PM JAFARI AND DEPUTY PRESIDENT ABD AL-MAHDI WARN

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 000566

SIPDIS

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/22/2026
TAGS: PINS PGOV PREL IZ
SUBJECT: PM JAFARI AND DEPUTY PRESIDENT ABD AL-MAHDI WARN
OF INFLAMED SECTARIAN TENSIONS AFTER SAMARRA BOMBING

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad. Reasons 1.4
(B) and (D)


1. (U) This is an action message. Please see paragraph

12.


2. (S) Summary: Prime Minister Jafari and Deputy
President Abd al-Mahdi emphasized to the Ambassador and
General Casey midday on February 22 that the bombing of
the Askeri mosque in Samarra had inflamed sectarian
tensions and raised the risk of major civil strife.
Jafari recalled the planning behind the successful
security operations before the Shia Ashura celebrations
earlier this month and said it would be useful to plan
quickly for the "worst-case scenario." He thought the
statement issued by Ayatollah SISTANI would help reduce
the likelihood of Shia street action against Sunni Arabs.
Jafari asked that the U.S. urge Arab and Islamic states
to send messages condemning the attack against the
Samarra mosque; messages from Saudi Arabia and al-Azhar
in Egypt would be especially useful in reassuring the
angry Iraqi Shia about Sunnis. The Ambassador and
General Casey promised to provide whatever support
possible. Jafari welcomed Casey's offer of help with the
forensic investigation in Samarra. He said he would
highlight that help, and the arrest of a group of Iraqi
workers at the Samarra mosque believed possibly connected
to the bombing, to minimize criticism of the Coalition.
Deputy President Abd al-Mahdi called sectarian tensions
"critical." He urged that new security measures be taken
to reassure a skeptical Shia public "fed up" with terror
attacks. The Ambassador and General Casey urged the
Prime Minister and the Deputy President to use the
bombing as a rallying point to bring all Iraqis together
to condemn terrorism. Embassy Baghdad requests
assistance from Department and regional posts in
eliciting strong statements condemning the Samarra attack
from Arab capitals. End Summary.

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Jafari Ponders the Worst Case Scenario
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3. (S) A somber Prime Minister Jafari told the
Ambassador and General Casey on the afternoon of February
22 that he is worried about the reaction among the Shia
public in the wake of the bombing of the al-Askeri
(Golden Dome) mosque in Samarra early in the day. Those
who attacked the mosque clearly aim to incite sectarian
strife ("fitna") and civil war. Jafari had dispatched
Interior Minister Bayan Jabr Solagh and Sunni Endowment
leader Shaykh Ahmed Abd al-Ghafur Samarrai'e to Samarra
to see events on the ground first-hand. He said the
Iraqi cabinet would meet later on February 22 and he
asked that the Coalition representatives to the Iraqi
National Security Council also attend a meeting at 17:00
local. Jafari said it would be prudent to plan for the
"worst case." He recalled the planning that went into
the successful security for the Ashura celebrations
earlier this month and said the same level of planning is
necessary now.


4. (S) Jafari said further terror attacks to cause even
greater agitation were possible. He said that ISF should
be deployed to protect sensitive religious sites to
prevent further acts of violence. The ISF would need
Coalition Forces' assistance. If there were clashes
between Sunni and Shia groups on the street, the ISF
would need to intervene with help from the Coalition.
Jafari mused that a curfew may well be required beginning
the evening of February 22.

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PM Welcomes SISTANI Statement
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5. (C) Jafari said the role of the Shia religious
establishment in Najaf was vital to contain Shia
retaliation. Jafari noted that the four top clerics in
Najaf were meeting urgently to discuss the situation.
During the meeting, an aide informed Jafari that
television reports stated that Ayatollah SISTANI had just
issued a statement calling for only peaceful
demonstrations and forbidding attacks against Sunni
"mosques and symbols." Jafari said it was a good
statement that would help. (TV reports also say that
SISTANI called for seven days of mourning; Jafari said he
had already ordered a three-day mourning period.)

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Getting Support from the Arab States
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6. (C) Jafari asked that the United States use its good
offices to encourage Arab and Islamic states to send
condolence messages to the Iraqi government and to the
Shia religious establishment in Najaf for the loss of the
Golden Dome mosque - an important religious and cultural
site. Jafari highlighted the importance of such a
message from Saudi Arabia, given Shia public suspicions
of Wahhabis. He also underlined the utility of a message
from Egypt and from al-Azhar as a symbol of the Sunni
religious establishment. Expressions of willingness from
Arab states to help rebuild the Golden Dome would absorb
some of the anger on the Shia street, he said. It would
also demonstrate to Iraq's Shia, who feel they are under
constant attack from Sunni Arabs, that there is real
Shia-Sunni solidarity.

