PM JAFARI AND DEPUTY PRESIDENT ABD AL-MAHDI WARN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000566 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2026 TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL IZ SUBJECT: PM JAFARI AND DEPUTY PRESIDENT ABD AL-MAHDI WARN OF INFLAMED SECTARIAN TENSIONS AFTER SAMARRA BOMBING Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (U) This is an action message. Please see paragraph ¶12. ¶2. (S) Summary: Prime Minister Jafari and Deputy President Abd al-Mahdi emphasized to the Ambassador and General Casey midday on February 22 that the bombing of the Askeri mosque in Samarra had inflamed sectarian tensions and raised the risk of major civil strife. Jafari recalled the planning behind the successful security operations before the Shia Ashura celebrations earlier this month and said it would be useful to plan quickly for the "worst-case scenario." He thought the statement issued by Ayatollah Sistani would help reduce the likelihood of Shia street action against Sunni Arabs. Jafari asked that the U.S. urge Arab and Islamic states to send messages condemning the attack against the Samarra mosque; messages from Saudi Arabia and al-Azhar in Egypt would be especially useful in reassuring the angry Iraqi Shia about Sunnis. The Ambassador and General Casey promised to provide whatever support possible. Jafari welcomed Casey's offer of help with the forensic investigation in Samarra. He said he would highlight that help, and the arrest of a group of Iraqi workers at the Samarra mosque believed possibly connected to the bombing, to minimize criticism of the Coalition. Deputy President Abd al-Mahdi called sectarian tensions "critical." He urged that new security measures be taken to reassure a skeptical Shia public "fed up" with terror attacks. The Ambassador and General Casey urged the Prime Minister and the Deputy President to use the bombing as a rallying point to bring all Iraqis together to condemn terrorism. Embassy Baghdad requests assistance from Department and regional posts in eliciting strong statements condemning the Samarra attack from Arab capitals. End Summary. -------------- Jafari Ponders the Worst Case Scenario -------------- ¶3. (S) A somber Prime Minister Jafari told the Ambassador and General Casey on the afternoon of February 22 that he is worried about the reaction among the Shia public in the wake of the bombing of the al-Askeri (Golden Dome) mosque in Samarra early in the day. Those who attacked the mosque clearly aim to incite sectarian strife ("fitna") and civil war. Jafari had dispatched Interior Minister Bayan Jabr Solagh and Sunni Endowment leader Shaykh Ahmed Abd al-Ghafur Samarrai'e to Samarra to see events on the ground first-hand. He said the Iraqi cabinet would meet later on February 22 and he asked that the Coalition representatives to the Iraqi National Security Council also attend a meeting at 17:00 local. Jafari said it would be prudent to plan for the "worst case." He recalled the planning that went into the successful security for the Ashura celebrations earlier this month and said the same level of planning is necessary now. ¶4. (S) Jafari said further terror attacks to cause even greater agitation were possible. He said that ISF should be deployed to protect sensitive religious sites to prevent further acts of violence. The ISF would need Coalition Forces' assistance. If there were clashes between Sunni and Shia groups on the street, the ISF would need to intervene with help from the Coalition. Jafari mused that a curfew may well be required beginning the evening of February 22. -------------- PM Welcomes Sistani Statement -------------- ¶5. (C) Jafari said the role of the Shia religious establishment in Najaf was vital to contain Shia retaliation. Jafari noted that the four top clerics in Najaf were meeting urgently to discuss the situation. During the meeting, an aide informed Jafari that television reports stated that Ayatollah Sistani had just issued a statement calling for only peaceful demonstrations and forbidding attacks against Sunni "mosques and symbols." Jafari said it was a good statement that would help. (TV reports also say that Sistani called for seven days of mourning; Jafari said he had already ordered a three-day mourning period.) -------------- BAGHDAD 00000566 002 OF 003 Getting Support from the Arab States -------------- ¶6. (C) Jafari asked that the United States use its good offices to encourage Arab and Islamic states to send condolence messages to the Iraqi government and to the Shia religious establishment in Najaf for the loss of the Golden Dome mosque - an important religious and cultural site. Jafari highlighted the importance of such a message from Saudi Arabia, given Shia public suspicions of Wahhabis. He also underlined the utility of a message from Egypt and from al-Azhar as a symbol of the Sunni religious establishment. Expressions of willingness from Arab states to help rebuild the Golden Dome would absorb some of the anger on the Shia street, he said. It would