iraq. Last month he told
a major Arabic daily that he supports the Iraqi resistance --
a remark that immediately drew the ire of the Shia. Most
recently, on February 17, Mutlaq publicly stated, "It is time
for the occupier to leave our land immediately." He said
this even while privately telling us that he supports a
continued Coalition presence in Iraq -- a two-faced approach
that exceeds the boundaries of even Iraqi political behavior.
At his worst, Mutlak is a potentially dangerous demagogue
who is only interested in securing a government position for
himself. At his more benign, he is increasingly discounted
even by his own supporters. If the Turks receive Mutlak,
they must deliver a stern message about his public remarks
and the importance of fostering reconciliation, not
extremism.

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KIU: Now Part of the Kurdish Alliance
--------------


8. (C) Post has no objection to the GOT inviting KIU leaders
to visit Ankara. The KIU, which recently agreed to join the
Kurdistan Alliance, has a record of being the third-party
choice for many disaffected Kurds in the North. Its
relations with the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in
particular are strained, and the GOT can expect that an
invitation to the KIU will raise more than passing interest
among KDP leadership. Although an Islamic party, the KIU
repeatedly has stressed to U.S. interlocutors its commitment
to separating religion from politics and its adherence to the
principles of the constitution. Moreover, the KIU appears to
be a peaceful party, without a quasi-militia force such as
the peshmerga. The KIU, however, is seeking significant
political spoils in return for merging with the Kurdistan
Alliance (reftels C and D).
KHALILZAD