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Limiting Damage to Coalition's Credibility
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7. (S) Jafari added that those who responsible for the
attack also hope to spur increased Iraqi antipathy
towards the Coalition Forces. He predicted Arab
satellite stations would air interviews blaming the
Coalition Forces for the attack to further stir up
trouble. He welcomed General Casey's offer of assistance
with a forensic investigation as something that could be
publicly highlighted to show the positive role of the
Coalition Forces. Casey informed the PM that Iraqi
police that morning had arrested ten Golden Dome mosque
security guards who had tested positive for traces of
explosives. Jafari told an aide to immediately
publicize that Iraqis who had possibly been involved in
the attack had been detained. The PM stressed that it
was important to calm public anxiety by showing that
those responsible had been apprehended and punished.

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Promoting Unity out of the Tragedy
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8. (C) Ambassador Khalilzad promised the PM that the
U.S. would respond positively to every request that it
could, including seeking condolence messages from Arab
and Islamic states and issuing strong American
denunciations. He also agreed to the PM's request that
he meet with Iraqi Sunni Arab leaders to get them to
respond positively to the Iraqi government's relative
restraint and to convince them to work to calm their own
community. The Ambassador noted this was a shocking
attack that could be turned to bring all Iraqis together
to condemn terrorism as one unified nation. Jafari
agreed, and said he would try to stake a position like he
did during the September 2005 bridge disaster when he
highlighted a Sunni boy's efforts to save drowning Shia
pilgrims.

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Abd al-Mahdi: "A Critical Situation"
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9. (S) In a subsequent meeting, Deputy President Abd
al-Mahdi told the Ambassador and General Casey that that
with this attack Iraq had entered "a very critical
situation." Abd al-Mahdi underlined the religious
significance to the Shia of the al-Askeri mosque. He
predicted that "some" Sunni mosques would be attacked in
retaliation. Abd al-Mahdi pointed to the SISTANI
statement on TV and said it could help. Abd al-Mahdi
also stressed, however, that the Shia public feels
enormous frustration that terror attacks continue. He
stated that Ayatollah Mohammed Said al-Hakim, the second-
most important cleric in Najaf, had told his aides after
the meeting of the four top clerics in Najaf that if the
Iraqi government could not maintain security, then the
Shia public should be allowed to protect itself with its
own means.

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Urges New Security Measures
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10. (C) Abd al-Mahdi also stressed that new, concrete
measures on security are essential to reassuring the Shia
public. He lightly but directly castigated the Coalition
Forces for not allowing SCIRI to help fix security
problems with its own resources. He claimed that SCIRI

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could have deployed its "forces" (i.e. the Badr Corps) to
maintain security starting in 2003 but had not done so at
Coalition request. Instead, the Shia had accepted the
need to build new Iraqi security units whose recruitment
had unfortunately only introduced new problems into the
security forces. The Shia public's perception is that
they had tried to work peacefully to build a new Iraq but
their restraint was rewarded only with terror. Now, they
are "fed up." He wondered whether it was not time to
reconsider neighborhood watches and an enhanced Coalition
Force presence in Samarra to protect Shia sites and
visitors.


11. (C) The Ambassador said we deeply regretted the
attack in Samarra and urged Abd al-Mahdi to think
politically about how to use the attack as a rallying
point to unify the Iraqi nation. He urged Abd al-Mahdi
to consider the utility of immediately assembling Iraq's
political leaders to issue a statement - and visible
demonstration - of unity against terror. General Casey
said that MNF-I would be open to considering new security
measures; out of great tragedies perhaps useful new ideas
can come forward, he observed. Abd al-Mahdi appreciated
the remarks but doubted that a meeting of leaders would
be useful now. Such meetings lead to positive verbal
exchanges, but no action. He emphasized that new
security measures are essential. The Shia political
leadership can no longer only urge patience and hope on
the Shia public.


12. (C) ACTION REQUEST: Assuming Department approves, Embassy
would appreciate urgent assistance from posts in Arab
capitols to elicit strong statements of condemnation of
the attack on the Samarra mosque. We would in particular
welcome Cairo's help in ensuring a strong statement from
Al-Azhar and Riyadh's with condemnations from the Saudi
Government and religious authorities. END ACTION
REQUEST.

KHALILZAD