also demonstrate to Iraq's Shia, who feel they are under constant attack from Sunni Arabs, that there is real Shia-Sunni solidarity. -------------- Limiting Damage to Coalition's Credibility -------------- ¶7. (S) Jafari added that those who responsible for the attack also hope to spur increased Iraqi antipathy towards the Coalition Forces. He predicted Arab satellite stations would air interviews blaming the Coalition Forces for the attack to further stir up trouble. He welcomed General Casey's offer of assistance with a forensic investigation as something that could be publicly highlighted to show the positive role of the Coalition Forces. Casey informed the PM that Iraqi police that morning had arrested ten Golden Dome mosque security guards who had tested positive for traces of explosives. Jafari told an aide to immediately publicize that Iraqis who had possibly been involved in the attack had been detained. The PM stressed that it was important to calm public anxiety by showing that those responsible had been apprehended and punished. -------------- Promoting Unity out of the Tragedy -------------- ¶8. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad promised the PM that the U.S. would respond positively to every request that it could, including seeking condolence messages from Arab and Islamic states and issuing strong American denunciations. He also agreed to the PM's request that he meet with Iraqi Sunni Arab leaders to get them to respond positively to the Iraqi government's relative restraint and to convince them to work to calm their own community. The Ambassador noted this was a shocking attack that could be turned to bring all Iraqis together to condemn terrorism as one unified nation. Jafari agreed, and said he would try to stake a position like he did during the September 2005 bridge disaster when he highlighted a Sunni boy's efforts to save drowning Shia pilgrims. -------------- Abd al-Mahdi: "A Critical Situation" -------------- ¶9. (S) In a subsequent meeting, Deputy President Abd al-Mahdi told the Ambassador and General Casey that that with this attack Iraq had entered "a very critical situation." Abd al-Mahdi underlined the religious significance to the Shia of the al-Askeri mosque. He predicted that "some" Sunni mosques would be attacked in retaliation. Abd al-Mahdi pointed to the Sistani statement on TV and said it could help. Abd al-Mahdi also stressed, however, that the Shia public feels enormous frustration that terror attacks continue. He stated that Ayatollah Mohammed Said al-Hakim, the second- most important cleric in Najaf, had told his aides after the meeting of the four top clerics in Najaf that if the Iraqi government could not maintain security, then the Shia public should be allowed to protect itself with its own means. -------------- Urges New Security Measures -------------- ¶10. (C) Abd al-Mahdi also stressed that new, concrete measures on security are essential to reassuring the Shia public. He lightly but directly castigated the Coalition Forces for not allowing SCIRI to help fix security problems with its own resources. He claimed that SCIRI BAGHDAD 00000566 003 OF 003 could have deployed its "forces" (i.e. the Badr Corps) to maintain security starting in 2003 but had not done so at Coalition request. Instead, the Shia had accepted the need to build new Iraqi security units whose recruitment had unfortunately only introduced new problems into the security forces. The Shia public's perception is that they had tried to work peacefully to build a new Iraq but their restraint was rewarded only with terror. Now, they are "fed up." He wondered whether it was not time to reconsider neighborhood watches and an enhanced Coalition Force presence in Samarra to protect Shia sites and visitors. ¶11. (C) The Ambassador said we deeply regretted the attack in Samarra and urged Abd al-Mahdi to think politically about how to use the attack as a rallying point to unify the Iraqi nation. He urged Abd al-Mahdi to consider the utility of immediately assembling Iraq's political leaders to issue a statement - and visible demonstration - of unity against terror. General Casey said that MNF-I would be open to considering new security measures; out of great tragedies perhaps useful new ideas can come forward, he observed. Abd al-Mahdi appreciated the remarks but doubted that a meeting of leaders would be useful now. Such meetings lead to positive verbal exchanges, but no action. He emphasized that new security measures are essential. The Shia political leadership can no longer only urge patience and hope on the Shia public. ¶12. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Assuming Department approves, Embassy would appreciate urgent assistance from posts in Arab capitols to elicit strong statements of condemnation of the attack on the Samarra mosque. We would in particular welcome Cairo's help in ensuring a strong statement from Al-Azhar and Riyadh's with condemnations from the Saudi Government and religious authorities. END ACTION REQUEST. KHALILZAD